Watching Game Film: Privacy Law Concerns and the Potential Use of Algorithmic Video Surveillance Programs at the 2028 Olympic Games in Los Angeles

By: Grace McCrone*                                                                      Posted: 10/24/2024                               

AI Surveillance in Paris

In connection with the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games, new algorithmic video surveillance software was implemented in and around the city of Paris.[1]  This technology was implemented, as a part of the security and safety protocols for the Games, to address the safety and security concerns that accompany a large, crowded, and complex event like the Olympics.[2]  Prior to the Paris Olympics, no country in the European Union had approved, through statute, the use of algorithmic video surveillance.[3]

In March 2023, the French National Assembly passed the Olympic Games Law, which, in Article 10, allowed for certain algorithmic video surveillance to be carried out for a set period of time surrounding the 2024 Olympics.[4]  The Olympic Games Law allowed for CCTV footage to be collected and then screened by software programs that detect and flag certain "predefined events.”[5]  These events are determined ahead of time by human users, but the algorithmic system may only legally be instructed to monitor for eight specific types of events.[6]  Under Article 10, enforcement personnel with access to the system may choose whether to respond to events that the software flags.[7]

The Olympic Games Law, and the algorithmic surveillance system that it sanctioned, is still subject to its own limitation regarding the kind of information analysis that may be conducted by software programs; despite the fact that the Olympic Games Law allows certain algorithmic surveillance, within specific parameters, it does not allow facial recognition analysis or the analysis of biometric identification data.[8]  The Olympic Games Law’s surveillance program is also subject to limitation imposed by both French and EU law.[9]  However, privacy questions that might have first been raised by algorithmic surveillance at the Paris Olympics will, to some extent, follow the Olympics and their AI surveillance systems around the world as Olympic host-cities change and AI surveillance technology develops.[10]

The 2028 Olympics and Paralympics in Los Angeles: Security Planning, the Implementation of AI Surveillance Tools, and Major Privacy Laws

Planning for the 2028 Los Angeles Olympic and Paralympic Games is underway, and organizers of the event are paying consideration to the successful and unsuccessful aspects of the Paris 2024 Games.[11]  In the context of event security, organizers of the 2028 Olympics are working with organizers of the Paris Olympics to develop a safety plan for the Los Angeles Games that includes addressing AI-related security topics.[12]  However, if algorithmic or AI surveillance mechanisms are going to be incorporated into the security system for the Los Angeles Olympics, their implementation will need to comport with applicable federal and state laws.[13]

Under United States federal law, there is no statute or regulation that is analogous to the EU’s broad data and personal privacy protections.[14]  In the absence of such a federal protection, the default rule regarding the use of AI technology, including AI used for video analysis, is that data collection and analysis is permitted under federal law unless otherwise specifically prohibited.[15]  However, California has consumer privacy laws, like the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), that trigger privacy considerations and legal protections when nonconsensual collection of biometric information and other types of personal information is at issue.[16]  Although systems, like the one used in Paris, purport to stop short of collecting biometric data and of performing active facial recognition analysis, it has been argued that, in reality, such systems ultimately do collect information that falls into protected categories.[17]  It is thus possible that, depending on how surveillance technology implemented at the 2028 Olympics actually functions, California’s consumer privacy laws might apply to use of such technology at the Los Angeles Olympics.[18]  There are, however, also exceptions to the CCPA that allow personal information to be retained, disclosed, or used when that information is obtained while combatting fraudulent and illegal activity; it could be argued that security operations at the Olympic Games might fall under such an exception.[19]

Furthermore, while the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution might provide some limits on the use of surveillance technology created and implemented by the government, the Fourth Amendment’s protection from unreasonable searches and seizures only applies to actors in the public sector.[20]  However, California’s state constitution does enumerate a right to privacy that applies to private actors.[21]  Thus, if the Los Angeles Olympics utilizes an algorithmic video surveillance security system created and maintained by a private company, like the one implemented in France, federal constitutional considerations may not apply.[22]  But, legal consideration will likely still need to be paid to the constitutional privacy requirements created by the California state constitution.[23]

The 2028 Olympic Games Have Been Designated as a National Special Security Event: Special Considerations

The United States’ Secretary of Homeland Security has designated the 2028 Olympic and Paralympic Games as a National Security Event (NSSE).[24]  When an event is classified as an NSSE, the U.S. Secret Service becomes the lead agency responsible for designing and implementing security plans for that event and event organizers gain access to resources from the federal government, state and local public safety and law enforcement organizations, and private organizations.[25]  The 2028 Olympic Games’ status as an NSSE may have implications on privacy protections as they apply to any algorithmic video surveillance systems that the event organizers and members of the security team might choose to implement; there is a potentiality that such protections could be overridden, subverted, or ignored because of the event‘s designation as an NSSE.[26]

Ultimately, “[t]he extent to which privacy laws are implicated will depend on how the AI-powered system functions, its purpose and the type of information it collects.”[27]  It seems that no organizer of the Los Angeles Olympics has yet announced whether algorithmic, AI analysis technology will be implemented as a part of the security protocols for the 2028 Olympics.[28]  However, if such security systems are used in the US, particularly in California, it is clear that there are immediate and apparent privacy law concerns to contend with during the implementation and execution of any security plan that pairs video surveillance with AI analysis technology.

*Staff Writer, Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, J.D. Candidate, May 2025,

Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law

[1] See Florian Reynaud & Martin Untersinger, Paris 2024: Controversial AI-Led Video Surveillance Put to the Test During Olympics, Le Monde (July 24, 2024), https://www.lemonde.fr/en/pixels/article/2024/07/24/paris-2024-controversial-ai-led-video-surveillance-put-to-the-test-during-olympics_6697267_13.html (detailing implementation and use of algorithmic surveillance at Paris Olympics).

[2] See Ben Church, The Olympic Games Face a Unique Set of Potential Security Threats in Paris. Organizers Say Everyone Will Be Safe, CNN (July 27, 2024) https://www.cnn.com/2024/07/23/sport/paris-olympics-security-threats-spt-intl/index.html (asserting need to prevent terrorist and cyber-attacks at Olympic Games); see also Ryan Gauthier, Olympic Game Host Selection and the Law: A Qualitative Analysis, 23 Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports L.J., 1, 42 (2016) (explaining Olympic host cities are expected to be able to address many types of criminality that might occur at Olympic events); Keith Kobland, What Does it Take to Keep the Olympic Games Safe?: Q&A with Emergency Management Instructor Tony Callisto, Syracuse Univ. News (July 30, 2024), https://news.syr.edu/blog/2024/07/30/what-does-it-take-to-keep-the-olympic-games-safe-qa-with-emergency-management-instructor-tony-callisto/ (noting importance of planning for general spectator safety, crowd control, and unincumbered movement of people and commerce at large events like Olympics); Lydia Smears, The Route to Olympic Gold: Logistics Lessons for Crowd Control During Citywide Events, IESE Insight (Apr. 1, 2012), https://www.iese.edu/insight/articles/olympics-logistics-lessons-crowd-control-london/ (explaining how officials in London prepared for city’s streets and transit system to handle crowds during 2012 Olympics).

[3] See Jorja Siemons, Olympics' AI Security Stokes Backlash Over Mass Surveillance, Bloomberg L. (July 26, 2024), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/olympics-ai-security-stokes-backlash-over-mass-surveillance (explaining rollout of algorithmic video surveillance system in Paris); see also Jules Boykoff & Dave Zirin, The Olympics Have Turned Paris into a Panopticon, The Nation (July 31, 2024), https://www.thenation.com/article/society/olympics-paris-surveillance-police/ (explaining that Olympic Games Law, passed by French National Assembly in 2023, marked France's first time approving use of AI surveillance technology); id. (explaining France is first EU country to explicitly legalize use of such surveillance technology).

[4] See Kelly Buchanan, France: New Law Establishes Legal Framework for 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games, L. Libr. of Cong. (Nov. 16, 2023), https://www.loc.gov/item/global-legal-monitor/2023-11-15/france-new-law-establishes-legal-framework-for-2024-olympic-and-paralympic-games/#:~:text=On%20May%2019%2C%202023%2C%20France,24%20to%20September%208%2C%202024 (detailing provisions of Olympic Games Law related to algorithmic surveillance and Article 10’s context in Olympic Games Law); Amarins Laanstra-Corn & Tia Sewell, Algorithmic Surveillance Takes The Stage At The Paris Olympics, Lawfare Inst. (Aug. 9. 2024), https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/algorithmic-surveillance-takes-the-stage-at-the-paris-olympics#:~:text=The%202023%20Olympic%20and%20Paralympic,experimental%20basis”%20to%20support%20law (noting Olympic Games Law permits use of algorithmic surveillance to secure “large-scale sporting, recreational, and cultural events that are particularly vulnerable to terrorism or serious safety threats”).  The Olympic Games Law currently only allows use of algorithmic camera surveillance until March 2025.  See Peter Caddle, Paris Olympics’ AI Mass-surveillance System ‘to Be Made Permanent’, Media Reports, Brussels Signal (Oct. 2, 2024), https://brusselssignal.eu/2024/10/paris-olympics-ai-mass-surveillance-system-to-be-made-permanent-media-reports/ (noting although France stated Olympic Games Law provisions about AI surveillance would be temporary, recent documents from interior ministry suggest French government plans to continue and expand algorithmic surveillance).

[5] See Corn & Sewell, supra note 4  (explaining France’s installation of surveillance cameras, on ground and on aircraft, to record footage in and around event venues).  The surveillance systems use algorithmic computer programs to recognize “predetermined events” in real-time and alert security authorities.  See Boykoff & Zirin, supra note 3 (“Algorithmic video surveillance speeds up the processing and analysis of CCTV imagery based on human inputs that narrow the technology’s focus.”).  Humans can direct the programs to flag events like people wearing certain colors, people moving in a certain way, or specific kinds of inanimate objects left in specified locations.  See id. (discussing algorithmic video surveillance system benefits and capabilities).

[6] See Buchanan, supra note 4 (noting legalization of use of AI surveillance program to detect only certain events); see also Corn & Sewell, supra note 4 (explaining under French law, AI surveillance software may only be set to detect crowd surges, abnormally heavy crowds, abandoned objects, weapons, individuals on the ground, fire, and driving the wrong way in traffic.).  Users can direct programs only to scan for a certain number of people, specific type of vehicle, or certain timing parameters within the broader categories of events.  See Corn & Sewell, supra note 4 (explaining users are permitted to further direct algorithmic surveillance program to look for events that fit more narrow parameters).

[7] See id. (explaining that law enforcement’s response to flagged events is not automatic).  Human users determine whether to respond to events that are caught on camera and flagged by AI surveillance software.  See Juliette Jabkhiro & Julien Pretot, How France Plans to Use AI Surveillance to Keep Paris 2024 Olympics Safe, Reuters (Mar. 8, 2024), https://www.reuters.com/sports/olympics-how-france-plans-use-ai-keep-paris-2024-safe-2024-03-08// (explaining that local police, national police, firefighters, public transportation security officers, and others have access to surveillance system and respond to incidents detected by system).

[8] See Buchanan, supra note 4 (stating specific limitations on the treatment of collected data); see also Corn & Sewell, supra note 4 (explaining Article 10 explicitly prohibits use of “biometric identification, facial recognition, or automated data matching with other personal data systems” in algorithmic surveillance).  But see Buchanan, supra note 4 (noting Article 10 does not affect sections of French Criminal Procedure Code that give French police authority to use photos of individuals stored in police database to perform some facial recognition for criminal investigations).  “Consequently, the images captured by surveillance cameras remain eligible for retrospective facial recognition under the stipulations of the Criminal Procedure Code despite the limitations outlined in article 10 of the law.”  See id. (discussing limitations for use of facial recognition software on video surveillance systems).

[9] See Buchanan, supra note 4 (explaining, under Olympic Games Act, use of AI surveillance must comport with  EU’s General Data Protection Regulation, comport with France’s own data protection laws, and be approved by the French Data Protection Authority).  “Moreover, the French Constitutional Council has issued a conditional endorsement, reserving the right to revoke it if the necessary conditions that justify the authorization to use this new surveillance technology are no longer being met.”  See id. (discussing how French government dealt with approving and using new technology for security purposes at Olympic and Paralympic games).

[10] See Nteboheng Maya Mokuena, Playing Games with Rights: A Case Against AI Surveillance at the 2024 Paris Olympics, Geo. L. Tech. R. (May 2024), https://georgetownlawtechreview.org/playing-games-with-rights-a-case-against-ai-surveillance-at-the-2024-paris-olympics/GLTR-05-2024/ (explaining Olympic Games Act draws attention to how use of AI in this context may trigger concerns about privacy); see also Boykoff & Zirin, supra note 3 (“To be clear, this is not a Paris issue as much as it is an Olympic issue.”).  “The Games have become a high-tech playground for soft-launching invasive security technologies . . . [t]his serves to normalize what should be abnormal policing practices, softening up the population for the next round of incursions on civil liberties.”  See Boykoff & Zirin, supra note 3 (discussing security issues relating to large scale events, like Olympic and Paralympic games).

[11] See Noreen Nasir, As the Paris Olympics Wind Down, Los Angeles Swings into Planning for 2028, AP News (Aug. 7, 2024), https://apnews.com/article/2028-olympics-los-angeles-8744e50a12b4a76fce461a3cad017279 (noting organizers for 2028 Games are planning Los Angeles event with logistical successes and failures of Paris Olympics in mind).

[12] See California Governor’s Office of Emergency Services, Cal OES and France Collaborate on Security for the Olympic Games, Cal. OES News (July 24, 2024), https://news.caloes.ca.gov/cal-oes-and-the-security-of-the-olympic-games/ (explaining Cal OES Homeland Security Division has been meeting and collaborating with French officials to discuss security measures implemented during Paris Olympics and to develop protocols for Los Angeles Olympics).  “The Cal OES Cyber Threat Intelligence team discussed strategies to mitigate risks associated with artificial intelligence, emphasizing the proactive approach taken in readiness for large-scale events such as the Olympics.”  See id. (discussing security measures taken to protect against AI threats).

[13] See Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140 (creating legal protections, under California law, that apply to certain categories of consumer information); see also Chris Conley, Artificial Intelligence and the Right to Privacy, Berkeley Tech. L.J. (Oct. 26, 2023), https://btlj.org/2023/10/artificial-intelligence-and-the-right-to-privacy/ (explaining California’s constitutional right to privacy should limit use of AI software for surveillance and examination in both consumer and law enforcement context); Holly Fechner & Matthew S. Shapanka, U.S. Artificial Intelligence Policy: Legislative and Regulatory Developments, Covington & Burling LLP (Oct. 20, 2023) https://www.cov.com/en/news-and-insights/insights/2023/10/us-artificial-intelligence-policy-legislative-and-regulatory-developments#layout=card&numberOfResults=12 (describing discussions about need for federal restriction on AI and collection of private information as well as avenues through which future federal AI regulation might possibly be enacted).

[14] See Siemons, supra note 3 (explaining there is no comprehensive federal privacy statute and that attempts to regulate AI have been generally inconsistent across US federal and state law).

[15] See id. (characterizing legal environment created by general absence of broad data privacy laws in the US); see also The Civil Rights Implications of the Federal Use of Facial Recognition Technology: Key Findings from U. S. Commission on Civil Rights Report, U.S. Comm’n on C.R. (2024) (finding there is no explicit statutory or constitutional restriction on federal government’s use of artificial intelligence or facial recognition technology); Elizabeth McClellan, Facial Recognition Technology: Balancing the Benefits and Concerns, 15 J. Bus & Tech. L. 363, 370–71 (2020) (explaining that private companies often require customer and users to affirmatively withdraw consent to their personal data being used).

[16] See Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.140 (designating biometric information and personal information as protected categories of information); see also Jonathan Maddalone, AI and Sports - Security vs. Privacy, JD Supra (Sep. 27, 2024), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/ai-and-sports-security-vs-privacy-6065595/ (explaining potential applicability of California consumer privacy law to algorithmic video surveillance).

[17] See Siemons, supra note 3 (explaining although France stated that its surveillance system would not process biometric information, commentators argue that its ability to identify individuals in crowds ultimately amounts to “unique identification” triggering protections under European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation); see also Civil Society Public Letter on the Proposed French Law on the 2024 Olympic and Paralympic Games, Eur. Ctr. for Non-profit L. 2–3, https://ecnl.org/sites/default/files/2023-03/Civil%20society%20public%20letter%20on%20Art.%207%20of%20the%20French%20Olympics%20law%20-%20Final_EN_0.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2024) (arguing that Olympic Games Law would effectively allow for surveillance on basis of biometric data).

[18] See Maddalone, supra note 15 (explaining potential applicability of California consumer privacy law to algorithmic video surveillance).

[19] For further discussion of the established rationales for implementing security systems and protocols at Olympic Games, see supra note 2 and accompanying text.

[20] See Srivats Shankar, Fourth Amendment Constraints on Automated Surveillance Technology in the Public to Safeguard the Right of an Individual to be “Secure in Their Person”, 18 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 209, 228 (2023) (explaining there are some limitations, based on Fourth Amendment protections, on federal government's ability to conduct automated surveillance).  But see Siemons, supra note 3 (noting that protections do not apply when non-state actors are conducting surveillance).

[21] See Cal. Const. art. I, § 1 (creating affirmative right to privacy under California Constitution); see also Nicole A. Ozer, The California Constitutional Right to Privacy – A History and a Future Rooted in Intersectional Justice and Integrated Advocacy, 39 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1, 4–5 (2023) (explaining California’s right to privacy and its applicability to surveillance, including facial and object detection); Siemons, supra note 3 (explaining California’s right to privacy).

[22] See Reynaud & Untersinger, supra note 1 (noting AI surveillance system used in Paris was created by Wintix, private company contracted by the government); see also Siemons, supra note 3 (noting that Fourth Amendment protections only limit government action).

[23] See California Constitutional Right to Privacy, ACLU of N. Cal., https://www.aclunc.org/campaign/california-constitutional-right-privacy#:~:text=Article%20I%2C%20Section%201%20of%20the%20California%20Constitution%20applies%20to,the%20face%20of%20technological%20advances (explaining California’s state constitution contains right to privacy that has been interpreted to apply to government and private entities).  See, e.g., White v. Davis, 13 Cal.3d 757, 773 (1975) (holding that Los Angeles Police Department violated California state constitutional right to privacy when it surveilled university students and faculty without suspicion of criminality); Sheehan v. San Francisco Forty-Niners, 45 Cal. 4th 992, 1002 (2009) (explaining California right to privacy requires organizers of entertainment events to have security policies and practices that are reasonable)

[24] See 2028 Olympic And Paralympic Games in Los Angeles Designated a National Special Security Event, U.S. Secret Serv. (June 13, 2024), https://www.secretservice.gov/newsroom/releases/2024/06/2028-olympic-and-paralympic-games-los-angeles-designated-national-special [hereinafter 2028 LA Olympic and Paralympic Games] (announcing designation of 2028 Olympics as National Special Security Event).

[25] See 18 U.S.C. § 3056 (authorizing Secret Service and Secretary of Homeland Security to control security operations at certain important national events); see also 2028 LA Olympic and Paralympic Games, supra note 23 (explaining criteria usually used to classify event as national special security event and effects of such classification); Mike Rowbottom, Los Angeles 2028 Establishes Key Cooperative to Deal with Games Security, Inside Games (Feb. 24, 2021), https://www.insidethegames.biz/articles/1104649/los-angeles-2028-security-measures-mou (explaining that memorandum of understanding regarding national special security event status of 2028 Olympics indicated that federal agencies like Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Secret Service, and Federal Emergency Management Agency would also be involved in 2028 Olympics).

[26] See Lee Davidson, Old Secrets Emerge: After 9/11 Attacks, 2002 Olympics Considered Banning Spectators; Many Countries Balked at Sending Athletes, Salt Lake Trib. (Sep. 16, 2018), https://www.sltrib.com/news/politics/2018/09/16/old-secrets-emerge-after/ (explaining former Salt Lake City Mayor Rocky Anderson sued federal government, alleging, in part, that US intelligence agencies engaged in improper, mass digital surveillance during 2002 Olympic Games, which were held in Salt Lake City and had been designated national special security event); see also Matt McClain, Former NSA Exec Says Agency Used ‘Blanket’ Surveillance in 2002 Olympics in Utah, Wash. Post (Aug. 22, 2019), https://web.archive.org/web/20240207183608/https://www.chicagotribune.com/2017/06/02/former-nsa-exec-says-agency-used-blanket-surveillance-in-2002-olympics-in-utah/ (explaining former National Security Agency senior executive’s contention that NSA and FBI broadly collected and stored emails and text messages of individuals in and around Salt Lake City during 2002 Olympics, which is considered national special security event).  But see id. (noting that NSA refuted this assertion of mass data collection at national special security event).

[27] See Maddalone, supra note 15 (highlighting fact-based nature of whether certain data collection activities violate California and US law).

[28] See Los Angeles City Council Looks to Expand LAPD Surveillance Program, ABC 7 (Apr. 21, 2024) https://abc7.com/los-angeles-city-council-looks-to-expand-lapd-surveillance-program/14709596/ (explaining LAPD’s intent to expand its real-time crime monitoring systems, which incorporate video footage and automated license plate reading programs, ahead of 2028 Olympics).