Does Florida’s Second Chance Act Raise Liability Risks for Under-Resourced School Districts?

By: Isabella Astolfi*                                                                           Posted: 10/17/2025

Introduction

On September 7, 2024, rising-star high school football player Chance Gainer from Florida’s Panhandle region collapsed during a game and never got back up.[1]  His death rippled through the community and galvanized Florida’s lawmakers to act.[2]  In response, the Florida legislature in 2025 passed the Second Chance Act, the first law in the nation requiring schools to provide student-athletes with low-cost electrocardiogram (EKG) screenings as a condition of play.[3]  Named in Chance’s honor, the statute aims to detect hidden heart conditions before they turn fatal.[4]

However, the Act provides no funding to school districts to carry out this mandate.[5]. Rather, it merely encourages schools to partner with local hospitals and nonprofits to secure affordable screenings.[6]. Yet the Act also excuses any district unable to offer screenings for fifty dollars or less from compliance.[7].  This exemption, while shielding these districts from statutory violations, does not necessarily protect against common law negligence claims.[8] By formally recognizing sudden cardiac death as a foreseeable risk in youth sports, the Act reshapes how Florida courts may analyze a school district’s duty if another tragedy occurs.[9] In effect, the new law may fall hardest on the very districts it currently excuses.[10]

Statutory Interpretation

Courts have long held that there is an established common law duty of care that schools owe to their students.[11] In Florida, courts have recognized a heightened standard of care, where schools owe their students common law duties of supervision and reasonable care.[12] Therefore, the Second Chance Act presumptively builds upon those duties in preventing tragedies like Chance Gainer’s from ever happening again.[13]

Yet despite these standards of care, the Act’s exemption excuses districts unable to provide EKGs for fifty dollars or less from statutory violation.[14]  Problematically, complying with a legislative enactment or regulation, including qualifying for an immunity, does not prevent a finding for negligence.[15] While the Act’s exemption prevents a successful negligence per se claim for failing to provide EKGs against exempt districts, safety regulations and statutes generally establish a floor of safety that exempt defendants can still fall below.[16]  This leaves the door open for Florida courts to consider whether a heightened standard of care should be applied to exempt districts who fail to secure necessary partnerships or otherwise provide low-cost EKGs.[17]

Codifying Foreseeability

Florida’s negligence law is unique because it has elevated the concept of “foreseeability” to be a primary factor in the calculation of duty.[18]  In Kaisner v. Klob[19] and McCain v. Florida Power Corporation[20], the Florida Supreme Court established that where conduct creates a “foreseeable zone of risk,” the law recognizes a duty.[21]  While other jurisdictions consider numerous factors, Florida has adhered “tenaciously to its foreseeable-zone-of-risk analysis.” [22]  Florida courts’ reliance on the “foreseeability” standard, often bypassing other legal obstacles such as policy concerns, has led to expansive negligence liability.[23]

Chance Gainer’s tragic passing was not an isolated occurrence; it was another evident instance of a recurring, harm-causing event.[24]  Florida lawmakers sought to prevent that recurring harm by mandating heart screenings to mitigate risk.[25]  Thus, through the Second Chance Act, the legislature codified sudden cardiac death in student-athletes as a foreseeable risk.[26]  Given that Florida courts typically give deference to legislatures and perceive “foreseeability” as the linchpin of duty, a Florida judiciary’s duty analysis will likely revolve around recognition of the risk posed by student-athletes playing without heart screenings.[27]

Florida Duty Analysis

The Florida Supreme Court has long recognized that schools owe students a special duty of supervision and reasonable care.[28]  While the duty itself remains fixed, the “methods and means of fulfilling that duty” evolve with changing risks, new circumstances, and adjusted expectations.[29]  In Limones v. School District of Lee County[30], the Florida Supreme Court declined to extend schools’ common law duty to require use of an automated external defibrillator (“AED”), even though a Florida statute required their presence on school grounds.[31]  Yet the court emphasized that the scope of reasonable care in the school-student context is evolving with changing circumstances, especially with respect to students’ medical needs.[32]  The Second Chance Act marks such an evolution since, unlike the AED statute that addresses post-injury rescue, the Act mandates preventive measures.[33]

By explicitly identifying sudden cardiac death as a foreseeable harm, the Act supplies the policy consideration that can justify treating low-cost EKGs as part of the evolving means of fulfilling the school’s duty of reasonable care.[34]  Florida’s duty jurisprudence, which provides that a duty arises whenever conduct creates a foreseeable zone of risk, reinforces this interpretation.[35] The legislature’s decision to mandate screenings in response to repeated tragedies is notice to the judiciary that sudden cardiac death in student-athletes is considered a clear and foreseeable risk.[36] Under this analysis, the Act does not impose a new categorical duty to provide EKGs for exempt districts, but shapes what schools’ reasonable duty of care requires in contemporary circumstances.[37]

For exempt districts, the recognition of a common law duty shaped by the legislature’s codification of sudden cardiac death as a foreseeable risk shifts the inquiry from whether a duty exists to what constitutes a breach of that duty.[38]  Factfinders would need to assess the reasonableness of the school’s conduct against the legislature’s identification of partnership-seeking as the minimally burdensome pathway toward compliance.[39]  Evidence of a good-faith effort to secure low-cost screenings by exempt districts that failed to provide the tests may demonstrate satisfaction of the duty, while a failure to pursue even that minimal step could be viewed as unreasonable neglect of a catastrophic, foreseeable harm.[40]

Regulatory Compliance and Policy

Even if exempt districts cannot show good-faith efforts to secure partnerships or otherwise provide low-cost EKGs, extending liability when a tragedy strikes exposes an uncomfortable reality.[41]  Affluent districts are not only better able to absorb the costs of EKG screenings, but they also benefit from structural advantages that make compliance easier: proximity to well-resourced hospitals and cardiology practices, access to nonprofit providers, and stronger parent or alumni networks capable of raising supplemental funds.[42]  These advantages reduce both the logistical and financial barriers to compliance.[43]

By contrast, under-resourced districts face a double bind.[44]  On one hand, they are excused from statutory violation yet remain vulnerable to negligence claims if they cannot provide documented compliance efforts.[45]  Many of these rural or under-resourced districts operate in healthcare deserts, lack nearby nonprofit infrastructure, and rely on limited tax bases, making even the pursuit of partnerships much more difficult.[46]  On the other hand, students in under-resourced districts may have the greatest need for school-provided screenings, since families in those communities likely face the same financial and logistical barriers that limit the schools’ ability to provide them.[47]  The result is an uneven distribution of both risk and responsibility: under-resourced schools become the likeliest targets of litigation, while their students may be the most vulnerable to the harms the Second Chance Act was designed to prevent.[48]

*Staff Writer, Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, J.D. Candidate, May 2027, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law.

[1] See Associated Press, Florida High Schooler Chance Gainer Dies After in-game Collapse, ESPN (Sep. 7, 2024, at 12:15 ET), https://www.espn.com/espn/story/_/id/41160657/florida-high-schooler-chance-gainer-dies-game-collapse (reporting death of eighteen-year-old wide receiver and defensive back Chance Gainer after he ran toward play and suddenly collapsed).  Chance was an honors student who had recently visited Vanderbilt to discuss attending the school.  See id. (discussing Gulf County School superintendent Jim Norton’s comments on Gainer’s high-school career).

[2] See Regina Gonzalez & Jordan Bowen, New Florida Law Requires Heart Screenings for High School Athletes. Here’s What to Know, FOX 13 Tampa Bay (Jul. 22, 2025, at 22:04 EDT), https://www.fox13news.com/news/new-florida-law-requires-heart-screenings-high-school-athletes-heres-what-know (reporting that Chance’s autopsy showed hypertrophic cardiomyopathy, which is leading cause of sudden cardiac death in young athletes).  The high school-athlete’s death galvanized bipartisan support in the Florida legislature, leading to the enactment of the Act to prevent future tragedies.  See id. (explaining how Gainer’s and Lexi Sima’s sudden cardiac deaths sparked legislative momentum in Florida, culminating in Governor Ron DeSantis signing Act into law).

[3] See Second Chance Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 1002.20(17)(b)(1)–(2), 1006.165(6)(b) (West 2025) (requiring students to receive electrocardiograms prior to participating in athletics); see also Angela Small, Second Chance EKG Law, WKGC Pub. Media (Jul. 14, 2025), https://www.wkgc.org/2025/07/14/second-chance-ekg-law (noting how Chance’s death mobilized Florida’s representatives to create Second Chance Act).  Representative Jason Shoaf championed the bill.  See id. (explaining that Chance’s death exposed a hidden danger as undiagnosed heart conditions threaten every one-in-three hundred young athletes).

[4] See Small, supra note 3 (describing purpose of Act to combat growing risk of student-athlete cardiac deaths).

[5] See Second Chance Act § 1006.165(6)(b) (requiring school districts to pursue public and private partnerships to provide affordable EKGs).

[6] See id. (requiring the pursuit of partnerships and including no alternative pathway to compliance).

[7] See id. (exempting districts unable to find partner offering test for under fifty dollars per student).  The statute also embeds additional exemptions.  See also id. § 1006.20(2)(d) (providing religious and medical exemptions to AED and EKG mandates and immunizing schools from liability for injuries resulting from undisclosed conditions that would have been detected absent the religious or medical exemption).

[8] See id. (noting exception for certain districts); Mark A. Geistfeld, Tort Law in the Age of Statutes, 99 Iowa L. Rev. 957, 1006 (2014) (explaining that statutory compliance does not preclude finding of negligence if reasonable person would have taken additional precautions).  For further discussion on how the Act’s exemption may not shield exempt school districts from liability if there is both harm and a failure to provide EKGs, see infra notes 27–39 and accompanying text.

[9] See Second Chance Act § 1002.20 (17)(b)(1)–(2) (requiring student-athletes to receive electrocardiograms prior to play); William N. Drake, Jr., Foreseeable Zone of Risk: Confusing Foreseeability with Duty in Florida Negligence Law, 78 Fla. Bar J. 10 (Apr. 2004) (noting how Florida’s duty analysis turns on identified foreseeable risks).  For further discussion on how this Act may reshape negligence duty analysis in Florida, see infra notes 15–33 and accompanying text.

[10] See Second Chance Act § 1006.165(6)(b) (requiring school districts to pursue partnerships to provide EKGs but exempting districts from compliance when unable to provide EKG for less than fifty dollars per student).  For further discussion on the potential disparate impacts of the Act, see infra notes 44–47 and accompanying text.

[11] See Munn v. Hotchkiss Sch., 165 A.3d 543, 559–60 (Conn. 2017) (establishing school’s special duty to protect students because school assumes custody and control over students, taking place of parents); Nguyen v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 96 N.E.3d 438, 452–60 (Mass. 2018) (confirming MIT’s special duty to its students); Dinsmoor v. City of Phoenix, 492 P.3d 371, 377 (Ariz. 2021) (holding that once students leave school’s control, school’s duty is released and directed back to parents); Barlow v. State, 540 P.3d 586, 596–98 (Wash. 2024) (ruling that special relationship exists between university and its students, giving rise to duty to use reasonable care to protect students from foreseeable harms).

[12] See Limones v. Sch. Dist. of Lee County, 161 So. 3d 384, 393 (Fla. 2015) (recognizing special duty owed by Florida schools to students).  This duty is based on the school’s special supervisory role.  See id. at 393–94 (reasoning that school’s assumption of parental role during on-campus activities and school-sponsored events requires schools to exercise reasonable care in supervising students “under the circumstances.”).  The scope of the supervisory duty may “fluctuate with time.”  See id. (explaining that whether a school breached this duty is a jury question turning on reasonableness of conduct in light of student’s age, activities, available responders and technologies, and surrounding conditions).

[13] See Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Common Law as Statutory Backdrop, 136 Harv. L. Rev. 608, 616 (2022) (explaining judicial presumption that state legislature drafts law against backdrop of established common law).  New developments in the law, whether “common law or other legislation, . . . brings the old soil with it.”  See id. (depicting purpose of interpretive principle as preserving continuity between existing legal principles and newly enacted legislation); see also Minerva Surgical, Inc. v. Hologic, Inc., 594 U.S. 559, 560 (2021) (quoting Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1992)) (explaining that Congress enacts legislation against backdrop of common-law doctrines that guide courts in interpreting statutory text and inform how new statutes are construed).  For further discussion of the common law duty of care owed by schools to students, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of how Florida judiciaries apply a heightened standard of care to schools, see infra note 17, 21 and accompanying text.

[14] See Second Chance Act § 1006.165(6)(b) (acknowledging exemption for districts unable to secure low-cost EKGs).  The legislature’s failure to provide funding and its specific encouragement of partnerships indicates that the exemption is a legislative compromise based on cost, rather than a policy determination that the risk is acceptable.  See Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 1006 (explaining that legislative decisions to impose precautionary duties typically rest on empirical cost-benefit analyses identifying level of precaution deemed reasonable).

[15] See Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 994 (observing that statutory compliance does not bar negligence liability because such regulations typically represent minimum safety standards rather than full scope of reasonable car); see also Todd A. DeMitchell, Stefanie King & Terri A. DeMitchell, Educational Malpractice: Is It a Tort Whose Time Has Come? An Exploratory Mixed Methods Study, U. Fla. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 253, 262 n.49 (explaining that statutory compliance may serve as evidence of due care, but may also support negligence finding if reasonable conduct required more precaution than statute mandates); see generally Limones, 161 So. 3d at 384 (clarifying that existence of duty is analytically distinct from question of sovereign immunity, which limits recovery but does not determine whether duty exists).

[16] See DeMitchell et al., supra note 15, at 262 (noting that negligence per se liability arises when jurisdiction recognizes statute violation as negligence conclusively); Brackin v. Boles, 452 So. 2d 540, 545 (Fla. 1984) (noting three categories of statutory violations).  The first “creates strictly liability.”  See id. (explaining negligence per se).  The second “comprises [statutory] violations which provide proof of negligence.”   See id. (explaining statutory violations that create rebuttable presumption of negligence).  The third “consists of violations which provide evidence of negligence.”  See id. (explaining statutory violations providing evidence bearing on whether defendant acted reasonably); see also Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 994 (noting that safety statutes and regulations merely define minimum standard of conduct and do not immunize defendants who fail to take further reasonable precautions when deemed necessary by jury).

[17] See Limones, 161 So. 3d at 391, 401 (describing how school’s duty changes only in regard to methods and means of fulfilling duty, and determination of duty as most minimal threshold); Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 994 n.138 (explaining that safety statutes do not limit courts from recognizing higher common-law standards).  Courts often defer to “non-binding legislative policy determination[s].”  See id. at 976–77 (noting courts deference to policy determinations when deciding to recognize a new common-law duty consistent with statute).  Additionally, some statues may “resolv[e] a policy issue that courts had previously relied on to reject the duty.”  See id. at 962 (observing that when new legislation resolves previous objections to applying a duty, courts may subsequently recognize that duty under common law).

[18] See Peter F. Lake, Common Law Duty in Negligence Law: The Recent Consolidation of a Consensus on the Expansion of Analysis of Duty and the New Conservative Liability Limiting Use of Policy Considerations, 34 San Diego L. Rev. 1503, 1537 (1997) (clarifying that duty in Florida negligence law turns on whether defendant’s conduct foreseeably created general risk of harm); see also Drake, Jr., supra note 9, at 10 (describing Florida’s notable approach to duty).  Florida’s duty analysis hinges exclusively on foreseeability as the basis for recognizing a duty of care.  See id. (categorizing Florida’s duty analysis as relying exclusively on foreseeability of harm to determine whether duty exists).

[19] 543 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1989).

[20] 593 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 1992).

[21] See Kaisner, 543 So. 2d at 733–36 (Fla. 1989) (establishing foreseeability zone of risk test); Drake, supra note 9, at 10 (discussing Kaisner’s effect on McCain).  The “foreseeable zone of risk” framework articulated in Kaisner served as McCain’s “supporting authority.”  See id. (describing McCain’s use of the foreseeability-zone-of-risk test for duty analysis).  In Florida, if the defendant’s conduct “foreseeably created a broader zone of risk” posing harm to others, then the “minimal threshold” requirement for recognizing a legal duty is satisfied.   See id. (clarifying that when defendant’s conduct generates a foreseeable risk of harm, Florida law imposes duty either to mitigate risk or ensure adequate precautions are taken).

[22] See Thomas A. Bustin & William N. Drake, Jr, Judicial Tort Reform: Transforming Florida’s Waiver of Sovereign Immunity Statute, 32 Stetson L. Rev. 469, 488 (2003) (discussing Florida Supreme Courts’ use of foreseeability test).  The Court has “adhered tenaciously to its foreseeable-zone-of-risk analysis.”  See id. (noting that Court has applied foreseeable zone-of-risk framework to nine cases following Kaisner, finding duty in each case); Drake, supra note 9, at 10 (observing that Florida diverges from majority of jurisdictions by defining existence of duty solely through foreseeability of harm).

[23] See Bustin & Drake, supra note 22, at 486 n.105 (explaining that Florida’s foreseeability-based duty standard has displaced narrower traditional duty rules, thereby broadening potential liability for both public entities and private actors); see also Drake, supra note 9, at 10 (emphasizing how since McCain, court has employed this standard to consistently conclude duty existed).  See generally Pate v. Threkel, 661 So. 2d 279, 281–82 (Fla. 1995) (employing broad foreseeability test and finding legal duty on physician); Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So. 2d 533, 538 (Fla. 1991) (utilizing foreseeability test to side-step public duty doctrine and find duty on sheriff’s deputies).

[24] See Dana H. Benbow, 3 High School Athletes Died of Sudden Cardiac Arrest. Their Moms Are Fighting back, Play for Jake Found., (Oct. 20, 2021), https://playforjake.org/3-high-school-athletes-died-of-sudden-cardiac-arrest-their-moms-are-fighting-back/ (noting that sudden cardiac death is leading cause of death for high school athletes in United States).  Zac Mago, a seventeen-year-old high school basketball player, went to take a nap after practice and died from sudden cardiac death.  See id. (discussing Zac’s mother, Teresa Mago’s, reaction to son’s sudden cardiac death and subsequent efforts to advocate for AED precautions).  Mark Mayfield, a seventeen-year-old basketball player, collapsed after walking off the court and died from sudden cardiac arrest.  See id. (discussing Mark’s mother, Diane Mayfield’s, reaction to son’s sudden cardiac death and her campaign for better cardiac training at school).  Jake West, a high school football player, collapsed on the field during a play and died from sudden cardiac arrest.  See id. (discussing Jake’s mother, Julie West’s, reaction to son’s sudden cardiac death and her efforts to improve bystanders’ responses to cardiac arrest).  For further discussion on the recurring harm derived from sudden cardiac deaths in young athletes, see supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.

[25] See Regina Gonzalez & Jordan Bowen, New Florida Law Requires Heart Screenings for High School Athletes. Here’s What to Know, FOX 13 Tampa Bay (Jul. 22, 2025, at 22:04 EDT), https://www.fox13news.com/news/new-florida-law-requires-heart-screenings-high-school-athletes-heres-what-know (reporting swift bipartisan organization to pass Second Chance Act after sudden cardiac death of multiple high-school student-athletes).  For further discussion on the legislature’s intent behind the Second Chance Act, see supra notes 1–4 and accompanying text.

[26] See Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 1003 (2014) at 966 (explaining that safety statutes in negligence actions provide standards of conduct the court may adopt to define the standard of care when determining liability); see also DeJesus v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 281 So. 2d 198, 201 (Fla. 1973) (holding that statutory violations are evidence of negligence); Brackin v. Boles, 452 So. 2d 540, 544 (Fla. 1984) (reaffirming that statutory violations are evidence of negligence but do not conclusively establish negligence).  For further discussion of how foreseeability impacts the standard of care determinations by Florida judiciaries, see supra notes 18–22 and accompanying text.

[27] See Drake, Jr., supra note 9, at 10 (highlighting Florida’s distinctive duty analysis, which deems duty fully established once defendant’s conduct is shown to have foreseeably created broader zone of risk of harm); see also Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 1009 (describing how courts accept legislative safety measures as evidence in negligence inquiries out of deference to lawmakers).  For further discussion of how judiciaries treat statutes regulating safety measures in relation to the common law duty of care, see supra note 11 and accompanying text.

[28] See Limones v. School District of Lee County, 161 So. 3d 384, 391, 401 (noting Florida public schools’ longstanding duty to exercise reasonable care in supervising students during on-campus and school-sponsored activities).  For further discussion on the duty owed by Florida schools to students, especially in the medical context, see supra notes 12, 17 and accompanying text.

[29] See Limones, 161 So. 3d at 391 (emphasizing effect of circumstances on school’s reasonable duty of care to students).  The “methods and means of fulfilling that duty” depends on circumstances, especially regarding “advancements with technology and equipment available today.”  See id. (discussing whether presence of AED on school grounds expands school’s duty of care in light of evolving medical and technological knowledge).  See generally DeMitchell et al., supra note 15, at 267 (analogizing West Virginia’s approach to duty to Florida’s given shared emphasis on duty’s evolution with changes in society).

[30] 161 So. 3d 384 (Fla. 2015) (holding that school owed duty to take reasonable measures to aid student who collapsed from cardiac arrest during soccer match).

[31] See id. at 393 (finding that whether reasonable post-injury efforts required use of AED, even with statutory mandate to maintain one on campus, was jury question).  The Florida law required public schools to “acquire an AED, train staff in its use, and register its location,” yet the Court declined to hold that failure to use the device during a medical emergency constituted a per se breach of duty.  See id. at 391–92 (explaining that statutory AED requirements establish duty to maintain device, but jury determines whether statutes dictate standard of care in specific emergency circumstance).  The Court further clarified that statutory immunity applies only to harm caused by use of an AED, not to claims alleging failure to act with reasonable care.  See id. at 393 (distinguishing immunity for AED use from liability for negligent inaction during medical emergency).

[32] See id at 389–90 (rejecting Second District’s approach).  The Florida Supreme Court rejected “narrowly fram[ing] the issue” as whether the school had a specific duty to use an AED.  See id. at 391 (reasoning that reasonable care under specific circumstances is evolving standard based on facts).  In Florida, reasonable care standards are not “fixed concept[s]” but ones that evolve with changing technology, medical knowledge, and the circumstances under which the school’s duty is triggered.  See id. at 391, 397 (emphasizing that standard of care changes over time because “methods and means” of fulfilling that duty “[depend] on [fluctuating] circumstances,” including societal developments).

[33] See Second Chance Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 1002.20(17)(b)(1)–(2), 1006.165(6)(b) (West 2025) (requiring student-athletes to satisfactorily complete medical screenings before athletic participation, indicating EKG screening’s treatment as preventive safety measures intended to detect cardiac issues before play).  Common law has traditionally been more reluctant to impose affirmative rescue duties than to recognize duties of risk prevention.  See Limones, 161 So. 3d at 390 (describing general tort principle that declines to extend affirmative duty absent special relationship).  “A party does not have a duty to take affirmative action to protect or aid another unless a special relationship exists which creates such a duty.”  Id. (discussing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 314 cmt. a (1965)).

[34] See Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 980 (explaining that when new statute resolves policy issue that previously led courts to reject duty, courts may defer to legislative judgment and recognize corresponding component of common-law duty); see also Limones, 161 So. 3d at 391–93 (emphasizing that while existence of school’s duty to protect students remains constant, “methods and means” of fulfilling that duty evolve with changing medical knowledge and circumstances).

[35] See Kaisner v. Kolb, 543 So. 2d 723, 733–36 (Fla. 1989) (establishing zone-of-risk test which finds duty whenever conduct creates foreseeable zone of harm).  For further discussion on how Florida courts interpret foreseeability to establish duty, see supra notes 21–22 and accompanying text.

[36] See McCain v. Fla. Power Corp., 593 So. 2d 501, 502 (1992) (limiting duty inquiry to zone-of-risk foreseeability test); Limones, 161 So. 3d at 389 n.5

(explaining that determining whether duty exists requires considering parties’ identity and relationship and whether any special relationship gives rise to a specific duty); see also id. (clarifying that foreseeability remains central inquiry in establishing duty of care and further factual analysis risks encroaching on jury’s role in determining breach); Drake, Jr., supra note 9, at 10 (explaining how Florida will recognize duty whenever actor creates foreseeable risk of harm to others).  For further discussion on how the legislature affects judicial interpretations of duty and foreseeability, see supra notes 18–22, 28 and accompanying text.

[37] See Limones, 161 So. 3d at 385 (noting how methods to fulfill unchanging common law duty of care may evolve as medical circumstances change).  The Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Limones to submit the question of whether the school’s duty encompassed the use of an AED to the jury reflects the judiciary’s reluctance to impose a categorical mandate on schools.  See id. at 393 (remanding for jury to determine whether use of AED was required, reasoning that “means” of fulfilling duty evolve with changing circumstances and that imposing categorical rule would improperly remove issue of reasonable care from jury’s determination); see also Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 908, 1003 (noting that statutory enactments may justify judicial recognition of new duties when they address policy concerns that previously limited common-law liability).  The Second Chance Act appears to resolve such a policy issue: unlike the AED requirement at issue in Limones, which merely required schools to maintain the device, the statute affirmatively mandates cardiac screenings, thereby providing legislative support for recognizing a broader preventive duty.  See Limones, 161 So. 3d at 391–93 (discussing statutory AED requirements limited to maintaining device on campus); see generally Lake, supra note 18, at 1503, 1537 (explaining principle of common law that allows it to grow and evolve to meet evolving needs of society).  For further discussion on Florida’s reluctance to make duty and foreseeability determinations that might infringe upon the jury’s role, see supra note 38 and accompanying text.  For further discussion of how the Second Chance Act may impact the Florida judiciary’s duty analysis, see supra note 36 and accompanying text.

[38] See Drake Jr., supra note 9, at 10 (explaining Florida’s threshold standard for duty, which is conduct creating a foreseeable zone of risk); Lake, supra note 18, at 1537 (emphasizing Florida’s unique duty analysis hinges on foreseeability); see also Limones, 161 So. 3d at 392 (explaining how once duty is determined, Florida law necessitates that the jury must consider how reasonably prudent person would act under circumstances).  Once duty is met, the remaining decision on how that duty should have been fulfilled is “a jury function.”  See id. at 389 (describing jury’s function as determining the specific actions and precautionary measures necessary to satisfy obligation of particularized reasonable care under the circumstances).  Thus, a satisfactory execution of duty evolves alongside adaptions to new circumstances and risks.  See id. (noting that scope of Florida school’s duty is fixed, but manner of fulfillment may vary); see generally Geistfeld, supra note 8, at 908 (explaining how judges rely on statutes to shape tort analysis when it represents policy determinations unanswered by existing common law).

[39] See Second Chance Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 1002.20(17)(b)(1)–(2), 1006.165(6)(b) (West 2025) (requiring schools to seek partnerships with hospitals and nonprofits to provide low-cost EKGs).  See also Limones, 161 So. 3d at 391, 397 (highlighting how means of fulfilling duty of reasonable care evolves alongside changes in society and technology especially in school-student medical context).  The Second Chance Act defines these new “method and means” by encouraging schools to seek partnerships with hospitals and nonprofits to provide low-cost EKGs.  See Limones, 161 So. 3d at 393 (noting that whether school district acted reasonably in attempting to use certain methods is question of breach for jury); see also Second Chance Act § 1006.165(6)(b) (requiring method of partnership-seeking by schools).  For further discussion on how Florida law requires juries to determine the reasonableness of the defendant’s action once duty is established, see supra note 35 and accompanying text.

[40] See Limones, 161 So. 3d at 393 (declining to categorically frame duty as AED use).  The Court rejected this approach because applying fixed duties to the common law tradition “slides too easily into breach, a factual matter for the jury.”  See id. at 391 (reasoning that reasonable care is flexible standard and arguing that defining duty too specifically is improper because duty’s fulfillment methods depend on case-by-case context); see also DeMitchell et al., supra note 15, at 253, 266 (describing core question in breach analysis as whether actor acted reasonably under circumstances).

[41] See Norin Dollard, Florida Child Well-Being Index: 2025, Fla. Pol’y Inst., (Feb. 19, 2025), https://www.floridapolicy.org/posts/2022-florida-child-well-being-index (explaining data showing that thirty to thirty-five of sixty-seven Florida school districts are considered high poverty and higher-poverty school districts receive around sixteen percent less revenue than zero-poverty districts); ERS, Poverty, Homelessness Rising Sharply Among Florida Students, ERStrategies, https://www.erstrategies.org/news/poverty-homelessness-rising-sharply-among-florida-students/ (last visited Sept. 29, 2025) (noting how fifteen to twenty Florida school districts exceed thirty-percent child poverty rate); Florida’s Regional Consortia – Serving Small, Rural School Districts, Regional Consortia Overview, Panhandle Area Educ. Consortium 1 (Aug. 2024), https://www.paec.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/Regional-Consortia-Overview.pdf (providing that Florida has three rural district consortia, including 36 school districts and 430 schools serving more than 160,000 students).

[42] See The Adequacy and Equity in Capital Funding for Florida’s PK-12 Public Schools, LeRoy Collins Inst. 1, 59 (July 5, 2022), https://lci.fsu.edu//wp-content/uploads/sites/28/2022/08/FINAL-Adequacy-and-Equity-in-Capital-Funding-for-Floridas-Public-Schools-7-5-2022.pdf (explaining that students attending wealthier districts have much more capital support than students in poorer districts).  The “lion’s share” of this funding comes “from local property tax revenue.”  See id. at 60 (finding that each one percent increase in per-capita income correlates with one point forty-five percent increase in capital funding, indicating that wealthier Florida school districts are substantially better positioned); see also Tonie Marie Gordon, Closing Care Gaps: Physician Shortages, Medical Deserts, and Health Disparities, Nonprofit Quarterly (Mar. 11, 2024), https://nonprofitquarterly.org/closing-care-gaps-physician-shortages-medical-deserts-and-health-disparities/ (explaining how medical centers and the most physicians and surgeons are located near cities); Rural Health Disparities Overview, RHIhub, https://www.ruralhealthinfo.org/topics/rural-health-disparities (last visited Sept. 24, 2025) (noting that healthcare services are less available in rural areas and offer less specialized or sophisticated care).  Rural residents have “lower income than urban counterparts” and rural areas overall have “higher poverty rates,” with rural residents less likely to have insurance and more likely to face health coverage gaps.  See id. (identifying that lower socioeconomic status, greater geographic isolation, and other constraints create huge disparity in health care access for rural districts).

[43] See Rural Health Disparities Overview, supra note 43 (explaining how reliable transportation is major barrier for healthcare access).  For further discussion of how affluent school districts face less barriers in securing funding and medical resources, see supra note 43 and accompanying text.

[44] See Bruce D. Baker & Sean P. Corcoran, The Stealth Inequities of School Funding, Ctr. for Am. Progress, (Sept. 19, 2012), https://www.americanprogress.org/article/the-stealth-inequities-of-school-funding/ (noting that school districts with greatest needs receive least resources).  For further discussion on the double bind faced by under-resourced school districts in Florida, see infra notes 45–48 and accompanying text.

[45] See Second Chance Act, Fla. Stat. Ann. §1006.165(6)(b) (West 2025) (exempting districts unable to provide EKGs for less than fifty dollars); see also Limones, 161 So. 3d at 393 (indicating that Florida negligence liability turns on reasonableness of conduct under circumstances).  Duty arises when a foreseeable harm is recognized, and liability depends on the reasonableness of the specific actor’s response to that risk.  See id. (illustrating that statutory safety standards inform foreseeability, since question of whether statutory AED requirement made AED use part of school’s duty was left to jury).  Likewise, Florida school districts without demonstrated good-faith efforts to secure partnerships may be found liable because statutory obligations help inform what a reasonable district would do under the circumstances.  See id. at 390 (limiting statute’s effect on duty by emphasizing case-by-case assessment over categorical rules governing how duty is fulfilled).  For further discussion of how under-resourced districts unable to provide low-cost EKGs are exempt from the statute but may still face negligence liability for a students’ sudden cardiac death, see supra notes 14–23 and accompanying text.

[46] See Gordon, supra note 43 (noting statistic that three-fifths of 7,200 federally designated health care shortage areas are in rural regions); Rural Health Disparities Overview, supra note 43 (highlighting chronic barriers faced by health facilities in rural areas).  These include severe shortages in both medical and non-profit infrastructure and personnel, as well as outdated technology.  See id. (emphasizing that rural districts face insufficient funding which weakens ability to deliver preventive and emergent care); see also Holly Bullard, Funding Florida’s K-12 Public Schools: Inadequacy Breeds Inequity, Fla. Pol’y Inst. (Feb. 28, 2022), https://www.floridapolicy.org/posts/funding-floridas-k-12-public-schools-inadequacy-breeds-inequity (noting how Florida’s impoverished school districts are significantly disadvantaged in funding and resources).

[47] See Rural Health Disparities Overview, supra note 42 (explaining how rural populations have worse health statuses than urban residents and are less likely to use “preventive health services” or have “private health insurance.”).

[48] See Gordon, supra note 43 (noting that rural residents are more likely to die from cardiovascular disease than others).  For further discussion on how students at under-resourced school districts are more vulnerable to sudden cardiac death, see supra notes 38–39, 45 and accompanying text.  For further discussion on how the Second Chance Act may result in increased liability for under-resourced and rural districts, see supra notes 42–46 and accompanying text.