Flying Under the Radar: How Improving Drone Security in Stadiums with the DEFENSE Act May Endanger Sports Fans’ Privacy Rights

By: Ruslan Aminov*                                                                            Posted: 5/2/2025

As drones become increasingly available in public and commercial markets, their presence over sports venues has prompted an important debate about the balance between public security and privacy concerns.[1]  Recently, major sports leagues, including the National Football League (“NFL”), the Major League Baseball (“MLB”), the National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”), and the National Association for Stock Car Auto Racing (“NASCAR”), publicized their support for Senate Bill 663, entitled the Disabling Enemy Flight Entry and Neutralizing Suspect Equipment Act (“DEFENSE Act”).[2]  The DEFENSE Act would permit state and local authorities to detect, monitor, track, control, seize, or destroy unmanned aircraft systems—commonly referred to as drones—operating over temporary flight restrictions (“TFRs”).[3]  However, the proposed bill is likely to face strong resistance in the Senate over concerns of encroaching on privacy rights and the potential for government overreach.[4]

The State of Drone Security in Sports Stadiums

At every NFL, MLB, NCAA Division One Football, and NASCAR event, the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) announces a TFR within a three-mile radius of the venue.[5]  TFRs prohibit the operation of drones without permission and subject violating pilots to civil and criminal penalties.[6]  Yet, unauthorized drone incidents continue to occur in sizable numbers.[7]

For example, on January 11, 2025, NFL referees were forced to call for an administrative time-out during the Ravens-Steelers wildcard playoff game when a drone flew over the M&T Bank Stadium in Baltimore.[8]  One year prior, on January 28, 2024, the Ravens-Chiefs conference championship game was similarly delayed because of an unregistered drone in the M&T Bank Stadium airspace.[9]  In fact, the NFL claimed that it experienced 2,845 unlawful drone flights over football games in 2023—a 20,000% increase in incidents since 2017.[10]

Despite the increasing frequency of unauthorized drone flights, most NFL, MLB, and NCAA games, as well as NASCAR races, do not have officials on-site with legal authorization to remove an unauthorized drone from the stadium.[11]  That is because the United States Government has exclusive sovereignty over the airspace of the United States.[12]  Consequently, only federal law enforcement agents, under the Homeland Security Act of 2002, are authorized to mitigate credible threats to the safety or security of sports venues posed by drones.[13]  Federal agents, however, only account for a small fraction of law enforcement.[14]  Rather, sports venues must rely on state and local authorities to protect the restricted airspace with passive drone detection technology because the federal agencies lack the personnel necessary to cover every large sporting event.[15] 

According to NFL’s Chief of Security, Cathy Lanier, the disparity between federal authority and state and local authorities is problematic for sports leagues because drone detection is not the same as drone mitigation.[16]  In a letter to the United States Senate, Lanier warned that terrorist groups and other like actors consider stadiums attractive targets for drone attacks.[17]  But, even at a basic level, improperly-piloted drones create a risk of crashing into another object, or worse, an unsuspecting person.[18]  State and local law enforcement agents may be able to spot an unauthorized drone in the stadium airspace, but they lack the legal authority, training, and equipment to disable it.[19]

The DEFENSE Act

Senators Tom Cotton (R-AR) and Jacky Rosen (D-NV) introduced the DEFENSE Act to the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs precisely to address the gap in law enforcement powers.[20]  Under the DEFENSE Act, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security and the Attorney General of the Department of Justice may deputize a state or local law enforcement officer to act with federal authority under the Homeland Security Act of 2002.[21]  Additionally, state and local law enforcement officers would have access to federal training programs, and once deputized may operate authorized federal counterdrone equipment.[22]

A deputized state or local law enforcement officer would be able to: (1) monitor or track an unauthorized drone by intercepting oral, wire, or electrical communications with the drone, (2) disrupt the control of an unauthorized drone, (3) seize or control an unauthorized drone, or (4) use reasonable force necessary to disable, damage, or destroy an unauthorized drone.[23]  Moreover, state and local governments would be permitted to retain any data or communications obtained in the process of capturing an unauthorized drone for up to 180 days.[24]  The 180-day limit may be extended if the Department of Homeland Security or Department of Justice determines that such records would be necessary to investigate or prosecute a violation of law, or support any pending litigation.[25]

The Privacy Trade-Off with Expanding State and Local Powers

This is not the first time that federal legislators have proposed extending federal counterdrone authority to state and local governments.[26]  The Safeguarding the Homeland from the Threats Posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems Act of 2023, co-sponsored by Senators Chuck Schumer (D-NY) and Gary Peters (D-MI), set forth a statutory scheme to designate a limited number of state and local law enforcement agencies to engage in counterdrone actions under the direct supervision of  pilot programs.[27]  In December 2024, Senator Rand Paul (R-KY) prevented a unanimous consent request to discharge the proposed bill from the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs, where he now serves as Majority Chairman.[28]  The unanimous consent request would have bypassed the committee review process and allowed senators to immediately vote on the proposed bill.[29]  By objecting, Senator Paul effectively kept the counterdrone bill from ever reaching the Senate floor.[30]

In his objections, Senator Paul warned that “[h]istory has shown us time and again how fear and manufactured urgency are used as pretexts to expand government power at the expense of freedom.”[31]  Specifically, he explained that the expansion of government authority would allow a broad surveillance of “the phones of innocent Americans traveling through U.S. airports” as long as law enforcement agencies claim that the surveillance effectuates the neutralization of a drone.[32]  Likely, the Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs would find no meaningful difference between surveillance at an airport and surveillance at a stadium.[33]

Unlike the Safeguarding the Homeland from the Threats Posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems Act of 2023, the DEFENSE Act also encourages a policy of surveillance without inherent restraint.[34]  Nothing in the text of the DEFENSE Act, as it is currently written, limits the number of state or local law enforcement officers that the federal government may deputize.[35]  Conversely, if the federal government sought to deploy its own agents to an NFL, MLB, NCAA, or NASCAR event, it would require equipment, transportation, and manpower.[36]  Likewise, expanding federal coverage over sports venues would necessitate purchasing additional equipment and training additional federal officers.[37]  The significantly cheaper alternative, afforded by the DEFENSE Act, allows the federal government to outsource its expenses to state and local governments.[38]  Without the burden of labor and economic costs, the federal government may be enticed to rubber-stamp counterdrone surveillance over public gatherings even when doing so would be unnecessary.[39]

* Staff Writer, Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, J.D. Candidate, May 2026, Villanova Charles Widger School of Law.

[1] See Drones: Actions Needed to Better Support Remote Identification in the National Airspace, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off. 1–4 (June 6, 2024), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-24-106158.pdf (reporting progress on remote identification technologies for drone registration and operation to address law enforcement uses considering growing commercial and recreational use).  By 2027, the Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”) forecasts that there will be approximately 955,000 commercial drones and 1.82 million recreational drones registered in the United States.  See id. at 1 (describing drone market as fastest growing segment of U.S. aviation industry).

[2] See Tisha Thompson, NFL, MLB, NCAA, NASCAR Back Bill to Disable Drones at Stadiums, ESPN (Feb. 20, 2025, 5:35 PM), https://www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/43937074/nfl-mlb-ncaa-nascar-back-bill-disable-drones-stadiums (explaining sports leagues’ support and lobbying efforts to expand law enforcement’s ability to intercept or seize unauthorized drones flying over stadiums).

[3] See generally Disabling Enemy Flight Entry and Neutralizing Suspect Equipment Act, S. 633, 119th Cong. (2025) (permitting Department of Homeland Security and Department of Justice to deputize state or local law enforcement officers with limited federal authority).  For further discussion of TFRs and their scope, see infra notes 5–6 and accompanying text.

[4] See Forbes Breaking News, Breaking: Rand Paul Blocks Drone Security Bill Due to Concerns Over Privacy Violations and Overreach, YouTube (Dec. 18, 2024), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ApiXNv9eiXA (declaring similar bill expanding authority over counterdrone surveillance as “unchecked government overreach . . . capitalizing on fear and media-driven hysteria to jam through sweeping legislation that violates the civil liberties of the American people”).  Senator Rand Paul’s (R-KY) objections were made in the context of numerous reports of drones flying across the eastern United States after federal officials confirmed that the drones did not pose any threat to national security or public safety.  See Dave Collins, Mystery Drone Sightings Continue in New Jersey and Across the U.S. Here’s What We Know, AP News,  https://apnews.com/article/drones-new-jersey-what-to-know-e6f565f5d51d9d47ad140e7e7d131842 (last visited Mar. 23, 2025) (reporting that many drone sightings were confirmed to be legal drones, manned aircraft, and even stars).

[5] See Stadiums and Sporting Events, Fed. Aviation Admin., https://www.faa.gov/uas/getting_started/where_can_i_fly/airspace_restrictions/sports_stadiums (last visited Mar. 23, 2025) (listing major sporting events subject to automatic prohibition of unmanned aircraft systems).

[6] See Temporary Flight Restrictions (TFRs), Fed. Aviation Admin., https://www.faa.gov/uas/getting_started/temporary_flight_restrictions (last visited Mar. 23, 2025) (explaining that FAA maintains airspace safety and efficiency through flying restrictions over designated areas).

[7] See, e.g., Safeguarding the Homeland from Unmanned Aerial Systems: Hearing Before the H. Homeland Sec. Subcomm. on Counterterrorism, L. Enf’t, and Intel., 118th Cong. 2–3 (2024) (statement of Cathy L. Lanier, Chief Security Officer, National Football League) [hereinafter Drone Hearing] (documenting increasing statistics in drone incursions between 2017 and 2023).

[8] See John Breech, Steelers vs. Ravens: NFL Forced to Briefly Pause Wild-Card Playoff Game in Baltimore for Peculiar Reason, CBS Sports (Jan. 11, 2025, 10:28 PM), https://www.cbssports.com/nfl/news/steelers-vs-ravens-nfl-forced-to-briefly-pause-wild-card-playoff-game-in-baltimore-for-peculiar-reason/ (explaining NFL policy to automatically pause game until drone situation is resolved).

[9] See Edward Sutelan, Why Was Chiefs vs. Ravens Delayed? Drone Hovering Over M&T Bank Stadium Pauses AFC Championship Game, Sporting News (Jan. 28, 2024, 3:58 PM), https://www.sportingnews.com/us/nfl/news/chiefs-ravens-delay-drone-stadium-afc-championship/a7638fa6e1985c6d8eb5b869 (commenting on Baltimore Ravens’ unlucky streak with delays during playoff games).  A Pennsylvania resident pled guilty to a misdemeanor for violating national defense airspace and was sentenced to a one-year probation and $500 fine.  See Geoff Maggliocchetti, Ravens’ AFC Title Game Drone Pilot Pleads Guilty, Sentenced Probation, Sports Illustrated (Mar. 15, 2024), https://www.si.com/nfl/ravens/news/baltimore-ravens-afc-championship-game-drone-pilot-pleads-guilty-probation-sentence (reporting that pilot was unaware of airspace restrictions because drone control app did not advise him of TFR).

[10] See Drone Hearing, supra note 7, at 2 (underscoring that drone tracking software likely understates total number of TFR violations).

[11] See Thompson, supra note 2 (noting disconnect in state and local law enforcement ability to protect road-side threats but not airspace threats).

[12] See 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1) (2024) (codifying FAA’s authority to regulate United States airspace).

[13] See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 124n (permitting authorized personnel from Department of Homeland Security or Department of Justice to detect, identify, monitor and track, disrupt control, seize control, or destroy unmanned aircraft system).

[14] See Thompson, supra note 2 (interviewing Senator Cotton about purpose of DEFENSE Act).

[15] See id. (explaining need for state and local authorities on-site to substitute federal authority at large-scale sporting events).

[16] See Drone Hearing, supra note 7, at 4 (distinguishing drone mitigation, namely disabling and destroying, as law enforcement function).

[17] See id. at 3 (referring to Islamic State propaganda encouraging attacks on stadiums related to Paris Summer Olympic games and Cricket World Cup).

[18] See Lisa Robinson, Leave the Drones at Home: FBI Warns of Stiff Penalties for Flying Drones Near Ravens-Steelers Playoff Game, WBAL-TV, https://www.wbaltv.com/article/fbi-warns-stiff-penalties-drones-ravens-steelers-playoff/63396213 (last visited Mar. 23, 2025) (cautioning against flying drones over stadium because of risk to injure somebody, kill somebody, or interrupt air operations).  In 2017, the MLB had a close call with an out-of-control unauthorized drone which struck an empty seat near fans in the stadium stands during a Padres-Diamondbacks regular season game.  See Marissa Payne, MLB Will ‘Monitor the Situation’ After Drone Nearly Takes Out Fans at Padres Game, Fla. Times-Union (May 24, 2017, 6:56 PM), https://www.jacksonville.com/story/news/nation-world/2017/05/24/mlb-will-monitor-situation-after-drone-nearly-takes-out-fans-padres-game/15756400007/ (reporting that crashed drone was earlier recalled because of battery design issue).

[19] See Austin Green, NFL, MBL, NCAA, NASCAR Back Drone Crackdown Bill, Front Off. Sports (Feb. 21, 2025, 9:54 PM), https://frontofficesports.com/nfl-mlb-ncaa-nascar-back-drone-crackdown-bill/ (contrasting federal law enforcement to state and local law enforcement capabilities).  Counter-drone technologies generally include machinery that enables law enforcement to: (1) track heat signatures, signals, and unique radio frequency system sounds, (2) jam drone communications, or (3) use lasers, projectiles, or nets to damage or destroy drones mid-flight.  See Science & Tech Spotlight: Counter-Drone Technologies, U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off. 1 (Mar. 2022), https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-22-105705.pdf (summarizing state of drone security).

[20] See Thompson, supra note 2 (reporting Senator Cotton’s comment that scope of local law enforcement’s power should mirror on-ground protection efforts).

[21] See Disabling Enemy Flight Entry and Neutralizing Suspect Equipment Act, S. 633, 119th Cong. § 2(m) (2025) (expanding state and local government powers under federal oversight).

[22] See Disabling Enemy Flight Entry and Neutralizing Suspect Equipment Act, S. 633, 119th Cong. § 2(m)(2)–(4) (2025) (requiring state or local law enforcement officer to complete sufficient training program under federal guidelines and restricting counterdrone equipment to federally authorized systems and technologies).

[23] See generally Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 124n(b)(1) (enabling federal agents to take necessary actions to mitigate credible threats to covered facilities or assets by unmanned aircraft systems).

[24] See id. § 124(n)(e)(3) (providing for maintenance of records).

[25] See id. (extending collection timeline to account for any future litigation or prosecution).

[26] See, e.g., Safeguarding the Homeland from the Threats Posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems Act of 2023, S. 1631, 118th Cong. § 210G(d)(1) (2024) (establishing pilot program for state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement agencies to practice limited federal authority).

[27] See id. § 210G(d)(2)–(3) (prescribing five-year durational limit for pilot program and capping number of state and local agency designations to twelve per year).

[28] See Forbes Breaking News, supra note 4 (reporting Senator Paul’s remarks challenging necessity of security measures in proposed counterdrone bill); see also About Committee Membership, Homeland Sec. & Governmental Affs., https://www.hsgac.senate.gov/about/committee-members/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2025) (showing Senator Rand Paul as majority leader of Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs).

[29] See Carle Hulse, It’s Unanimous: In the Senate, Neither Party Consents to the Other’s Ideas, N.Y. Times (June 19, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/2024/06/19/us/politics/senate-democrats-republicans-guns-ivf.html (describing unanimous consent request as rhetorical tool to criticize opposing political party in predictable stalemates for refusing to agree to policy proposals).

[30] See id. (characterizing unanimous consent as procedural shortcut); see also John V. Sullivan, How Our Laws Are Made, U.S. Gov’t Publ’g Off. 15 (July 24, 2007), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CDOC-110hdoc49/pdf/CDOC-110hdoc49.pdf (“A committee may table a bill or fail to take action on it, thereby preventing its report to the House.”).

[31] See Forbes Breaking News, supra note 4 (referring to prior abuse, misuse, and weaponization of Patriot Act by U.S. government).

[32] See id. (criticizing grant of significant authority to intercept private electronic communications without consent).

[33] See id. (emphasizing that purpose of counterdrone powers is not about security, but rather unchecked government overreach).

[34] Compare Safeguarding the Homeland from the Threats Posed by Unmanned Aircraft Systems Act of 2023, S. 1631, 118th Cong. § 210G(d)(2)–(3) (2024) (limiting number of designated state or local law enforcement agencies to sixty total) with Disabling Enemy Flight Entry and Neutralizing Suspect Equipment Act, S. 633, 119th Cong. § 210G(m) (2025) (failing to prescribe such limits).

[35] See Disabling Enemy Flight Entry and Neutralizing Suspect Equipment Act, S. 633, 119th Cong. § 210G(m)(2) (restricting Secretary of Department of Homeland Security and Attorney General to deputize only those law enforcement officials who have completed sufficient training, but otherwise no restriction on number of deputies permitted).

[36] See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. §§ 124n(b)(3), 124n(d) (requiring all federal agents charged with mitigatory duties to be trained in accordance with internal regulations, and all equipment to be researched, tested, and evaluated).

[37] See id. § 12n(b)(3) (mandating electronic equipment be researched, tested, and evaluated before integration into federal counter-drone measures).

[38] See generally Disabling Enemy Flight Entry and Neutralizing Suspect Equipment Act, S. 633, 119th Cong. § 210G(m)(2)–(m)(4) (2025) (requiring state and local law enforcement officers to abide by federal training and purchase approved counterdrone equipment); see also Drone Hearing, supra note 7, at 4 (requesting Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Government Affairs to approve direct access to advanced drone detection technology without need to engage with federal government as intermediary).

[39] See Forbes Breaking News, supra note 4 (reminding Congress of its “constitutional responsibility to serve as a check on executive power—not as a rubber stamp for it”).  Notably, the most effective counterdrone strategy does not require anything more than passive detection technologies already available to sports leagues.  See Thompson, supra note 2 (explaining that most cases of unauthorized drone flights may be resolved by finding who is operating and asking them to land); see also Pennsylvania Man Charged with Flying Drone Over Baltimore Stadium During AFC Championship Game, AP News (Feb. 6, 2024, 4:11 PM), https://apnews.com/article/afc-championship-drone-c5b93485de6e3abcc0d8c17b2b4ca076 (reporting that state troopers, without federal aid, followed unauthorized drone flight over NFL game to nearby neighborhood and apprehended pilot).