The Price of Amateurism: Student-Athletes Challenge NCAA’s Ban on Receiving Prize Money

By: Ruslan Aminov*                                                                          Posted: 10/10/2024

In 2021, sixteen-year-old high school student Reese Brantmeier advanced to the third round of singles in the U.S. Open qualifying tournament, which allowed her to collect just short of $49,000 in prize money.[1] However, she accepted only $10,000 of that prize money, plus tournament-related expenses, to ensure that she would not run afoul of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA) rules.[2]  Instead, the NCAA refused to certify Brantmeier as eligible to compete for the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hills’s (UNC) women’s tennis team for the Fall 2022 season.[3]  Specifically, the NCAA claimed that Brantmeier accepted more than the $10,000 limit because some of her reported tournament-related expenses were not actual and necessary.[4]  On March 18, 2024, Brantmeier filed her complaint against the NCAA seeking to prevent the organization from enforcing its prize money restrictions. [5]

Notably, Brantmeier’s experiences are not unique.[6]  In 2023, Brantmeier’s own UNC teammate Fiona Crawley was forced to reject over $80,000 in prize money for her performance in the U.S. Open’s qualifying singles tournament.[7]  On September 8, 2024, eighteen-year-old Maya Joint joined Brantmeier’s lawsuit after being forced to forfeit a substantial portion of the $146,657 in prize money that she secured in the 2024 U.S. Open.[8]  Ultimately, these collective experiences raise concerns for the NCAA’s long-held justification of amateurism as a way to regulate the money student-athletes may receive.[9]

The Upward Trend in Student-Athlete Compensation

In her complaint, Brantmeier alleged a hypocrisy: recent case law has permitted student-athletes to be paid for their likeness, but the NCAA continues to closely guard its restrictions on student-athlete compensation.[10]  Brantmeier has gone as far as to label the NCAA as oppressive and a monopsony.[11]  While student-athletes have made immense strides in obtaining certain rights to compensation, litigation surrounding amateurism is not straightforward.[12]

In 1984, the United States Supreme Court proclaimed in NCAA v. Board of Reagents[13] that the NCAA plays a critical role in the maintenance of a revered tradition of amateurism in college sports, which requires ample latitude and adds richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics.[14]  The court reasoned that only rules that restrict, rather than enhance or preserve, such tradition would be inconsistent with the goals of antitrust law.[15]  Moreover, the Supreme Court indicated that rules concerning the eligibility of participants to play in intercollegiate sports were especially important to the public’s interest.[16]  After Board of Regents, lower courts cited to the Supreme Court to conclude that the NCAA’s rules on student-athlete eligibility were subject to a reasonableness standard and not strict scrutiny under antitrust law.[17]

In 2015, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals took amateurism down from its pedestal in O’Bannon v. NCAA.[18]  While admitting that the NCAA’s emphasis on amateurism promotes two pro-competitive effects, being the integration of academics with athletics and the popularity of intercollegiate sports, the Ninth Circuit rejected the argument that access to compensation would somehow transfigure student-athletes into something other than students.[19]  Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district courts’ finding that allowing NCAA member schools to offer student grants that cover the full costs of education would be virtually as effective and substantially less restrictive alternative to the amateur-status rule.[20]  Not far behind, the United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of amateurism again in 2021 in NCAA v. Alston.[21]  Although neglecting to resolve the national debate on amateurism, the Supreme Court rejected many of the NCAA’s concerns that increased avenues for education-related compensation would become tantamount of giving student-athletes a professional salary.[22]

Interestingly, not all litigation efforts against the NCAA are as successful as the aforementioned cases.[23]  For example, the Illinois Northern District Court denied two student-athletes’ motion for preliminary injunction against the NCAA for its student-athlete eligibility, crediting the importance Board of Reagent’s underscore of amateurism in collegiate sports.[24]  Aggrieved student-athletes must specifically prove that the NCAA’s reliance on amateurism is unreasonable, and that substantially less restrictive, yet equally effective means for regulation are available to the organization.[25]

Is Amateurism a Pretext for Profit?

Brantmeier’s complaint alleges two claims under the Sherman Act.[26]  First, she asserts that the NCAA uses the guise of amateurism to unreasonably restrain trade in order to artificially fix the prices paid to student-athletes for the use, and to limit supply for, the organization’s athletic services.[27]  Second, she asserts the NCAA similarly uses amateurism to effectuate a boycott against any person who does not wish to abide by the organization’s rules.[28]  Neither of these assertions are surprising in the aftermath of Alston.[29]

On appeal to the Supreme Court in Alston, the NCAA took issue with the way in which the district court described its policy of amateurism.[30]  The Supreme Court refused to overturn the district court’s findings of fact, namely that the NCAA failed to adopt a consistent definition for the concept of “amateurism” and that the organization failed to reference any considerations for consumer demand in its amateurism rules.[31]  To add on, Justice Kavanaugh strayed from the majority opinion to further comment on his concerns about the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules.[32]  His position was unequivocal on the matter of amateurism: “the NCAA’s business model would be flatly illegal in almost any other industry in America…and under ordinary principles of antitrust law, it is not evident why college sports should be any different.”[33]  In other words, the NCAA’s attestation that student-athletes are students first and athletes second is thoroughly undermined when its amateurism policies allow the non-profit organization to build a massive, money-raising empire.[34]

Potential Changes to the NCAA’s Amateurism Rules

Justice Kavanaugh’s formal clobbering of the NCAA’s rules has become an increasingly popular opinion.[35]  Accordingly, there is mounting pressure on the organization to adapt its rules to the modern-day notion of the student-athlete.[36]  And to some degree, the NCAA is certainly aware of such pressure.[37]

Within the next year, through October of 2025, the NCAA’s Division I Council will consider recommended rule changes to student-athlete eligibility, including permitting athletes to accept prize money beyond just actual and necessary expenses.[38]  Similarly, the NCAA’s own president, Charlie Baker, floated the possibility of permitting certain colleges to offer student-athletes at least $30,000 annually as pay-for-play compensation through trust funds.[39]  Based on these discussions, it seems that the NCAA is begrudgingly moving toward a new direction: one which blurs the line between amateur and professional.[40]  At this point, the only question left may not be “will amateurism survive?,” but rather “will the NCAA adopt a quasi-professional model before the courts impose one themselves?”[41]

* Staff Writer, Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, J.D. Candidate, May 2026, Villanova Charles Widger School of Law.

[1] See Mathew Futterman, Top College Tennis Player Sues NCAA to Challenge Tournament Prize Restrictions, The Athletic (May 18, 2024), https://www.nytimes.com/athletic/5346029/2024/03/18/reese-brantmeier-ncaa-lawsuit-tennis-prize-money/ (recounting Brantmeier’s success at U.S. Opens).  Brantmeier’s success is notable as she was raised in a small town of about 750 residents, where the nearest tennis courts were a forty-five minute drive away.  See generally Lori Nickel, A 16-Year-Old International Tennis Phenom is Right From Our Own Backyard, Milwaukee J. Sentinel (Oct. 2, 2021, 5:20 PM), https://www.jsonline.com/story/sports/2021/06/24/reese-brantmeier-tennis-phenom-small-town-wisconsin/7768162002/ (summarizing Brantmeier’s introduction to tennis as sport).

[2] See Shelby Swanson, UNC Women’s Tennis Star Reese Brantmeier Sues the NCAA Over Prize Money Rules, Daily Tar Heel (Mar. 26, 2024, 7:32 PM), https://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2024/03/unc-womens-tennis-reese-brantmeier-lawsuit-ncaa-name-image-and-likeness-nil-prize-money-fiona-crawley (explaining Brantmeier’s attempt to abide by NCAA rules).  Article 12.1.2(a) of the NCAA’s bylaws states that if an individual “uses [their] athletic skill for pay,” then that individual loses their amateur status and is not “eligible for intercollegiate competition” in that sport.  See Bylaw 12.1.2, NCAA, https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/bylaw?ruleId=7300 (last visited Oct. 1, 2024) (“An individual loses amateur status and thus shall not be eligible for intercollegiate competition in a particular sport if the individual . . . [u]ses athletics skill (directly or indirectly) for pay in any form in that sport”); see also Division I 2024–25 Manual, NCAA 36 (Sept. 12, 2024), https://web3.ncaa.org/lsdbi/reports/getReport/90008 [hereinafter NCAA Manual] (outlining general regulations to retain amateur status).  However, pursuant to Article 12.1.2.4.2.1, tennis players are permitted to “accept up to $10,000 per calendar year in prize money based on place finish or performance” prior to their full-time collegiate enrollment.  See NCAA Manual, supra note 2, at 39 (discussing current exception for pre-collegiate prize money awarded to tennis players).  Additionally, under Article 12.1.2.4.2.1, tennis players may also accept additional prize money to cover actual and necessary expenses for participation in the athletic event, prior to enrolling in college full-time.  See id. at 39 (establishing additional exceptions for prize money compensation).

[3] See Futterman, supra note 1 (describing purported violation of NCAA rules).  If Brantmeier had begun to play for UNC’s women’s tennis team and was later declared ineligible by the NCAA, UNC would have been forced to forfeit their matches.  See id. (explaining consequences of NCAA’s eligibility ruling).

[4] See id. (detailing specific items rejected by NCAA, including portable scanner, racket restringing expense, and hotel room); see also Complaint at 27, Brantmeier v. NCAA, No. 1:24-CV-00238 (M.D. N.C. Mar. 18, 2024) [hereinafter Brantmeier Complaint] (calling NCAA’s enforcement of Brantmeier’s expenses “farcical”).  The organization took issue with the portable scanner because of its questionable necessity to track and catalog her receipts; the racket restringing expense because it fell a single day outside of the unwritten fourteen-day window; and half of the cost of her hotel room because she had shared the room with her mother.  See id. at 27–28 (alleging NCAA’s reported reasons for finding Brantmeier had retained excess prize money).

[5] See id. at 30 (alleging anticompetitive and unlawful restrictions on behalf of Brantmeier and others similarly situated in Division I sports).

[6] See Caroline Wills, Fiona Crawley, UNC Tennis Players Struggle with NCAA Prize Money Rules, Daily Tar Heel (Sept. 27, 2023, 11:33 PM), https://www.dailytarheel.com/article/2023/09/sports-tennis-prize-money-regulations-in-college-fiona-crawley-us-open-tar-heels-north-carolina-collegiate-womens-tennis (describing Crawley’s experience with NCAA expense reports).

[7] See id. (detailing UNC’s concern that NCAA would declare Crawley illegible at start of tennis season).

[8] See Jesse Dougherty, Why a College Tennis Player Had to Forfeit a Substantial Portion of $146,000, Wash. Post (Sept. 10, 2024, 8:37 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2024/09/10/maya-joint-us-open-prize-money/ (explaining Joint’s decision to join Brantmeier’s suit against NCAA).  Joint had initially requested that the United States Tennis Association’s (USTA) prize money office grant her an extension on the deadline to collect her winnings until Brantmeier’s motion for preliminary injunction would be decided, but her request was ultimately rejected.  See id. (summarizing Joint’s filed declarations).

[9] See, e.g., id. (describing Joint’s difficulty in weighing “a ton of money” against worth of “[being] able to play with [her] peers, to be able to celebrate a win”); see also NCAA Manual, supra note 2, at 33 (emphasizing that only amateur student-athletes may be eligible for intercollegiate athletics participation).

[10] See Brantmeier Complaint, supra note 4, at 23 (reviewing recent cases challenging NCAA’s compensation restrictions).

[11] See id. at 20 (stating that American public challenged NCAA’s regime against various forms of student-athlete compensation).

[12] See Joseph M. Long, Applying the Non-Profit Duty of Obedience in Litigation: Penn State, Paterno, Student-Athletes, & the NCAA, 3 Miss. Sports L. Rev. 173, 174 (2014) (“Successful antitrust claims against the NCAA are rare . . . Plaintiffs seeking recourse for NCAA actions still must employ innovative legal theories with which to challenge NCAA leadership.”).

[13] NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).

[14] See id. at 120 (establishing necessity of preserving sanctity of student-athletes in higher education).

[15] See id. (finding NCAA’s television plan for broadcasting college football games in violation of Sherman Act).  In 1981, the NCAA adopted a television plan that sought to reduce the adverse effects of live television on football game attendance by, in essence, limiting the number of games any one college could televise.  See id. at 91–95 (describing broadcasting agreements between carrying networks and participating NCAA member institutions).  The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court decisions that the NCAA’s television plan unreasonably restricted trade and that amateurism was insufficient to justify the plan because other NCAA restrictions were better tailored to such goal.  See id. at 119 (rejecting NCAA’s argument that interest in maintaining competitive balance among amateur athletic team was legitimate and important justification to television regulations).

[16] See id. at 117–18 (distinguishing specific restraints on football telecasts from rules defining conditions of contest or eligibility of participants).

[17] See, e.g., McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1343–44 (5th Cir. 1988) (recognizing that horizontal restraints on competition are essential to make product available to public, and that some rules are essential to survival).

[18] See generally O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015) (finding that NCAA’s reliance on Board of Regents to show deference to amateurism was unpersuasive).  Ed O’Bannon was a former basketball player at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) who discovered his likeness was used to create a playable character in a videogame, and thereafter sued the NCAA because it has licensed his trademark for commercial use without compensating him.  See id. at 1055 (describing factual background of O’Bannon litigation).

[19] See id. at 1072–74 (examining pro-competitive effects of restraint on student-athlete compensation).

[20] See id. at 1074 (emphasizing that NCAA’s own standards admit that student-athletes remain amateurs as long as money paid to them only covers legitimate educational expenses).

[21] See generally NCAA v. Alston, 594 U.S. 69 (2021) (affirming district court’s injunction prohibiting NCAA from enforcing rules related to education-related benefits and compensation).

[22] See id. at 104–07 (exercising caution in fashioning an antitrust remedy).

[23] See Lang, supra note 12, at 174 (listing cases in which claims against NCAA were dismissed).

[24] See Bewley v. NCAA, No. 23-CV-15570, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5131, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2024) (rejecting claim that NCAA’s limit of compensation for participation in professional sports team violates Sherman Act because amateurism as policy goal is pro-competitive justification).

[25] See, e.g., Alston, 594 U.S. at 81–82 (explaining legal standards under Sherman Act).  For further discussion of the Sherman Act’s principles and history, see infra note 26 and accompanying text.

[26] See Brantmeier Complaint, supra 4, at 45–52 (setting out two claims for relief).  In 1890, the U.S. Congress passed the Sherman Act as the first federal antitrust law, which set out rules on monopolistic business practices.  See Sherman Anti-Trust Act (1890), Nat’l Archives (Mar. 15, 2022), https://www.archives.gov/milestone-documents/sherman-anti-trust-act (describing historical context and provisions of Sherman Act).  Specifically, Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits all contracts, trusts, and conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce and declares such conduct a felony.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (outlawing restrictive competitive practices and activities).  Although not explicit in its brief provision, courts have interpreted the Sherman Act to forbid only unreasonable restraints on trade or commerce.  See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. of N.J. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59–60 (1911) (limiting scope of Sherman Act to target only undue restraints on business).  Brantmeier’s lawsuit premises its claims on Section 1 of the Sherman Act, analogizing the NCAA’s prize money rules to adversely and unreasonably stifle markets related to student-athlete competition.  See Brantmeier Complaint, supra note 4, at 40–44 (alleging NCAA’s rules intend unlawfully “fix, maintain, and/or stabilize prices paid” to student-athletes like Brantmeier for athletic services).

[27] See id. at 45–48 (explaining basis for first claim of relief under Sherman Act).

[28] See id. at 48–52 (explaining basis for second claim of relief under Sherman Act).

[29] See Sara Levien, There’s a Crack in the NCAA’s Amateurism Shield: Johnson v. NCAA May Shatter it Completely. What Then?, 57 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 175, 188–89 (observing drastic changes in appellate jurisprudence).

[30] See Alston, 594 U.S. at 101 (evaluating NCAA’s contention that district court replaced policy of amateurism with its own preferred conception).

[31] See id. (finding district court’s determinations to be straight application of rule of reason doctrine).  Specifically, the district court relied on evidence which showed that the NCAA did not include a definition of the concept of “amateurism” in its Division I manual; that the NCAA defined “amateurism” in its court filings as “not pay for play,” which is language not referenced in the Division I manual; that the NCAA permits student-athletes to obtain payments, such as grants-in-aid, up to the cost of attendance or to receive monies from an academic enhancement fund; and that the NCAA failed to credibly show that student-athlete compensation would reduce consumer demand for intercollegiate sports.  See In re NCAA Athletic Grant-In-Aid Cap Antitrust Litig., 375 F. Supp. 3d 1058, 1071–74 (evaluating record of evidence).

[32] See Alston, 594 U.S. at 108 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (“I add this concurring opinion to underscore that the NCAA’s remaining compensation rules also raise serious questions under the antitrust laws.”).

[33] See id. at 109–12 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (supporting challenges to all of NCAA’s amateurism rules).  Justice Kavanaugh further analogized the student-athlete situation to other commercial spheres, including one which strikes near the hearts of many law students: “Law firms cannot conspire to cabin lawyers’ salaries in name of providing legal services out of a ‘love of the law.’”  See id. at 109 (emphasizing that NCAA’s reliance on amateurism is circular and unpersuasive).  His concurring opinion can more broadly be read as a hit-piece to overturn Board of Reagents and return to the strict scrutiny standard in NCAA-related litigation.  See id. at 110 (“Price-fixing labor is price-fixing labor.  And price-fixing labor is ordinarily a textbook antitrust problem.”).

[34] See id. at 111–12 (arguing that traditions alone cannot justify lack of fair compensation for student-athletes).

[35] See Tracie Canada, Kaitlin Pericak & Miray D. Seward, Amateurism as a Narrative of Control: An Interdisciplinary Approach to the Lived Experiences of College Athletes, 3 Ind. Sports Innovation J. 55, 57–59 (2022) (suggesting that NCAA’s use of amateurism functions as tool to control and exploit student-athletes’ social world); see also Will Gonsior & Ruthvi Tadakamalla, Foul Play: Amateurism or a Collegiate Cartel?, Pathfinder (Jan. 8, 2024), https://pwestpathfinder.com/2024/01/08/foul-play-amateurism-or-a-collegiate-cartel/ (criticizing NCAA for corrupting methods of money-making to allow for itself and colleges to profit at expense of student-athletes).

[36] See Levien, supra note 29, at 201 (recognizing need to develop athletic programs where student-athletes can thrive under pay-for-play model).

[37] See Ross Dellenger, NCAA Considering Applying Football Redshirt Rule to Athletes in All Sports, Yahoo Sports (Sept. 1, 2024), https://sports.yahoo.com/docs-ncaa-considering-applying-football-redshirt-rule-to-athletes-in-all-sports-154903963.html (reporting on proposed changes to NCAA bylaws).

[38] See id. (listing rules under consideration for change related to pre-college enrollment).

[39] See Ralph D. Russo, NCAA President Charlie Baker Calls for New Tier of Division I Where Schools Can Pay Athletes, AP News (Dec. 5, 2023, 4:48 PM), https://apnews.com/article/ncaa-baker-nil-c26542c528df277385fea7167026dbe6 (describing contents of NCAA President’s letter to more than 350 Division I schools).

[40] See, e.g., Dellenger, supra note 37 (referring to proposed changes as latest steps in evolution away from amateurism model that has cost NCAA billions in legal losses).

[41] See generally Brantmeier Complaint, supra note 4, at 52 (requesting district court to declare prize money restrictions illegal and unenforceable).