“In order for anyone to do well whether in the daily activities of life or in the peace of their own heart, they need the fellowship of friends.”

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Lectio 1 – Divine Existence

ST I, Q.2, A.3- Whether God Exists?


Objection 1. It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.

Iª q. 2 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, quod potest compleiri per pauciora principia, non fit per plura. Sed videtur quod omnia quae apparent in mundo, possunt compleiri per alia principia, supposito quod Deus non sit, quia ea quae sunt naturalia, reducuntur in principium quod est natura; ea vero quae sunt a proposito, reducuntur in principium quod est ratio humana vel voluntas. Nulla igitur necessitas est ponere Deum esse.

Objection 2. Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.

Iª q. 2 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Exodi III, ex persona Dei, ego sum qui sum

On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." (Exodus 3:14)

Iª q. 2 a. 3 co. 1 Respondeo dicendum quod Deum esse quinque viis probari potest.

I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways

Iª q. 2 a. 3 co. 2 Prima autem et manifestior via est, quae sumitur ex parte motus. Certum est enim, et sensu constat, aliqua moveri in hoc mundo. Omne autem quod movetur, ab alio movetur. Nihil enim movetur, nisi secundum quod est in potentia ad illud ad quod movetur, movet autem aliquid secundum quod est actu. Movere enim nihil aliud est quam

The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion except it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves inasmuch as it is in act. For motion is nothing else
educere aliquid de potentia in actum, de potentia autem non potest aliquid reduci in actum, nisi per aliquod ens in actu, sicut calidum in actu, ut ignis, facit lignum, quod est calidum in potentia, esse actu calidum, et per hoc movet et alterat ipsum. Non autem est possibile ut idem sit simul in actu et potentia secundum idem, sed solum secundum diversa, quod enim est calidum in actu, non potest simul esse calidum in potentia, sed est simul frigidum in potentia. Impossibile est ergo quod, secundum idem et eodem modo, aliquid sit movens et motum, vel quod moveat seipsum. Omne ergo quod movetur, oportet ab alio moveri. Si ergo id a quo movetur, moveatur, oportet et ipsum ab alio moveri et illud ab alio. Hic autem non est procedere in infinitum, quia sic non esset aliquod primum movens; et per consequens nec aliquod aliud movens, quia moventia secunda non movent nisi per hoc quod sunt mota a primo movente, sicut baculus non movet nisi per hoc quod est motus a manu. Ergo necesse est devenire ad aliquod primum movens, quod a nullo movetur, et hoc omnes intelligunt Deum.

Iª q. 2 a. 3 co. 3 Secunda via est ex ratione causae efficientis. Invenimus enim in istis sensibilibus esse ordinem causarum efficientium, nec tamen invenitur, nec est possibile, quod aliquid sit causa efficiens sui ipsius; quia sic esset prius seipso, quod est impossible. Non autem est possibile quod in causis efficientibus procedatur in infinitum. Quia in omnibus causis efficientibus ordinatis, primum est causa medii, et medium est causa ultimi, sive media sint plura sive unum tantum, remotae autem causa, movetur effectus, ergo, si non fuerit primum in causis efficientibus, non erit ultimum nec medium. Sed si procedatur in infinitum in causis efficientibus, non erit prima than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for so it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no
causa efficiens, et sic non erit nec effectus ultimus, nec causae efficiences mediae, quod patet esse falsum. Ergo est necesse ponere aliquam causam efficientem primam, quam omnes Deum nominant.

Iª q. 2 a. 3 co. 4 Tertia via est sumpta ex possibili et necessario, quae talis est. Invenimus enim in rebus quaedam quae sunt possibilia esse et non esse, cum quaedam inveniantur generari et corrupi, et per consequens possibilia esse et non esse. Impossible est autem omnia quae sunt, talia esse, quia quod possibile est non esse, quandoque non est. Si igitur omnia sunt possibilia non esse, aliquando nihil fuit in rebus. Sed si hoc est verum, etiam nunc nihil esset, quia quod non est, non incipit esse nisi per aliquid quod est; si igitur nihil fuit ens, impossibile fuit quod aliquid inciperet esse, et sic modo nihil esset, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo omnia entia sunt possibilia, sed oportet aliquid esse necessarium in rebus. Omne autem necessarium vel habet causam suae necessitatis aliunde, vel non habet. Non est autem possibile quod procedatur in infinitum in necessariis quae habent causam suae necessitatis, sicut nec in causis efficientibus, ut probatum est. Ergo necesse est ponere aliquid quod sit per se necessarium, non habens causam necessitatis aliunde, sed quod est causa necessitatis aliis, quod omnes dicunt Deum.

Iª q. 2 a. 3 co. 5 Quarta via sumitur ex gradibus qui in rebus inveniuntur. Invenitur enim in rebus aliquid magis et minus bonum, et verum, et nobile, et sic de aliis huimusmodi. Sed magis ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence---which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of
et minus dicuntur de diversis secundum quod appropinquant
diversimode ad aliquid quod maxime est, sicut magis calidum
est, quod magis appropinquat maxime calido. Est igitur aliquid
quod est verissimum, et optimum, et nobilissimum, et per
consequens maxime ens, nam quae sunt maxime vera, sunt
maxime entia, ut dicitur II Metaphys. Quod autem dicitur
maxime tale in aliquo genere, est causa omnium quae sunt illius
generis, sicut ignis, qui est maxime calidus, est causa omnium
calidorum, ut in eodem libro dicitur. Ergo est aliquid quod
omnibus entibus est causa esse, et bonitatis, et cuiuslibet
perfectionis, et hoc dicimus Deum.

Iº q. 2 a. 3 co. 6 Quinta via sumitur ex gubernatione rerum.
Videmus enim quod aliqua quae cognitione carent, scilicet
corpora naturalia, operantur propter finem, quod apparat ex hoc
quod semper aut frequentius eodem modo operantur, ut
consequuntur id quod est optimum; unde patet quod non a casu,
sed ex intentione perveniunt ad finem. Ea autem quae non
habent cognitionem, non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab aliquo
cognoscente et intelligente, sicut sagitta a sagittante. Ergo est
aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad
finem, et hoc dicimus Deum.

Iº q. 2 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, sicut dicit
Augustinus in Enchiridio, Deus, cum sit summe bonus, nullo
modo sineret aliquid mali esse in operibus suis, nisi esset adeo
omnipotens et bonus, ut bene faceret etiam de malo. Hoc ergo
ad infinitam Dei bonitatem pertinet, ut esse permittat mala, et
ex eis eliciat bona.

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see
that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act
for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly
always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it
is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve
their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards
an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with
knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by
the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all
natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call
God.

Reply to Objection 1. As Augustine says (Enchiridion xi):
"Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to
exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were
such as to bring good even out of evil." This is part of the
infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and
out of it produce good.
Reply to Objection 2. Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must needs be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article.

Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics VIII, Lectio 1- Opinions on the beginning and end of motion

Chapter 1 – Aristotle’s Text

It remains to consider the following question. Was there ever a becoming of motion before which it had no being, and is it perishing again so as to leave nothing in motion? Or are we to say that it never had any becoming and is not perishing, but always was and always will be? Is it in fact an immortal never-failing property of things that are, a sort of life as it were to all naturally constituted things?

Now the existence of motion is asserted by all who have anything to say about nature, because they all concern themselves with the construction of the world and study the question of becoming and perishing, which processes could not come about without the existence of motion.

But those who say that there is an infinite number of worlds, some of which are in process of becoming while others are in process of perishing, assert that there is always motion (for these processes of becoming and perishing of the worlds necessarily involve motion),
ὅσοι δὲ ἕνα ἢ μὴ ἅμια, καὶ περὶ τῆς κινήσεως ὑποτίθενται κατὰ λόγον. εἰ δὲ ἐνδέχεται ποτὲ μηδὲν κινεῖσθαι, δηλώς ἀνάγκη τούτῳ συμβαίνειν: ἢ γὰρ ὡς Ἀναξαγόρας λέγει (φησὶν γὰρ ἐκεῖνος, ὅμως πάντων ὄντων καὶ ἑκομοῦντων τὸν ἰσχυρὸν χρόνον, κίνησιν ἐμποίησαι τὸν νῦν καὶ διακρίνει), ἢ ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐν μέρει κινεῖσθαι καὶ πάλιν ἁρεῖσθαι, κινεῖσθαι μὲν ὅταν ἡ φύσις ἐκ πολλῶν ποιή τὸ ἕν ἢ τὸ νεῖκος πολλά εἰς ἑνός, ἁρεῖσθαι δὲ ἐν τοῖς μεταξὺ χρόνοις.

λέγων οὔτως ἢ μὲν ἕν ἐκ πλεόνων μεμάθηκε φύεσθαι, ἢ ἐκ πάλιν διαφύσεως ἕνός πλέον ἐκτελέσθωσιν, (251a.) τῇ μὲν γίγνονταί τε καὶ οὐ σφισιν ἐμπεδοσι αἰώνι. ἢ δὲ τάδ' ἀλλάσοντα διαμερέσαντ' ὅσαν ἐλήμενε ταῦτα δ' αἵνε ἐσαιν ἀκίνητοι κατὰ κύκλων.

τὸ γὰρ "ἡ δὲ τάδ' ἀλλάσοντα" ἐνθένδε ἐκείσθη λέγειν αὐτὸν ὑποληπτέον.

σκεπτέον δὴ περὶ τούτων πῶς ἔχειν'

whereas those who hold that there is only one world, whether everlasting or not, make corresponding assumptions in regard to motion. If then it is possible that at any time nothing should be in motion, this must come about in one of two ways: either in the manner described by Anaxagoras, who says that all things were together and at rest for an infinite period of time, and that then Mind introduced motion and separated them; or in the manner described by Empedocles, according to whom the universe is alternately in motion and at rest—in motion, when Love is making the one out of many, or Strife is making many out of one, and at rest in the intermediate periods of time—his account being as follows:

'Since One hath learned to spring from Manifold, And One disjoined makes manifold arise, Thus they Become, nor stable is their life: But since their motion must alternate be, Thus have they ever Rest upon their round':

for we must suppose that he means by this that they alternate from the one motion to the other.

We must consider, then, how this matter stands, for the discovery of the truth about it is of importance, not only for the study of nature, but also for the investigation of the First Principle.

Thomas’s Commentary:

lib. 8 l. 1 n. 1 Postquam philosophus in praecedenti libro ostendit quod necesse est ponere primum mobile, et primum motum, et primum motorem; in hoc libro intendit inquirere qualis sit primum motor, et primum motus, et primum mobile.
Et dividitur in partes duas: in prima praemittit quod est necessarium ad sequentem investigationem, scilicet motum esse sempiternum; in secunda procedit ad investigationem propositi, ibi: principium autem considerationis et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo movet dubitationem; secundo ostendit veritatem secundum suam opinionem, ibi: incipiemus autem primum etc.; terto solvit ea quae in contrarium obiici possunt, ibi: contraria autem his et cetera. Circa primum tria facit: primo proponit dubitationem; secundo ponit opiniones ad utramque partem, ibi: sed quanti quidem etc.; terto ostendit utilitatem huius considerationis, ibi: considerandum igitur de hoc et cetera. Circa primum duo facit: primo proponit dubitationem de qua investigare intendit; secundo respondet tacitae quaestioni, ibi: esse quidem igitur et cetera.

The book is divided into two parts: in the first he premises something necessary to the following investigation, namely, that motion is sempiternal; in the second he proceeds to investigate what is proposed. (L. 5). About the first he does three things: First he raises a problem; Secondly, he states the truth according to his own opinion, (L. 2); Thirdly, he answers possible objections to the contrary, (L. 4). In regard to the first he does three things: First he proposes his problem; Secondly, he gives opinions for both sides, at 968; Thirdly, he shows the usefulness of this consideration, at 970. About the first he does two things: First he proposes the problem he intends to investigate; Secondly, he responds to a tacit question, at 967.

lib. 8 l. 1 n. 2 Circa primum sciendum est, quod Averroes dicit quod Aristoteles in hoc capitulo non intendit inquirere in universali utrum motus sit sempiternus, sed de primo motu. Sed si quis consideret et verba et processum philosophi, hoc est omnino falsum. Verba enim philosophi universaliter de motu loquuntur, quia dicit: utrum factus sit aliquando motus, cum non esset prius, et corrumpitur iterum sic quod moveri nihil sit. Ex quo manifeste appareat quod non de aliquo motu determinato quierit, sed universaliter: utrum aliquando nihil fuerit motus. Ex ipso etiam Aristotelis processu appareat hoc esse falsum. Primo quidem quia consuetudo sua est, semper ad propositum ex propriis argumentari; si quis autem sequentes rationes consideret quas inducit, in nulla earum sumitur aliquid pro medio, quod proprie ad primum motum pertineat, sed ad motum in communi. Unde ex hoc satis appareat quod intendit hic inquirere de sempiternitate motus in communi. Secundo quia, 966. In regard to the first it should be known that Averroes says that Aristotle in this book does not intend to inquire whether motion is sempiternal universally, but limits his question to the first motion. But if one considers both the words and procedure of the Philosopher, this is entirely false. For the words of the Philosopher speak of motion in a universal sense. He says in effect: “Was there ever a becoming of motion before which it had no being and is it perishing again so as to leave nothing in motion?” From this it is clear that he is not inquiring about one definite motion but about motion universally, asking whether at any time there was no motion. The falseness of Averroes’ statement appears also from the very procedure of Aristotle. First, it is Aristotle’s custom always to argue to his proposition from proper causes. Now, if anyone will consider the arguments he adduces, he will see that in none of them does Aristotle argue from a middle term that refers properly to the first motion, but he argues rather from a middle proper to motion in general. Hence this alone
si iam probatum esset quod est aliquis motus unus vel plures sempiterni, frustra inquireret inferius, utrum aliqua moveantur semper; cum hoc iam esset probatum. Ridiculum est etiam dicere quod Aristoteles inferius reiteret suam considerationem a principio, quasi aliquid omisisset, ut Commentator fingit. Erat enim copia Aristoteli corrigendi librum suum, et suppleundi in loco debito quod fuerat omissum, ut non inordinate procederet. Si enim hoc capitulum exponatur secundum praedicti Commentatoris intentionem, omnia sequentia confusa et inordinata apparebunt. Nec est mirum: quia uno inconvenienti posito, alia sequuntur. Adhuc autem manifestius hoc apparat per hoc, quod Aristoteles inferius inquirere intendens de sempiternitate primi motus, utitur eo quod hic demonstratur, quasi principio: quod nullo modo faceret, si hic probasset primum motum esse aeternum. Ratio autem ex quae Averroes motus fuit, omnino frivola est. Dicit enim quod si dicatur quod Aristoteles hic intendit inquirere de sempiternitate motus in communi, sequetur quod consideratio Aristotelis hic sit diminuta; quia non apparat per id quod hic determinatur, quomodo motus semper possint continuari ad invicem. Sed hoc nihil est: quia Aristoteli sufficit in hoc capitulo probare in communi quod motus semper fuerit; qualiter autem sempiternitas motus continuetur, utrum per hoc quod omnia semper moveantur, vel per hoc quod omnia quandoque moveantur et quandoque quiescant, vel per hoc quod quaedam semper moventur, quaedam vero quandoque moventur et quandoque quiescant, statim immediate inquiret. Sic igitur secundum hanc intentionem exponendum est praesens capitulum, quod intendit hic inquirere de motu in communi. Quaerit ergo secundum hoc, utrum motus in communi aliquando esse inceperit, ita quod prius nihil shows that he intends to inquire here about the sempiternity of motion in general. Secondly, if he had already proved that there is one or a number of sempiternal motions, he would have been foolish to ask below whether anything is eternally in motion, for that question would have been already answered. It also is ridiculous to say that Aristotle would repeat from the start his consideration of a problem he had already settled, and act as though he had omitted something, as the Commentator pretends. For Aristotle had the opportunity to correct his book and fill in at the proper place any section he had omitted, so as not to proceed in a disorderly way. For if this chapter had been treated in the way charged by the Commentator, everything that follows would be confused and disorderly. This is not strange, for, having supposed an initial impossibility, others then follow. Furthermore, the correctness of our view is shown by the fact that Aristotle later on uses what he proves here, as a principle to prove the eternity of the first motion. He would never have done this, had he already proved that the first motion is eternal. The reason which moved Averroes is wholly frivolous. For he says that if Aristotle is here intending to inquire into the eternity of motion in common, it will follow that the consideration of Aristotle has been diminished, because it is not evident from what he proves in this place, how motions could be always continued one to the other. But this has no weight, because it is enough for Aristotle to prove in this chapter in a general way that motion has always been. But how the eternity of motion is continued—whether it is because all things are always in motion, or because all things are sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest, or because some things are always in motion and others sometimes in motion and sometimes at rest—is a question he raises immediately after the present one. Thus the present chapter must be explained according to this intention, namely, that he intends to inquire about motion in common.
unquam motum fuerit; et quandoque sic deficiat quod nihil postmodum moveatur: aut e contrario, neque unquam inceperit, neque unquam deficiet; sed semper erat, et semper erit. Et ponit exemplum in animalibus, propter hoc quod quidam dixerunt mundum esse quoddam animal magnum. Videmus enim quod animalia vivunt, quamdiu apparat in eis aliquis motus: cessante autem omni motu, dicuntur animalia mori. Sic igitur et in tota universitate naturalium corporum motus consideratur ut vita quaedam. Si ergo motus semper fuit et semper erit, ista quasi vita naturalium corporum erit immortalis et sine cessatione.

According to this, therefore, he asks: “Did motion in common begin to be at some time, so that previously there had never been any motion, and so that at some time it will perish so as to leave nothing in motion, or, on the other hand, did it never begin and will it never cease, so that it always was and always will be? And he gives an example taken from animals, for some philosophers have said that the world is a certain large animal. For we see animals as alive so long as motion is apparent in them, but when all motion ceases in them they are said to be dead. Accordingly, motion in the whole universe of natural bodies is taken as a kind of life. If, therefore, motion always was and always will be, then this sort of life of natural bodies will be immortal and never-failing.

lib. 8 l. 1 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit: esse quidem igitur etc., respondet tacitae quaestioni. In praecedentibus enim libris Aristoteles locutus fuerat de motu in communi, non applicando ad res: nunc autem inquirens an motus semper fuerit, applicat communem considerationem motus ad esse quod habet in rebus. Posset ergo aliquis dicere, quod in hac consideratione prius erat quaerendum de motu, an habeat esse in rebus, quam quaeratur an sit sempiternus: et praecipue, cum quidam negaverint esse motum. Ad hoc respondet, dicens quod omnes qui locuti sunt de natura rerum, affirmant quod motus sit. Et hoc patet per hoc, quod dicunt mundum esse factum; et quod omnes considerant de generatione et corruptione rerum, quae non potest esse sine motu. Est igitur communis suppositio in scientia naturali, quod motus habeat esse in rebus. Unde de hoc non est quaerendum in scientia naturali: sicut nec in aliqua scientia movetur quaestio de suppositionibus illius scientiae.

lib. 8 l. 1 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit: sed quanti quidem etc., ponit opiniones ad utramque partem quaestionis motae. Et primo

967. Then at (749 250 b15) he answers a tacit question. For in the preceding books Aristotle had discussed motion in common, without applying it to things; but now, inquiring whether motion has always existed, he applies his general doctrine about motion to the existence it has in things. Therefore, someone could say that in this consideration the first question should have been about whether motion has existence in things rather than whether it is eternal, especially since there are some who have denied that motion exists. To this he responds that all who have spoken about the nature of things admit that motion exists. This is evident from their statements that the world was made, and from their consideration of the generation and ceasing-to-be of things, which cannot occur without motion. It is therefore a common supposition in natural science that motion has existence in things. Hence there is no need to raise this question in natural science any more than in other sciences are raised questions about the suppositions of the science.

968. Then at (750 250 b18) he presents opinions for both sides of the question he proposed. First he gives the opinions which declare
ponit opiniones dicentium motum semper esse; secundo opiniones ponentium motum non semper esse, ibi: quicumque autem et cetera. Ad evidentiam ergo primae partis scendum est, quod Democritus posuit prima rerum principia corpora indivisibilia per se et semper mobilia, ex quorum aggregatione dicebat mundum casualiter factum: et non solum istum in quo nos sumus, sed infinitos alios, secundum quod accidit in diversis partibus infiniti vacui, praedicta corpora congregata mundos fecisse. Nec tamen hos mundos ponerebat in perpetuum duraturos; sed quosdam eorum fieri per aggregationem atomorum, quosdam vero corrumpi per eorum segregationem. Quotcumque igitur philosophi hoc ponunt cum Democrito, dicunt semper esse motum; quia semper dicunt esse generationes et corruptiones aliquorum mundorum, quas necessarium est esse cum motu.

lib. 8 l. 1 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit: quicumque autem etc., ponit opiniones ad partem contrariam. Et dicit quod quicumque ponunt unum solum mundum, et non esse eum sempiternum, etiam de motu ponunt quod consequitur secundum rationem, ut scilicet non semper sit. Si ergo ponatur quod sit aliquod tempus in quo nihil movebatur, oportet quod hoc accidat duobus modis, sicut etiam duobus modis potest poni hic mundus non semper fuisset: uno modo quod mundus iste sic inceperit quod nunquam antea fuerit, sicut posuit Anaxagoras; alio modo quod mundus sic inceperit quod aliquo tempore non fuerit, sed ante illum tempus iterum fuerit, ut posuit Empedocles. Et similiiter circa motum Anaxagoras dixit quod quondam omnia simul erant unum cum alici commixtum, et nihil erat ab alici segregatum: in qua quidem rerum mixtura necesse fuit ponere quod omnia quiescerent: motus enim non est absque disgregatione; omne enim quod movetur, ab aliquo recedit, ut in aliud tendat. Hanc igitur 969. Then at (751 250 b21) he gives the opinions of the other side. And he says that whoever declare that there is just one world which is not eternal, also declare what reasonably follows with respect to motion, namely, that it is not eternal. Therefore, if there be supposed a time in which nothing was in motion, this could happen in two ways, just as it is in two ways that this world could be supposed not always to have been: in one way, that this world began in such a way that previously it never existed at all, as Anaxagoras held; in another way, that the world so began to be that it did not exist for some time previously, but that it again had existed before that time, as Empedocles held. In like manner with respect to motion, Anaxagoras said that at one time all things were a mixture of one thing with another and nothing was segregated from anything else—in which mixture it was necessary to posit that all things were at rest, for motion does not occur without separation, since whatever is in motion separates from one terminus in order to tend to another. Therefore Anaxagoras posited
rerum mixturam et quietem posuit praeexitisse in tempore infinito, ita quod nunquam antea fuerat aliquid motus; et quod intellectus, qui solus non erat permixtus, incepit de novo facere motum, et disgregare res ab invicem. Empedocles vero dixit quod in aliqua parte temporis est aliquid moveri, et iterum in alia parte temporis est omnia quiescere. Ponebat enim Empedocles quod amicitia et discordia sunt prima rerum moventia: amicitiae autem proprium est quod ex multis faciat unum, discordiae vero quod ex uno faciat multa. Quia vero ad esse corporis mixti requiritur quod elementa sint in unum commixta, ad esse vero mundi requiritur quod elementa sint in locis suis per ordinem distributa: ponebat quod amicitia est causa generationis corporum mixtorum, discordia vero causa corruptionis; sed e contrario in toto mundo amicitia causa corruptionis, et discordia generationis. Sic ergo ponebat moveri totum mundum, cum vel amicitia ex multis facit unum, vel discordia multa facit ex uno: sed quietem ponebat esse in mediis temporibus, non quidem ita quod nihil moveretur, sed quantum ad generalem mundi mutationem. Et quia posuit sententiam Empedoclis, ponit etiam eis verba, quae difficultatem habent, quia metrice scriptae sunt. Sic ergo suam sententiam expressit Empedocles his verbis, quae sic construenda sunt: didicit nasci, idest sic consuetum est aliquid generari, inquantum ex pluribus fit unum; et iterum, idest alio modo, ex uno gemitato, idest composito, perficiuntur plurima, idest fiunt multa per disgregationem: quaedam enim sunt quae generantur per compositionem, quaedam vero per disgregationem. Et sicut hoc videmus in particularibus generationibus, sic fiunt res, idest sic est intelligendum in universali rerum generatione quantum ad totum mundum. Et nullo modo est ipsius saeculum unum, idest non est unus status durationis rerum;
sed quandoque generatur mundus, quandoque corrumpitur,
quandoque medio modo se habet: saeculum enim dicitur
mensura durationis alicuius rei. Distinctionem autem horum
saeculorum exprimit subdens, sic autem permutantur; quasi
dicat: unum saeculum est in quo res permutantur per
congregationem vel seggregationem. Et ne aliquis opinaretur
quod ad generationem mundi non requiritur saeculum, idest
tempus aliquod, sed mundus fit in instanti, ad hoc
excludendum subiungit: neque simul perficiuntur, sed per
multam moram temporis. Deinde de alio saeculo subdens
dicit: sic autem semper sunt immobiles; quia scilicet in
medio tempore generationis et corruptionis posuit res
quiescere. Et ne aliquis crederet quod semper antea fuerit
permutatio, et postea semper futura sit quies, ad hoc
excludendum dicit, secundum circulum; quasi dicat:
circulariter hoc contingit, quod permutantur res et postea
quiescunt, et iterum permutantur, et sic in infinitum. Deinde
subduntur verba Aristotelis exponentis praedicta verba
Empedoclis, maxime quantum ad hoc quod dixit, sic autem
permutantur. Dicit ergo quod opinandum est in hoc quod
dixit, sic permutantur, intellexisse ab hinc inde, idest a
quodam principio usque nunc; non quod semper fuerit motus,
vel quod postquam incepit, sit interruptus.

lib. 8 l. 1 n. 6 Deinde cum dicit: considerandum igitur etc.,
ostendit utilitatem huius considerationis. Et dicit quod
considerandum est quomodo se habeat veritas circa hanc
questionem: quia scire veritatem huius questionis est
praepere, idest pernecessarium, non solum ad
do things come to be,” i.e., the same must be understood in the
universal coming-t-o-be of things with respect to the whole world.
“Nor is their era one,” i.e., there is not just one period of duration
of things; but at one time a world is generated, at another it is
destroyed, and in between there is rest: for “era” is taken to mean
the measure of the duration of a thing. He expresses the distinction
of these eras when he adds, “Thus are they changed,” i.e., as
though stating that the time in which things pass through the cycle
of combining or separating is called one era. And lest anyone
suppose that the generation of a world does not require an era, i.e.,
a period of time, but that the universe comes to be in an instant,
Empedocles adds, “nor are they made perfect all at once,” but after
a long interval of time. Then speaking of the other era he adds,
“thus are they always immobile,” i.e., in the time between the
generation and corruption cycle, he supposed that things are at rest.
And lest anyone believe that before there was always change, and
that later there will be continual rest, he excludes this by saying
“alternately,” i.e., as though saying that this happens in cycles,
namely, that things change and then rest, and then change again,
and so on ad infinitum. Then the words of Aristotle are added to
explain the foregoing words of Empedocles, especially the
expression, “thus they change.” He says therefore that following
the words, “thus they change,” must be understood the addition,
“from then hence,” i.e., from a definite beginning up to the
present—not in the sense that motion always was, or that after it
began it had been interrupted.
Metaphysics he uses the eternity of motion to prove the first principle. This method of proving the existence of a first principle is most efficacious and irresistible. For if on the supposition that both motion and the world existed forever, it is necessary to posit one first principle, then, if the eternity thereof should be rejected, it is all the more necessary, for it is clear that every new thing requires a principle bringing it into being. Now the only reason why it could seem that no first principle would be necessary, would be if things were ab aeterno. But if the existence of a first principle follows even on that supposition, i.e., that the world existed ab aeterno, it is clear that the existence of a first principle is absolutely necessary.

Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics VIII, Lectio 3- Arguments against Anaxagoras and Empedocles

Chapter 1 continued- Aristotle’s Text

and cannot have existed at one time and not at another: in fact such a view can hardly be described as anything else than fantastic.

And much the same may be said of the view that such is the ordinance of nature and that this must be regarded as a principle, as would seem to be the view of Empedocles when he says that the constitution of the world is of necessity such that Love and Strife alternately predominate and cause motion, while in the intermediate period of time there is a state of rest. Probably also those who like like Anaxagoras, assert a single principle (of motion) would hold this view.
ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲν γε ἀτακτὸν τὸν φύσει καὶ κατὰ φύσιν ἢ γὰρ φύσις αἰτία πᾶσιν τάξεως. τὸ δ’ ἀπειρὸν πρὸς τὸ ἀπειρὸν οὐδὲνα λόγον ἔχει· τάξεις δὲ πάσα λόγος. τὸ δ’ ἀπειρὸν χρόνον ἠρέμειν, εἴτα κινηθῆναι ποτε, τούτου δὲ μηδεμίαν εἶναι διαφοράν, ὅτι νῦν μάλλον ἢ πρότερον, μηδ’ αὖ τινά τάξιν ἔχειν, οὐκέτι φύσεως ἔργον. ἢ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἔχει τὸ φύσις, καὶ οὐχ ὅτε μὲν οὕτως ὅτε δ’ ἄλλως, οἶον τὸ πῦρ ἄνω φύσει φέρεται καὶ οὐχ ὅτε μὲν ὅτε δ’ οὖ· ἢ λόγον ἔχει τὸ μὴ ἀπλοῦν. διόπερ βέλτιον ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, κἂν εἰ τις ἔτερος εἴρηκεν οὕτως ἔχειν, ἐν μὲ τε τὸ πᾶν ἠρέμειν καὶ κινεῖσθαι πάλιν· τάξιν γὰρ ἡδὲ τιν’ ἔχει τὸ τοιοῦτον.

ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο δεῖ τὸν λέγοντα μὴ φάναι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν αἰτίαν αὐτοῦ λέγειν, καὶ μὴ τίθεθαι μηδὲν μηδ’ ἠξιών ἠξιώμ’ ἠλλογων, ἄλλ’ ἐπαγωγὴν ἢ ἀπειρίαν φέρειν· αὕτα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ αἰτία τὰ ὑποτεθέντα, οὐδὲ τοῦτ’ ἢν τὸ φιλότητι ἢ νείκειν εἴναι, ἀλλὰ τῆς μὲν τὸ συνάγειν, τοῦ δὲ τὸ διακρίνειν. εἰ δὲ προσφέρεται τὸ ἐν μέρει, λεκτέον ἢ ἢ ὅν οὕτως, ὀςπέρ ὅτι ἐστὶν τι ὑπενήσει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, ἢ φιλία, καὶ φεύγουσιν οἱ ἐχθροί ἄλληλοις· τοῦτο γὰρ ὑποτίθεται καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ εἶναι· φαίνεται γὰρ ἐπὶ τινὸς οὕτως. τὸ δὲ καὶ δ’ ἰσον χρόνον δεῖται λόγου τινὸς.

But that which is produced or directed by nature can never be anything disorderly: for nature is everywhere the cause of order. Moreover, there is no ratio in the relation of the infinite to the infinite, whereas order always means ratio. But if we say that there is first a state of rest for an infinite time, and then motion is started at some moment, and that the fact that it is this rather than a previous moment is of no importance, and involves no order, then we can no longer say that it is nature's work: for if anything is of a certain character naturally, it either is so invariably and is not sometimes of this and sometimes of another character (e.g. fire, which travels upwards naturally, does not sometimes do so and sometimes not) or there is a ratio in the variation. It would be better, therefore, to say with Empedocles and any one else who may have maintained such a theory as his that the universe is alternately at rest and in motion: for in a system of this kind we have at once a certain order.

But even here the holder of the theory ought not only to assert the fact: he ought to explain the cause of it: i.e. he should not make any mere assumption or lay down any gratuitous axiom, but should employ either inductive or demonstrative reasoning. The Love and Strife postulated by Empedocles are not in themselves causes of the fact in question, nor is it of the essence of either that it should be so, the essential function of the former being to unite, of the latter to separate. If he is to go on to explain this alternate predominance, he should adduce cases where such a state of things exists, as he points to the fact that among mankind we have something that unites men, namely Love, while on the other hand enemies avoid one another: thus from the observed fact that this occurs in certain cases comes the assumption that it occurs also in the universe. Then, again, some argument is needed to explain why the predominance of each of the two forces lasts for an equal period of time.
But it is a wrong assumption to suppose universally that we have an adequate first principle in virtue of the fact that something always is so or always happens so. Thus Democritus reduces the causes that explain nature to the fact that things happened in the past in the same way as they happen now: but he does not think fit to seek for a first principle to explain this 'always': so, while his theory is right in so far as it is applied to certain individual cases, he is wrong in making it of universal application. Thus, a triangle always has its angles equal to two right angles, but there is nevertheless an ulterior cause of the eternity of this truth, whereas first principles are eternal and have no ulterior cause. Let this conclude what we have to say in support of our contention that there never was a time when there was not motion, and never will be a time when there will not be motion.

Lecture 3 Arguments against Anaxagoras and Empedocles- Aquinas’s Commentary

lib. 8 l. 3 n. 1 Postquam philosophus posuit rationes ad ostendendum motum semper esse, hic ponit rationes contra Anaxagoram et Empedoclem, qui contrarium ponebant. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ponit rationem contra eorum positionem; secundo contra rationem quam supponebant, ibi: similiter autem et dicere et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod cum ostensum sit quod motus semper est, non erit dicendum quod aliquando sit motus et aliquando non, sicut dixerunt Empedocles et Anaxagoras: sic enim dicere sicut ipsi posuerunt, assimilatur cuidam figmento, quia scilicet absque ratione hoc ponebant; omne enim quod ponitur absque ratione vel auctoritate divina, fictitium esse videtur. Auctoritas autem divina praevalet etiam rationi humanae, multo magis quam auctoritas alieuius philosophi praevaleret alieui debili rationi, quam alieui puer induceret. Non ergo 991. After presenting the reasons showing that motion always existed, the Philosopher here gives arguments against Anaxagoras and Empedocles who posited the contrary. About this he does two things: First he gives an argument against their position; Secondly, against the argument they presupposed, at 992. He says therefore first that since it has been shown that motion always exists, it is wrong to say, as Empedocles and Anaxagoras did, that at some time motion exists and at another time it does not; for to make such a claim is a figment, because it has no basis. Something stated without a reason or the support of divine authority seems, indeed, to be a fiction. However, divine authority has more value than human reason, much more indeed than the authority of a philosopher is more valuable than the weak argument some
assimilantur figmento quae per fidem tenentur, licet absque ratione credantur: credimus enim divinae auctoritati miraculis approbatae, idest illis operibus quae solus Deus facere potest.

Therefore, what is held by faith, even though it be believed without an argument is not a figment of the mind, because we believe on the divine authority approved by miracles — works that God alone can produce.

lib. 8 l. 3 n. 2 Deinde cum dicit: similiter autem et dicere etc., obiicit contra rationem cui innitebantur. Et circa hoc tria facit: primo ponit istam rationem esse inconvenientem; secundo ostendit quod inconvenientior erat secundum positionem Anaxagorae, quam secundum positionem Empedoclis, ibi: at vero nihil inordinatum etc.; tertio ostendit quod nec secundum opinionem Empedoclis convenienter se habet, ibi: sed et oportet hoc dicentem et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod similiter etiam hoc videtur esse fictitium, quod aliquis ponens motum quandoque esse et quandoque non esse, dicat hoc pro ratione, quod hoc ideo est, quia naturum est sic esse, et hoc oportet accipere tanquam principium; sicut Empedocles videtur dicere, quod hoc quod res in parte temporis teneat amicitiam et in parte temporis teneat discordiam et moveantur, et quod in medio tempore quiescant, inest rebus ex necessitate; sicut si aliquis diceret quare calidum calefacit, quia sic necesse est esse, et hoc accipiatur quasi principium, quod calidum calefaciat. Similiter accipiebat Empedocles quasi principium, quod necesse est sic esse, quandoque res moveri per amicitiam, quandoque per discordiam, et quandoque quiescere. Et forte etiam eodem modo diceret Anaxagoras et alii ponentes unum principium activum, quod oportet hoc accipere quasi principium, quod motus inceperit postquam infinito tempore non fuit.

lib. 8 l. 3 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit: at vero nihil inordinatum etc., ostendit quod hac ratione inconvenientius utebatur Anaxagoras

992. Then at (763 252 a5) he objects against the argument on which they rested. About this he does three things: First he suggests that their argument is unsuitable; Secondly, that it was more unsuitable to Anaxagoras’ position than to that of Empedocles, at 993; Thirdly, he shows that even according to Empedocles’ opinion it is unsuitable, at 994. He says therefore First (763 252 a5) that it also seems a fiction that anyone, positing that motion at one time exists and at another time does not, should give as his reason that this is so because it is natural for it to be that way, and then adds that this statement must be accepted as a principle. Now that is what Empedocles seems to say, namely, that the situation whereby during one period of time things maintain friendship, and during another are ruled by discord that sets things in motion, but in the interim are at rest, is due to a sort of necessity in things. That is like saying that the reason why heat warms is that it has to be that way, and that heat warms should then be accepted as a principle. This is exactly what Empedocles does, when he takes as a principle that it is due to an ordinance of nature that things are at one time being moved by friendship, and at another time by discord, and at another time are at rest.

993. Then at (764 252 a11) he shows that Anaxagoras used this argument in a more unsuitable way than did Empedocles.
quam Empedocles. Manifestum est enim quod cum ponitur aliquid esse quasi principium, oportet accipere quod hoc sit secundum rei naturam; hoc est, ut natura rei sit talis quod hoc ei conveniat. Sic enim accipimus quasi principium, quod omne totum maius est sua parte, quia hoc est de ratione et natura totius, quod excedat partis quantitatem. Unde Empedocles dicebat, sic aptum naturam esse; dans intelligere quod hoc esset accipiendum quasi principium. Et similiter Anaxagoras diceret, licet non exprimeret. Sed manifestum est quod nulla res naturalis, nec aliquid eorum quae naturaliter rebus conveniunt, potest esse absque ordine; quia natura est causa ordinationis. Videmus enim naturam in suis operibus ordinate de uno in aliud procedere: quod ergo non habet aliquem ordinem, non est secundum naturam, nec potest accipi ut princi-pium. Sed duo infinita non habent ordinem ad invicem, quia infinitum nulla est proportio; omnis autem ordo proportio quaedam est. Sic ergo patet quod quiescere res tempore infinito, et postea incipere moveri per infinitum tempus, sine hoc quod sit aliqua differentia inter hoc tempus et illud, quare nunc magis quam prius motus fiat; neque iterum assignare aliquam aliam ordinationem inter aliqua duo, quorum uno deficiente, alterum incipiat et fiat motus, ut Anaxagoras ponebat; hoc non est opus naturae. Quia quidquid est in natura, aut semper simpliciter, id est eodem modo, se habet, et non aliquid alterum, sicut ignis semper sursum fertur; aut aliqua ratio est quare non semper est eodem modo, sicut non semper animalia crescent, sed quandoque diminuuntur, et hoc habet aliquam rationem. Sic ergo non videtur secundum naturam procedere, quod infinito tempore res quieverint, et postmodum moveri incepit, ut Anaxagoras posuit. Unde melius est quod dicatur, sicut Empedocles dixit, vel quicumque alius similiter opinatus est, quod totum universum in quadam parte temporis quiescit, et iterum movetur in alia parte temporis;
quia iam hoc potest habere aliquam ordinationem: finiti enim ad finitum potest esse proportio. Est autem considerandum quod sententia fidei nostrae non est similis positioni Anaxagorae. Non enim ponimus ante mundum infinita spatio temporis, cujus sit necesse accipere proportionem ad tempus sequens: sed antequam mundus inciperet, sola Dei simplex aeternitas fuit, sicut dicitum est, quae est omnino extra genus temporis.

as Anaxagoras assumed. Hence it is better to say, as Empedocles said—and those who believed as he—that the whole universe is at rest at one time and in motion at another, because at least in this case there would be order, for there can be a ratio between one finite and another. It should, however, be considered that the tenet of our faith is not akin to Anaxagoras’ position, for we do not assume before the world any infinite reaches of time that have to be related to a later time; rather, before the world began, only the simple eternity of God existed, and that is outside the genus of time.

lib. 8 l. 3 n. 4 Deinde cum dicit: sed et oportet hoc dicentem etc., ostendit quod nec etiam Empedocli convenit praedicta ratio. Et primo ostendit propositum; secundo excludit quandam falsam existimationem, ibi: omnino enim existimare et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod etiam qui hoc dicit quod Empedocles dixit, non oportet quod solum affirmet quod dicit, sed etiam quod assignet causam sui dicti; et quod nihil ex se apponat ultra id quod causa assignata requirit; neque etiam aliquid velit accipere ut dignitatem, idest ut principium, absque ratione. Sed oportet quod adducat ad manifestationem eius quod accepit quasi principium, aut inductionem, sicut in principiis naturalibus quae ex sensibilium experimento accipiuntur; aut demonstrationem, sicut in principiis quae per priora principia demonstrantur. Sed hoc Empedocles non servat. Esto enim quod ipse ponat amicitiam et litem esse causas, tamen hoc non est de ratione amicitiae vel inimicitiae, quod unum eorum post alterum moveat. Non est enim de ratione amicitiae, quod in inimicitiam convertatur, nec e converso: sed de ratione amicitiae est quod congreget, de ratione vero inimicitiae est quod disagreget. Sed si ulterior determinant quod in quadam parte temporis haec congreget, et iterum in quadam parte temporis illa disagreget; est ulterior manifestandum in aliquibus particularibus, in quibus hoc contingat. Sicut quod 994. Then at (765 252 a22) he shows that the above-mentioned argument is not appropriate in Empedocles’ situation either. First he explains the proposition; Secondly, he rejects a false interpretation, at 995. He says therefore first (765 252 a22) that even the holder of Empedocles’ theory ought not to assert the fact only but also should explain the cause of his statement and not go beyond what is required by the cause he assigns. Nor should he accept anything as an axiom, i.e., as a principle without reason; rather, whatever is accepted as a principle should be explained either by induction, as is done in the case of natural principles based on sense experience, or by demonstration, as in the case of those principles which are proved by prior principles. But Empedocles does not do that. Granted that he posits friendship and discord as causes, yet it is not the property of friendship or hostility that one should cause motion after the other. For it is not the nature of friendship to be changed into hostility, or vice versa; though it is of the nature of friendship to gather and of hostility to scatter. But if it is further determined that at one time the one gathers and that at another time the other scatters, it must be further made clear by definite instances in which this occurs. For example, that friendship gathers and discord scatters is manifested
amicitia congreget, et inimicitia disgreget, manifestatur in hominibus, quia amicitia homines adunantur ad invicem, inimicitia vero fugiunt ab invicem; et ideo hoc ab Empedocle supponit esse in toto universo, quia videtur sic esse in aliquibus. Sed quod secundum aequalia tempora moveant successive amicitia et inimicitia, hoc indiget aliqua ratione manifestante: non enim videtur hoc in hominibus contingere.

lib. 8 l. 3 n. 5 Deinde cum dicit: omnino enim existimare etc., excludit quandam falsam existimationem. Posset enim aliquis credere, quod quidquid semper est, non habet causam, propter hoc quod videmus ea quae apud nos causantur, de novo incipere: et ideo videbatur aliquibus, quod quando reducebatur aliqua quae est semper, non oporteret ulterius causam seu rationem quaerere. Sic ergo posset Empedocles dicere, quod amicitia et lis semper secundum aequalia tempora moverunt: et ideo non est quae sequens huius alia ratio. Hoc ergo Aristoteles removet, dicens quod non recte se habet opinari quod aliquid existimetur esse principium, propter hoc quod semper aut sic est, aut sic sit. Ad hoc enim Democritus reducebat omnes causas naturales, assignans principium iis quae de novo fiunt: sed eius quod est semper, nolebat aliquod principium quaerere. Quod autem in aliquibus recte dicitur, sed non in omnibus. Manifestum est enim quod triangulus semper habet tres angulos aequales duobus rectis; sed tamen huius perpetuae passionis est altera causa. Sed aliqua perpetua sunt, sicut principia, quorum non est alia causa.

lib. 8 l. 3 n. 6 Est autem vale notandum quod hic dicitur; quia ut in II Metaphys. habetur, eadem est dispositio rerum in esse et in veritate. Sicut igitur aliqua sunt semper vera et tamen habent among men, because by the former men are united but by the latter they fly from one another. So Empedocles supposed that this is what happens in the whole universe, because it seems to happen in certain cases. But that according to equal periods friendship should move at one time and discord at another, needs to be supported by argument, since that is not seen to happen among men.

995. Then at (766 252 a32) he rejects a false assumption. For someone could believe that whatever is eternal has no cause, since whatever we observe as being caused among us is something that begins newly to be. Consequently, it seemed to some that when a discussion reached something that always existed, there was no need to inquire any further for a cause or reasons In this vein Empedocles could say that friendship and discord had always caused motion according to equal times and therefore no reason for it need be sought. But Aristotle disqualifies this by saying that it is a wrong assumption to suppose that we have an adequate first principle in virtue of the fact that something always is so or always happens so. In this way Democritus reduced all the causes that explain nature to something existing always: he assigned a principle for things that begin newly to be, but would not look for a principle of what has always been. Now this is true in some things and not in others. For it is clear that a triangle always has three angles equal to two right angles, but even of this eternal property there is a cause other than the fact. But some things are indeed eternal, such as principles, that do not have a cause.

996. Very special attention should be paid to what is here said, because, as is mentioned in Metaphysics II, the arrangement of things in existence and in truth is the same. Therefore, just as
causam suae veritatis, ita Aristoteles intellexit quod essent aliqua semper entia, scilicet corpora caelestia et substantiae separatae, et tamen haberent causam sui esse. Ex quo patet quod quamvis Aristoteles ponet mundum aeternum, non tamen creditit quod Deus non sit causa essendi ipsi mundo, sed causa motus eius tantum, ut quidam dixerunt. Ultimo autem concludit principale propositum epilogando. Et dicit tanta dicta esse de hoc quod nullum tempus erit in futuro, neque erat in praeterito, in quo aliquis motus non sit.

some things are always true and yet have a cause of their truth, so Aristotle understood that there are some eternal beings, namely, the heavenly bodies and separated substances, which nevertheless have a cause of existence. From this it is evident that although Aristotle posited a world that was eternal, he did not believe that God is not the world’s cause of existence but of its motion only, as some maintained. Finally, he concludes his main proposition with a summary. And he says: “Let this conclude what we have to say in support of our claim that there never was a time when there was not motion and there will never be a time when there will not be motion.”

Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics XII, Lectio 12- God is the Final Cause of All Things. The Order of the Universe

Aristotle’s Text- Chapter 10: 1075a 11-1076a 4

ἐπισκεπτέον δὲ καὶ ποτέρως ἔχει ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις τὸ ἁγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστὸν, πότερον κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό, ἦ τὴν τάξιν.


πάντα δὲ συντέτακται πως, ἀλλ’ οὕχ ὧμιοίως, καὶ πλοιῶτα καὶ πτηνὰ καὶ φυτά: καὶ οὕχ οὕτως ἔχει ὡστε μὴ εἶναι θατέρῳ πρὸς θάτερον μηδὲν, ἀλλ’ ἔστι τι. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἀπαντα συντέτακται, ἀλλ’ ὃσπερ ἐν οἰκία τοῖς ἔλευθεροις [20] ἥκιστα ἐξεστὶν ὁ τί ἐπιχυρεῖ ποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ πάντα ἢ τὰ πλείστα τέτακται, τοὺς δὲ ἀνδραπόδοις καὶ τοὺς θηρίοις μικρὸν τὸ εἰς τὸ κοινόν, τὸ δὲ

1102. We must also inquire how the nature of the whole [universe] contains the good and the highest good, whether as something separate and self-subsisting or as the order of its parts.

1103. Or is it in both ways, as an army does? For the good of an army consists both in its order and in its commander, but mainly in the latter; for he does not exist for the sake of the order, but the order exists for him.

1104. And all things, both plants and animals (those that swim and those that fly), are ordered together in some way, but not alike; and things are not such that there is no relation between one thing and another, but there is a connection. For all things are ordered together to one end, but in the same way as in a household, where the children are not permitted to do just as

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πολύ δι' τι ἐτυχεν: τοιαύτη γὰρ ἐκάστου ἄρχη αὐτῶν ἢ φύσις ἐστίν. λέγω δ᾽ ὅσον εἰς γε τὸ διακριθήναι ἀνάγκη ἀπασιν ἐλθεῖν, καὶ ἄλλα οὕτως ἐστίν ὅν κοινωνεῖ [25] ἀπαντα εἰς τὸ ὅλον. they please, but all or most of the things done are arranged in an orderly way, while the slaves and livestock do little for the common good but act for the most part at random. For the nature of each of these constitutes such a principle. I mean that by it all must be able to be distinguished. And there are other activities which all have in common for the sake of the whole.

ὅσα δὲ ἀδύνατα συμβαίνει ἢ ἄτοπα τοῖς ἄλλως λέγουσι, καὶ ποία οἱ χαριστέρως λέγοντες, καὶ ἐπί ποιῶν ἐλάχιστον ἀπορίαι, δεῖ μὴ λανθάνειν. 1105. And we must not fail to consider all the impossible and incongruous conclusions that confront those who explain things differently, and what sort of views are expressed by the more popular thinkers, among whom the fewest difficulties appear.

πάντες γὰρ εἰς ἐναντίων ποιοῦσι πάντα. οὔτε δὲ τὸ πάντα οὔτε τὸ εἰς ἐναντίων ὀρθῶς, οὔτ’ ἐν ὅσοις τὰ ἐναντία ὑπάρχει, πῶς [30] ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐσται, οὐ λέγουσιν:

ἀπαθῆ γὰρ τὰ ἐναντία ὑπ’ ἀλλήλων. ἡμῖν δὲ λύεται τούτῳ εὐλόγως τῷ τρίτῳ οἷοι, ὡς ἑνὸς τῶν ἐναντίων ὑπάρχει, πῶς [30] ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐσται, οὐ λέγουσιν: 1106. For all these thinkers derive all things from contraries. But neither “all things” (1055) nor “from contraries” (1029) is correct; nor do they explain how the things in which contraries are present come from contraries.

έτι [35] ἀπαντα τοῦ φαύλου μεθέξει ἐξω τοῦ ἐνός: τὸ γὰρ κακὸν αὐτὸ θάτερον τῶν στοιχείων. 1107. For contraries cannot be acted upon by one another. But this difficulty is solved by us in a reasonable way on the ground that there is a third element. Some thinkers make one of the contraries matter, as those who make the unequal the matter of the equal, or the many the matter of the one. But this is also met in the same way; for matter, as one, is contrary to nothing.

οἱ δ’ ἄλλοι οὔτος ἄρχας τὸ ἄγαθον καὶ τὸ κακόν: καίτοι ἐν ἀπασι μάλιστα τὸ ἄγαθον ἄρχη. 1108. Further, [according to them] all things except the one will exist by participating in evil; for evil itself is one of the two elements (78).

οἰ δ᾽ ἄλλοι οὔτος ἄρχας τὸ ἄγαθον καὶ τὸ κακόν: καίτοι ἐν ἀπασι μάλιστα τὸ ἄγαθον ἄρχη. 1109. For other thinkers consider neither good nor evil as principles, even though the good is in the fullest sense a principle of things.
οἱ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ὅρθως ὃτι ἄρχην, ἄλλα πῶς τὸ ἄγαθὸν ἄρχη
οὐ λέγουσιν, πότερον ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς κινήσεις ἢ ὡς εἶδος.

οἶκω τοῦτο µὲν ὅτι ἂρχην ὃτι ἂρχην, ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸ ἄγαθὸν ἄρχη
οὐ λέγουσιν, πότερον ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς κινήσεις ἢ ὡς εἶδος.

[1075β] [1] ἀτόπως δὲ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς: τὴν γὰρ φιλίαν ποιεῖ τὸ
ἄγαθὸν, αὐτὴ δ᾽ ἄρχη καὶ ως κινοῦσα (συνάγει γὰρ) καὶ ως ὕλη:
μόριον γὰρ τοῦ μίγματος. εἰ δὴ καὶ τῷ αὐτῷ συμβέβηκεν [5] καὶ
ως ὕλη ἄρχη εἶναι καὶ ως κινοῦντι, ἄλλα τὰ γ᾽ εἶναι οὐ ταῦτα.
κατὰ πότερον οὖν φιλία; ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀφθάρτον εἶναι τὸ
νεῖκος: τοῦτο δ᾽ εστὶν αὐτῷ ἢ τοῦ κακοῦ φύσις.

Αναξαγόρας δὲ ως κινοῦν τὸ ἄγαθὸν ἄρχην: ὃ γὰρ νοῦς κινεῖ.
ἄλλα κινεῖ ἐνεκά τινος, ὡστε ἑτέρον, πλὴν ὡς ἡμείς λέγουμεν:
[10] ἢ γὰρ ἠτρική ἐστὶ ποιεῖ ἢ υγίεια. ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ ἔναντιον
μὴ ποίησαι τῷ ἄγαθῳ καὶ τῷ νῷ. πάντες δ᾽ οἱ τὰνεντία λέγοντες
οὐ χρόνται τοῖς ἐναντίοις, εἶναι μὴ ρυθμίσῃ τις.

καὶ διὰ τὰ µὲν φθάρτα τὰ δ᾽ ἀφθάρτα, οὐδεὶς λέγει: πάντα γὰρ
τὰ ὄντα ποιοῦσιν ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν ἄρχων. ἤτι οἱ [15] µὲν ἐκ τοῦ µὴ
ὄντος ποιοῦσι τὰ ὄντα: οἱ δ᾽ ἵνα µὴ τοῦτο ἀναγκασθῶσιν, ἐν
πάντα ποιοῦσιν.

ἐτὶ διὰ τὰ µὲν ἄρχουσιν καὶ τὰ ἐκ τοῦ ἀκάθαρτον, οὐδεὶς λέγει.

[110] οἱ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ὅρθως ὃτι ἄρχην, ἄλλα πῶς τὸ ἄγαθὸν ἄρχη
οὐ λέγουσιν, πότερον ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς κινήσεις ἢ ὡς εἶδος.

[111] Οἱ δὲ τοῦτο μὲν ὅτι ἂρχην ἄρχην, ἀλλὰ πῶς τὸ ἄγαθὸν ἄρχη
οὐ λέγουσιν, πότερον ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς κινήσεις ἢ ὡς εἶδος.

[1100] The former are right in holding that the good is a
principle, but they do not say how it is a principle: whether as
an end or as a mover or as a form.

[1111] And Empedocles’ doctrine (50) is also unreasonable; for
he identifies the good with friendship, although the latter is a
principle both as a mover (for it combines things), and as matter
(for it is a part of the mixture 4). Therefore, even if it happens
that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as a mover,
still their being is not the same. In what respect, then, is
friendship a principle? And it is also unreasonable that strife
should be indestructible; for the essence of evil, for him, is
precisely this strife.

[1112] Again, Anaxagoras makes the good a principle as a
mover; for his “Intellect” causes motion. But it causes motion
for the sake of some goal, and therefore there must be
something other than intellect (84), unless it is as we say; for
the art of medicine is in a sense health (606). It is also
unreasonable not to provide something that is contrary to the
good (78) or to intellect.

[1113] But all who speak of contraries fail to make use of them
as such, except that some make use of imagery. And none of
them explain why some things are destructible and others are
not; for they derive all things from the same principles (250-
263). Again, some derive beings from non-being, while others
(63) lest they be driven to this, make all things one.

[1114] Further, no one explains why there is always generation,
and what its cause is.
καὶ τοῖς δύο ἄρχας ποιοῦσιν ἄλλην ἀνάγκη ἄρχὴν κυριωτέραν εἶναι, καὶ τοῖς τὰ εἴδη ἔτι ἄλλη ἀρχὴ κυριωτέρα: διὰ τί γὰρ μετέχει;  

καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἄλλοις ἀνάγκη τῇ σοφίᾳ καὶ τῇ τιμωτάτῃ ἐπιστήμῃ εἶναι τι ἑναντίον, ἡμῖν δ’ οὐ. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἑναντίον τῷ πρῶτῳ οὐδὲν: πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἑναντία ὑλὴν ἔχει, καὶ δυνάμει ταῦτα ἔστιν: ἡ δὲ ἑναντία ἄγνοια εἰς τὸ ἑναντίον, τῷ δὲ πρῶτῳ ἑναντίον οὐδὲν.


εἴ δ’ ἔσται τὰ εἴδη: ἡ <οἱ> ἄριθμοι, οὐδένος αἴτια: εἴ δὲ μή, οὗτοι κινήσεως γε.


ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲν γ’ ἔσται τῶν ἑναντίων ὁπερ καὶ ποιητικὸν καὶ κινητικὸν; ἐνδέχοιτο γὰρ ἄν μὴ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν ὡστερὸν γε τὸ ποιεῖν δυνάμεος, οὐκ ἂρα ἄδια τὰ ὄντα. ἀλλ’ ἔστιν: ἀναιρετέουν ἂρα τούτων τι. τοῦτο δ’ εἰρήται πῶς.

1115. And those who posit two principles of things must assume a first principle which is superior. This also holds for those who posit separate Forms, because there is another principle which is more important; for why has matter participated in the Forms or why does it participate in them?

1116. And for other thinkers there must be something contrary to wisdom or the noblest science; but this is not so in our case. For there is nothing contrary to what is primary, since all contraries involve matter, and things having matter are in potentiality; and ignorance is contrary to the particular knowledge which is the contrary into which it can pass. But there is nothing contrary to what is primary.

1117. Further, if nothing exists except sensible things, there will be no principle, no order, no generation, no heavenly bodies; but every principle will have a principle, as is maintained by all the theologians and natural philosophers.

1118. Now if there are separate Forms and numbers, they will not be causes of anything; but if they are, they will certainly not be causes of motion.

1119. Again, how will extension or continuous quantity be composed of parts which are unextended? For number cannot either as a mover or as a form produce a continuum.

1120. Further, no one of the contraries will be a productive principle and a mover, because it would be possible for it not to be. And in any case its activity would be subsequent to its potentiality. No beings, then, would be eternal. But some are.
Therefore one of these premises must be rejected. How this may be done has been explained (1057).

1121. Again, as to the way in which numbers, or soul and body, or forms and things in general are one, no one states anything; nor is it possible to do so unless he says, as we do, that a mover makes them one (733-41).

1122. And those who say that mathematical number is the primary reality and that there is always one substance after another and give different principles for each, make the substance of the universe itself a group of substances unrelated to each other (for one substance confers nothing upon another, either by being or not being), and give us many principles. But beings do not want to be badly disposed.—“Many rulers are not good; therefore let there be one ruler.”

Aquinas’s Commentary-

lib. 12 l. 12 n. 1 Postquam philosophus ostendit qualiter primum movens est intelligens et intelligibile, hic intendit inquirere qualiter primum movens sit bonum et appetibile. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ostendit qualiter se habeat bonum in universo secundum opinionem propriam. Secundo secundum opinionem aliorum, ibi, quaecumque vero impossibilia. Circa primum duo facit. Primo movet quaestionem. Secundo solvit eam, ibi, aut utroque modo et cetera. Oritur autem ista quastio ex hoc, quod supra dictum est, quod primum movens movet sicut bonum et appetibile. Bonum enim, secundum quod est finis alcuuis, est duplex. Est enim finis extrinsecus ab eo quod est ad finem, sicut si dicimus locum esse finem eius quod movetur ad locum. Est etiam finis intra, sicut forma finis

2627. Having shown how the first mover is both an intelligence and an intelligible object, here the Philosopher aims to investigate how the first mover is a good and an object of desire; and in regard to this he does two things. First (1102:C 2628), he shows how the good is present in the universe, according to his opinion; and second (1105:C 2638), according to the opinions of other philosophers (“And we must not fail”). In regard to the first he does two things. First, he raises a question. Second (1103:C 2629), he answers it (“Or is it”). Now this question arises because of a statement which was made above to the effect that the first mover causes motion as something good and desirable; for good, inasmuch as it is the end or goal of a thing, is twofold. For an end is extrinsic to the thing ordained to it, as when we say
lib. 12 l. 12 n. 2 Quaerit ergo philosophus utrum natura totius universi habeat bonum et optimum, idest finem proprium, quasi aliquid separatum a se, vel habeat bonum et optimum in ordine suarum partium, per modum, quo bonum alicuius rei naturalis est sua forma.

lib. 12 l. 12 n. 3 Deinde cum dicit aut utroque solvit propositam quaestionem. Et circa hoc duo facit. Primo enim ostendit, quod universum habet bonum separatum, et bonum ordinis. Secundo ostendit qualiter partes universi se habent ad ordinem, ibi, omnia vero coordinata. Dicit ergo primo, quod universum habet utroque modo bonum et finem. Est enim aliquod bonum separatum, quod est primum movens, ex quo dependet caelum et tota natura, sicut ex fine et bono appetibili, ut ostensum est. Et, quia omnia, quorum unum est finis, oportet quod in ordine ad finem conveniant, necesse est, quod in partibus universi ordo aliquid movens, ex quo habitet et bonum separatum, et bonum ordinis.

lib. 12 l. 12 n. 4 Sicut videmus in exercitu: nam bonum exercitus est et in ipso ordine exercitus, et in duce, qui exercitui praesidet: sed magis est bonum exercitus in duce, quam in ordine: quia finis potior est in bonitate quae sunt ad finem: ordo autem exercitus est propter bonum ducis adimplendum, scilicet ducis voluntatem in victoriae.

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consecutionem; non autem e converso, bonum ducis est propter bonum ordinis.

2631. And since the formal character of things which exist for the sake of an end is derived from the end, it is therefore necessary not only that the good of the army exist for the sake of the commander, but also that the order of the army depend on the commander, since its order exists for the sake of the commander. In this way too the separate good of the universe, which is the first mover, is a greater good than the good of order which is found in the universe. For the whole order of the universe exists for the sake of the first mover inasmuch as the things contained in the mind and will of the first mover are realized in the ordered universe. Hence the whole order of the universe must depend on the first mover.

2632. And all things (1104). Here he shows the ways in which the parts of the universe contribute to its order. He says that all things in the universe are ordered together in some way, but not all are ordered alike, for example, sea animals, birds, and plants. Yet even though they are not ordered in the same way, they are still not disposed in such a way that one of them has no connection with another; but there is some affinity and relationship of one with another. For plants exist for the sake of animals, and animals for the sake of men. That all things are related to each other is evident from the fact that all are connected together to one end.

Sed quod omnia non sic sint similiter ordinata, manifestatur per quoddam exemplum. In aliqua enim domo vel familia ordinata inveniuntur diversi gradus, sicut sub of an army exists for the purpose of achieving the good of its commander, namely, his will to attain victory. But the opposite of this is not true, i.e., that the good of the commander exists for the sake of the good of order.

Deinde cum dicit omnia vero ostendit qualiter partes universi se habent ad ordinem; dicens, quod omnia quae sunt in universo, sunt aliquo modo ordinata, sed non similiter omnia habent ordinem, scilicet animalia marina, et volatilia, et plantae. Et tamen licet non sint eodem modo ordinata, non ita se habent, quod unum eorum non pertineat ad alterum; sed est aliqua affinitas et ordo unius ad alterum. Plantae enim sunt propter animalia, et animalia sunt propter homines. Et quod omnia sint ordinata adinivicem, patet ex hoc, quod omnia simul ordinantur ad unum finem.

Sed quod omnia non sic sint similiter ordinata, manifestatur per quoddam exemplum. In aliqua enim domo vel familia ordinata inveniuntur diversi gradus, sicut sub
patrefamilias est primus gradus filiorum, alius autem gradus est servorum, tertius vero gradus est bestiarum, quae servient in domo, ut canes, et huiusmodi animalia. Huiusmodi enim gradus diversimode se habent ad ordinem domus, qui imponitur a patrefamilias gubernatore domus. Filiis enim non competit ut faciant aliquid casualiter et sine ordine; sed omnia, aut plura eorum quae faciunt, ordinata sunt. Non autem ita est de servis aut bestiis, quia parum participant de ordine, qui est ad commune. Sed multum inventur in eis de eo quod contingit, et casualiter accidit. Et hoc ideo quia parvam affinitatem habent cum rectore domus, qui intendit bonum domus commune.

lib. 12 l. 12 n. 8 Sicut autem imponitur in familia ordo per legem et praeceptum patrisfamilias, qui est principium uniciuque ordinatorum in domo, exequendi ea quae pertinent ad ordinem domus, ita natura in rebus naturalibus est principium exequendi uniciuque id quod competit sibi de ordine universi. Sicuti enim qui est in domo per praeceptum patrisfamilias ad aliquid inclinatur, ita aliqua res naturalis per naturam proprium. Et ipsa natura uniuscuiusque est quaedam inclinatio indita ei a primo movente, ordinans ipsam in debitum finem. Et ex hoc patet, quod res naturales agunt propter finem, licet finem non cognoscant, quia a primo intelligente assequuntur inclinationem in finem.

lib. 12 l. 12 n. 9 Sed tamen non similiter omnia ista se habent ad istum finem. Est enim aliquid commune omnibus; quia necesse est quod omnia ad hoc perveniant quod discernantur, there is a first rank, namely, that of the sons, and a second rank, which is that of the slaves, and a third rank, which is that of the domestic animals, as dogs and the like. For ranks of this kind have a different relation to the order of the household, which is imposed by the head of the family, who governs the household. For it is not proper for the sons to act in a haphazard and disorderly way, but all or most of the things that they do are ordered. This is not the case with the slaves or domestic animals, however, because they share to a very small degree in the order which exists for the common good. But in their case we find many things which are contingent and haphazard; and this is because they have little connection with the ruler of the household, who aims at the common good of the household.

2634. And just as the order of the family is imposed by the law and precept of the head of the family, who is the principle of each of the things which are ordered in the household, with a view to carrying out the activities which pertain to the order of the household, in a similar fashion the nature of physical things is the principle by which each of them carries out the activity proper to it in the order of the universe. For just as any member of the household is disposed to act through the precept of the head of the family, in a similar fashion any natural being is disposed by its own nature. Now the nature of each thing is a kind of inclination implanted in it by the first mover, who directs it to its proper end; and from this it is clear that natural beings act for the sake of an end even though they do not know that end, because they acquire their inclination to their end from the first intelligence.

2635. However, not all things are disposed to this end in the same way. For there is something common to all things, since all things must succeed in being distinguished; that is, they must
idest quod habeant discretas et proprias operationes, et quod
etiam secundum substantiam adinvicem discernantur; et
quantum ad hoc in nullo deficit ordo. Sed quaedam sunt quae
non solum hoc habent, sed ulteriora talia sunt, quod omnia, quae
sunt in eis communicant ad totum, idest sunt ordinata ad
bonum commune totius. Hoc autem invenitur in illis, in quibus
 nihil est praeter naturam neque casualiter, sed omnia secundum
debitum ordinem praecedunt.

lib. 12 l. 12 n. 10 Manifestum est enim, quod unaquaeque res
naturalis, ut dictum est, ordinatur ad bonum commune,
secundum suam actionem debitam naturalem. Unde illa quae
nunquam deficiunt a sua actione debita et naturali habent
omnia sua communicantia ad totum. Illa vero quae aliquando
deficiant ab actione debita et naturali, non habent omnia sua
communicantia ad totum, sicut huiusmodi corpora inferiora.

lib. 12 l. 12 n. 11 Est ergo summa solutionis, quod ordo duo
requirit, scilicet ordinatum distinctionem et communicantiam
distinctorum ad totum. Quantum autem ad primum
indeficienter est ordo in omnibus; quantum autem ad
secundum est quidam ordo indeficienter in aliquisib, quae sunt
suprema et proxima primo principio, sicut substantiae
separatae et corpora caelestia, in quibus nihil casualiter accidit
et praeter naturam: in aliquibus autem deficit, scilicet
corporibus, in quibis interdum aliquid accidit casualiter praeter
naturam. Et hoc propter remotionem a primo principio semper
eodem modo se habente.

lib. 12 l. 12 n. 12 Deinde cum dicit quaecumque vero
determinat de bono et ordine universi secundum opinionem
aliorum; et circa hoc duo facit. Primo manifestat de quo est
have discrete and proper operations, and must also be
differentiated essentially from each other; and in this respect
order is lacking in none of them. But there are some things which
not only have this but are also such that all their activities
“participate in the whole,” i.e., are directed to the common good
of the whole. This is found to be true of those things which
contain nothing contrary to their nature, nor any element of
chance, but everything proceeds according to the right order.

2636. For it is evident, as has been pointed out (1104:C 2632-
34), that each natural being is directed to the common good by
reason of its proper natural activity. Hence those things which
never fail in their proper natural activity have all their activities
contributing to the whole. But those which sometimes fail in
their proper natural activity do not have all their activities
contributing to the whole; and lower bodies are of this kind.

2637. The answer briefly stated, then, is that order requires two
things: a distinction between the things ordered, and the
contribution of the distinct things to the whole. As regard the first
of these, order is found in all things without fail; but as regards
the second, order is found in some things, and these are the
things which are highest and closest to the first principle, as the
separate substances and the heavenly bodies, in which there is no
element of chance or anything contrary to their nature. But order
is lacking in some things, namely, in [lower] bodies, which are
sometimes subject to chance and to things which are contrary to
their nature. This is so because of their distance from the first
principle, which is always the same.

2638. And we must not (1105). Then he deals with the end and
order of the universe according to the opinion of other
philosophers. In regard to this he does two things. First, he
explains what he aims to do. He says that we must state all the impossible or incongruous conclusions facing those who express views different from our own about the good and order of the universe; and we must also state the kind of views held by those men who give a better explanation of things and in whose statements fewer difficulties appear.

lib. 12 l. 12 n. 13 Deinde cum dicit omnes enim prosequitur suam intentionem; et circa hoc duo facit. Primo ponit opinionem illorum, qui posuerunt principia esse contraria. Secundo eorum qui posuerunt principia esse naturas quasdam separatas, ibi. Amplius si non erunt et cetera. Circa primum duo facit. Primo proponit in quo deficiant illi, qui dicunt principia esse contraria; dicens quod omnes antiqui philosophi posuerunt omnia esse ex principiis contrariis. Et quantum ad tria non recte dixerunt. Neque enim recte dixerunt in hoc, quod posuerunt res esse ex contrariis; neque etiam in hoc quod dixerunt omnia ex contrariis; et tertio defecerunt in hoc quod non dixerunt quomodo ex contrariis res producantur.

lib. 12 l. 12 n. 14 Secundo ibi, impassibilia namque manifestat quomodo in praedictis tribus defecerunt. Et primo quomodo dixerunt in hoc, quod posuerunt esse res ex contrariis. Secundo in hoc quo posuerunt omnia esse ex contrariis, ibi, amplius autem omnia pravi participatione. Tertio quomodo dixerunt in hoc quo non dixerunt quomodo ex contrariis res sint, ibi, omnes autem contraria dicentes et cetera. Dicit ergo primo, quod non recte dicunt res esse ex contrariis, quia contraria secundum se accepta sunt impassibilia adinvicem: non enim albedo patitur a nigredine, neque e converso. Non autem ex eis posset aliquid unum constitui, nisi adinvicem patentur, ut sic reducantur ad aliquid medium.

2639. For all these (1106). He then carries out his plan. In regard to this he does two things. First (1106:C 2639), he gives the opinion of those who held that the principles of things are contraries; and second (1117:C 2656), the opinion of those who held that the principles of things are separate natures (“Further, if nothing”). In treating the first point he does two things. First (1106), he explains in what way those men are wrong who say that the principles of things are contraries. He says that all the ancient philosophers held that all things come from contraries as their principles; and they were wrong on three counts. First, they were wrong in holding that things come from contraries; and second, in saying that all things come from contraries; and third, in failing to explain how things are produced from contraries.

2640. For contraries (1107). Second, he indicates how they were wrong in the three ways mentioned above. He explains how they erred, first, in holding that things come from contraries; and second (1108:C 2643), in claiming that all things come from contraries (“Further, [according to them]”); and third (1113:C 2650), in failing to show how things come from contraries (“But all who speak”). He accordingly says, first (1107), that they were wrong in saying that things comes from contraries, because contraries taken in themselves cannot be acted upon by one another; for whiteness is not acted upon by blackness or vice versa, and one thing could come from them only if they were
influenced by one another and so were reduced to an intermediate state.

2641. But in Aristotle’s opinion this difficulty is easily solved, because besides the two contraries he also posited a third principle, matter. Hence one of the two contraries can be acted upon by the other in the sense that matter, which is the subject of one contrary, can be acted upon by the other contrary.

2642. But others claimed that matter is one of the two contraries and not something distinct from them, as is evident in the case of those who held that the contraries, the unequal and the equal, and the one and the many, are principles. For they attribute inequality and plurality to matter, and equality and unity to form, as is found in Plato’s opinion, although the natural philosophers held the opposite. But this statement of theirs is met in the same way, because matter, which is one thing as the common subject of contraries, is contrary to nothing.

2643. Further, [according to them] (1108). Then the Philosopher explains how these thinkers were wrong in saying that all things come from contraries; and in regard to this he does two things. First, he shows the unreasonable conclusion which follows from this view. For it is evident that the primary contraries are good and evil, because one of two contraries is always the privation of the other and so has the character of evil. Therefore, if all things come from contraries, it follows that all things participate in evil as well as in unity, i.e., good, which is a principle; for good is posited as one of the two elements, and everything else is supposed to come from these two principles. But this is not true, because destruction and evil are not found in the heavenly bodies or in the nature of the separate substances.
lib. 12 l. 12 n. 18 Secundo ibi, alii autem ostendit quod positio ponentium omnia ex contrariis, non convenit positioni quorumdam philosophorum. Si enim omnia sunt ex contrariis, sequitur, ut dictum est, quod prima principia sint bonum et malum. Sed quidam non posuerunt bonum et malum esse principia; sed id quod est bonum, esse principium omnibus.

lib. 12 l. 12 n. 19 Tertio ibi, alii vero ostendit quomodo in ponendo bonum esse principium, defecerunt etiam illi. Et hoc ostendit primo in communi; dicens, quod quidam, licet recte dicerent ponentes bonum esse principium omnium, tamen in hoc defecerunt, quia non determinaverunt quomodo bonum esset principium, utrum scilicet ut finis, aut ut forma, aut ut movens. Haec enim tria habent rationem perfecti et boni; non autem materia, quae non perficitur nisi per formam, unde de ea mentionem non facit.

lib. 12 l. 12 n. 20 Secundo ibi, inconveniencer autem descendit ad speciales opiniones; et primo ad opinionem Empedoclis; dicens, quod inconveniencer Empedocles ponit bonum esse principium. Ponit enim amorem principium, quasi bonum. Sed amorem dicit esse principium dupliciter. Dicit enim quod est ut movens, inquantum habet unire et congregare: et iterum ponit, quod est principium sicut materia. Probat enim amorem esse partem mixtorum. Corpora enim ponebat esse mixta ex quatuor elementis et amicitia et lice. Licet autem contingat esse principium idem sicut materia et sicut movens, non tamen secundum eamdem rationem. Potest enim ignis esse movens secundum formam et materiale principium secundum materiam: non autem secundum idem: quia movens, inquantum huiusmodi, est in actu, materia autem, inquantum

2644. For other thinkers (1109). Second, he shows that the position of all those who held that all things come from contraries is not in agreement with the position of certain of the philosophers. For if all things come from contraries, it follows, as has been pointed out, that good and evil are the first principles of things. But some did not claim that good and evil are principles but said that the good is the principle of all things.

2645. The former (1110). Third he indicates the error made even by those who claimed that the good is a principle of things. He makes this clear, first, in a general way. He says that, even though some philosophers are right in holding that the good is a principle of all things, they are still wrong in failing to show how it is a principle, i.e., whether as an end or as a form or as a mover. For these things are characterized by perfection and goodness, whereas matter which is perfected only by form, does not have the character of something good and perfect; and therefore he makes no mention of it.

2646. And Empedocles’ doctrine (1111). Next, he turns to certain particular opinions. First, he considers the opinion of Empedocles. He says that Empedocles made the unreasonable assumption that the good is a principle of things; for he claimed that love is a principle, identifying it with the good. However, he said that love is a principle in two ways. For he claimed that it is a moving principle inasmuch as its function is to unite things and bring them together; and he also claimed that it is a material principle inasmuch as he asserts that love is a part of compounds, since he assumed that bodies are compounds of the four elements and of friendship and strife. And even though the same principle can be both matter and a mover, it is not such under the same formal aspect. For fire can be a mover according to its form, and a material principle according to its matter; but it cannot be both
in the same respect, because a mover as such is actual, whereas matter as such is potential. Hence it must still be explained in what respect love has the character of a material principle, and in what respect it has the character of a mover and this he fails to do.

2647. Another incongruity which follows from Empedocles’ opinion is his positing strife as a first indestructible principle; for strife in itself seems to be essentially evil, and evil, in the opinions of those who are right, is not set down as a principle, but only the good, as has been stated (1109)C 2644).

2648. Again, Anaxagoras (1112). Third, he turns to the opinion of Anaxagoras. He says that Anaxagoras makes the good to be a first principle of things as a mover; for he said that an intellect moves all things. But it is evident that “an intellect always causes motion for the sake of some goal,” i.e., an end. Hence Anaxagoras must posit some other principle by reason of which this intellect causes motion, unless perhaps he should say, as we have, that an intellect and its intelligible object can be the same; and that an intellect moves for its own sake; which is true in a sense of those things which act by intellect, according to our view. For the art of medicine acts for the sake of health, and health is in a sense the art of medicine itself, as has been pointed out above (C 2619; 606:C 1407).

2649. Another unreasonable consequence which is contrary to the opinion of Anaxagoras also seems to follow if the common view is maintained, namely, that contraries are the principles of all things. For according to this view it would be absurd for him not to make some principle contrary to the good and to intellect.
Deinde cum dicit omnes autem ostendit tertium quod supra posuit, scilicet quod ponentes principia contraria esse, non dicunt quomodo principiata sunt ex contrariis. Et hoc est quod dicit, quod omnes dicentes principia esse contraria non utuntur ad causandum ea quae sunt apparentia in entibus. Nisi aliquid figuret, id est nisi aliquid velit fingere vel figurabiliter dicere.

Et primo cum dicit, et quare haec quidem et cetera. Ostendit quod non possunt causare differentiam corruptibilium vel incorruptibilium. Dicit ergo, quod nullus antiquorum philosophorum assignat causam, quare entia quaedam sunt corruptabilia, et quaedam incorruptabilia. Ponunt enim quidam eorum entia omnia esse ex eisdem principiis, scilicet contrariis. Et haec est opinio antiquorum naturalium. Alii vero, scilicet poetae theologi, posuerunt omnia ex non ente. Unde supra dixit, quod generat mundum ex non ente. Et sic, cum eamdem originem utrique assignent omnibus entibus, non possunt causare distinctionem rerum secundum corruptibile et incorruptibile. Et ideo alii, ut ad hoc non coggantur, quod scilicet ponant omnia esse ex non ente, vel quod assignent causam distinctionis rerum, posuerunt omnia esse unum, totaliter a rebus distinctionem tollentes: et haec est opinio Parmenidis et Melissi.

Secundo ibi, amplius propter ostendit quod etiam in alio deficiunt, quia scilicet non possunt assignare causam, quare generatio sit semipiterna, nec possunt assignare quae sit universalis causa generationis; neutrum enim contrariorum est universalis generationis causa.

But all who speak (1113). He explains the third error which he noted above (1106-07:C 2639-40), namely, that those who held the principles to be contraries did not explain how things come from contraries as their principles. He says that all those who speak of contraries as principles fail to make use of them in accounting for what appears in the world, unless “some make use of imagery,” i.e., unless someone wishes to indulge his fancy or to speak figuratively.

And none of them (ibid.). First, he shows that they cannot account for the differences between destructible and indestructible things. He accordingly says that none of the ancient philosophers give any reason why some beings are destructible and some are not. Some of them claimed that all things are derived from the same principles, namely, contraries; and this is the opinion of the ancient natural philosophers. Others, the theological poets, held that all things come from non-being. Hence he said above (1065: C 2515) that they generate the world from non-being. And so although both groups assign the origin of all things, they cannot explain why things are distinguished into destructible and indestructible. Hence others, in order not to be driven to this, i.e., to posit that all things come from non-being or to account for the difference between things, held that all things are one, thereby entirely doing away with the distinction between things. This is the view of Parmenides and Melissus.

Further, no one (1114). Second, he shows that they were also wrong in another respect, namely, in being unable to explain why generation is eternal or to state what the universal cause of generation is; for neither of the contraries is a universal cause of generation.
Tertio ibi, et duo principia tertium ponit, in quo deficiunt ponentes principia esse contraria. Necesse est enim eis assignare quod alterum contrarium sit principalius principium, cum semper alterum sit ut privatio. Vel intendit, quod necesse est ponere aliquod principium principalius utroque contrariorium, ex quo ratio assignari possit quare quaedam attribuuntur uni contrariorum sicut principio, et quaedam alteri, utpote quare quodam tempore moveat lis elementa ad separationem, et quodam tempore amicitia ad congregationem.

And those who (1115). Third, he states how those men were wrong who claimed that the principles of things are contraries; for they must maintain that one of two contraries is a superior principle, since one contrary has the character of a privation. Or he means that it is necessary to posit some principle, which is more important than both contraries, by which it is possible to explain why certain things are attributed to one of the contraries as their principle and why certain others are attributed to the other contrary; for example, why at one time strife will cause the elements to separate and why at another time friendship will cause them to combine.

This difficulty also faces those who posit separate Forms; for they must assign some principle which is superior to the Forms, since it is evident that things which are generated and destroyed do not always participate in a form in the same way. Hence it is necessary to posit some principle by which it is possible to explain why this individual formerly participated or now participates in a form.

And for other thinkers (1116). Here he gives a fourth incongruity which faces these thinkers. He says that the philosophers who claim that the principles of things are contraries must admit that there is something contrary to the primary kind of wisdom or noblest science, because wisdom is concerned with the first principle, as has been shown in Book I (13:C 35). Therefore, if there is nothing contrary to the first principle (for all pairs of contraries have a nature which is in potentiality to each pair), and according to us the first principle is immaterial, as is clear from what has been said (1058:C 2495), then it follows that there is nothing contrary to the first principle, and that there is no science which is contrary to the primary science, but merely ignorance.
Deinde cum dicit amplius si descendit ad opinionem ponentium substantias separatas. Et primo ostendit quod inconveniens sequitur non ponentibus eas: et dicit, quod si non sint alia entia praeter sensibilia, non erit primum principium, sicut ostensum est, nec ordo rerum qualis assignatus est, nec generatio perpetua, nec principia qualia supra posuimus; sed semper erit principii principium in infinitum, utpote quod Socrates generetur a Platone et ille ab illo, et sic in infinitum, ut visum est omnibus antiquis philosophis naturalibus. Non enim ponebant aliquid principium universale primum, praeter ista principia particularia et sensibilia.

Si autem ostendit quod inconveniens sequitur ponentibus naturas quasdam separatas. Et primo quantum ad eos qui ponebant in huiusmodi naturis connexionem quamdam originis. Secundo quantum ad eos qui hoc non ponebant, ibi, dicentes autem numerum. Circa primum ducit ad quatuor inconvenientia: quorum primum est, quod species et numeri, quae ponebant quidam praeter sensibilia, nullius causae videntur esse. Sed si sint alicuius causae, non videbitur aliquid esse causa motus, quia huiusmodi non videntur habere rationem principiorum moventium.

Secundo ibi, adhuc quomodo ducit ad alium inconvenientiam. Numerus enim non est magnitudo. Magnitudo autem non est nisi ex magnitudinibus, unde impossible videtur assignare quomodo magnitudo et continuum sunt ex numeris qui non sunt continui. Non enim potest dici quod numerus causet continuum sicut principium motivum et formale.

Further, if nothing. Next, he turns to the opinion of those who posited separate substances. First, he points out that an incongruity faces those who fail to posit such substances. He says that, if nothing exists except sensible things, there will be no first principle, as has been noted, no order of things such as has been described, no eternal generation, and no principles of the kind which we have posited above; but every principle will always have a principle, and so on to infinity. Thus Socrates will be begotten by Plato and the latter by someone else and so on to infinity, as was seen to be the view of all of the ancient philosophers of nature. For they did not posit a first universal principle over and above these particular and sensible principles.

Now if there. Then he shows that an unreasonable consequence faces those who posit certain separate natures. He does this, first, with regard to those who posited a certain connection in origin among natures of this kind; and second, with regard to those who did not hold this position (“And those who say”). Concerning the first he draws out four untenable consequences. The first of these is that the separate Forms and numbers, which some posited over and above sensible things, seem not to be causes of anything. But if they are causes of something, it seems that nothing will be a cause of motion, because things of this kind do not seem to have the character of a moving cause.

Again, how will. Second, he brings forward another incongruity. For number is not continuous quantity, but continuous quantity is constituted only of continuous quantities. Hence it seems impossible to explain how continuous quantity or extension comes from numbers, which are not continuous. For it
2659. Further, no one (1120). Then he gives the third untenable consequence. He says that, if the separate Forms and numbers are first principles, it follows, since contrariety is not found in forms and numbers, that first principles will not be contraries, because they are not held to be productive principles or movers. Hence it will follow that there is no generation or motion; for if the first principles are not efficient causes of motion but are subsequently caused from first principles, it will follow that they are contained in the potency of prior principles; and what can be can also not be. The conclusion, then, is that generation and motion are not eternal. But they are eternal, as has been proved above (1055:C 2490-91). Therefore one of the premises must be rejected, namely, the one holding that first principles are not movers. The way in which the first principles are movers has been stated in Book I (25-26:C 50-51).

2660. Again, as to the way (1121). He gives the fourth incongruity. He says that none of these philosophers can state what it is that makes number, or soul and body, or in general form and the thing to which form belongs, a unity, unless he says that a mover does this, as we explained above in Book VIII (736:C 1759). Forms and numbers, however, do not have the character of a mover.

2661. And those who say (1122). Here he indicates the unreasonable consequence facing those who claim that natures of this kind are unrelated things. He says that those who claim that mathematical number is the primary reality, as the Pythagoreans did, and “that there is always one substance after another” in this way, i.e., consecutively (so that after number comes continuous...
magnitudinem, et post magnitudinem, sensibilia, et dicentes cuivislibet naturae esse alia et alia principia, sicut quod alia sunt principia numerorum, et alia magnitudinum et alia sensibilium, isti inquam sic dicentes, faciunt substantiam universi esse inconnexam, idest sine ordine, ita quod una pars nihil conferat ad aliam vel ad alteram, sive sit sive non sit. Et similiter faciunt multa principia inconnexa.

lib. 12 l. 12 n. 36 Et hoc non potest esse, quia entia non volunt male disponi. Dispositio enim entium naturalium est qualis optima potest esse. Et hoc videmus in singulis, quod unumquodque est optimae dispositionis in sua natura. Unde multo magis oportet hoc existimare in toto universo.

lib. 12 l. 12 n. 37 Sed pluralitas principatum non est bonum. Sicut non esset bonum quod essent diversae familiae in una domo, quae invicem non communicarent. Unde relinquitur quod totum universum est sicut unus principatus et unum regnum. Et ita oportet quod ordinetur ab uno gubernatore. Et hoc est quod concludit, quod est unus princeps totius universi, scilicet primum movens, et primum intelligibile, et primum bonum, quod supra dixit Deum, qui est benedictus in saecula saeculorum. Amen.

quantity, and after continuous quantity come sensible things), and who say that there is a different principle for each nature, so that there are certain principles for numbers, others for continuous quantity, and others for sensible things—those who speak in this way, I say, make the substances of the universe a group of substances unrelated to each other, i.e., without order, inasmuch as one part confers nothing on any other part whether it exists or does not. And they likewise make their many principles to be unrelated.

2662. Now this cannot be the case, because beings do not want to be badly disposed; for the disposition of natural things is the best possible. We observe this in the case of particular things, because each is best disposed in its own nature. Hence we must understand this to be the case to a much greater degree in the whole universe.

2663. But many rulers are not good. For example, it would not be good for different families which shared nothing in common to live in a single home. Hence it follows that the whole universe is like one principality and one kingdom, and must therefore be governed by one ruler. Aristotle’s conclusion is that there is one ruler of the whole universe, the first mover, and one first intelligible object, and one first good, whom above he called God (1074:C 2544), who is blessed for ever and ever. Amen.
Lectio 2 – Creation

SCG IV, Ch.17.6-8- That the Holy Spirit is True God


[17.6] Again, creation is the work of God alone, as was shown above. But creation belongs to the Holy Spirit; as the Psalmist says: “Send forth your Spirit, and they shall be created” (Ps. 103:30); and Job (33:4) says: “The Spirit of God made me”; and Sirach (1:9) says of God: “He created her,” meaning wisdom, “in the Holy Spirit.” Therefore, the Holy Spirit is of the divine nature.

Adhuc. Apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. 2-10 spiritus omnia scrutatur, etiam profunda Dei. Quis enim scit quae sunt hominis nisi spiritus hominis, qui in ipso est? Ita et quae Dei sunt nemo cognovit nisi spiritus Dei. Comprehendere autem omnia profunda Dei non est alicuius creaturae: quod patet ex hoc quod dominus dicit, Matth. 11-27: nemo novit filium nisi pater, neque patrem quis novit nisi filius. Et Isaiae 24-16, ex persona Dei, dicitur: secretum meum mihi. Ergo spiritus sanctus non est creatura.

[17.7] The Apostle says, further: “The Spirit searches all things, yea, the deep things of God. For what man knows the things of a man but the spirit of a man that is in him? So the things also that are of God no man knows, but the Spirit of God” (1 Cor. 2:10-11). But to comprehend all the deep things of God is not the act of a creature. And this is clear from our Lord’s words: “No one knows the Son but the Father, neither doth any one know the Father but the Son” (Mat. 11:27). And Isaiah (24:16) says in the person of God: “My secret to Myself.” Therefore, the Holy Spirit is not a creature.

Praeterea. Secundum praedictam apostoli comparationem, spiritus sanctus se habet ad Deum sicut spiritus hominis ad hominem. Spiritus autem hominis intrinsecus est homini, et non est extraneae naturae ab ipso, sed est aliquid eius. Igitur et spiritus sanctus non est naturae extraneae a Deo.

[17.8] What is more, in the comparison by the Apostle just given, the Holy Spirit is to God as the spirit of man is to man. Now, the spirit of man is intrinsic to man and is not extraneous to him in nature, but is of his nature. Therefore, the Holy Spirit as well is not by nature extraneous to God.
SCG IV, Ch. 17.16-21


Item. I ad Cor. 14-2 dicitur: qui loquitur lingua, non hominibus loquitur, sed Deo: nemo enim audit, spiritus autem loquitur mysteria, ex quo dat intelligere quod spiritus sanctus loquebatur in his qui variis linguis loquebantur. Postmodum autem dicit: in lege scriptum est: quoniam in aliis linguis et labiis aliis loquar populo huic, et nec sic exaudiet me, dicit dominus. Spiritus ergo sanctus, qui loquitur mysteria diversis labiis et linguis, Deus est.

[17.16] Once again, to be everywhere is proper to God, who says in Jeremiah (23:24): “I fill heaven and earth.” This belongs to the Holy Spirit, for we read in Wisdom (1:7): “The Spirit of the Lord bath filled the whole world,” and the Psalmist says: “Whither shall I go from your Spirit? Or whither shall I flee from your face? If I ascend into heaven, You are there,” and so forth (Ps. 138:7-8). Our Lord also says to the disciples: “You shall receive the power of the Holy Spirit coming upon you, and you shall be witnesses unto Me in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and Samaria, and even to the uttermost parts of the earth” (Acts 1:8), from which it is clear that the Holy Spirit is everywhere; He dwells in those existing in every place. The Holy Spirit, therefore, is God.

[17.17] There is more. Scripture expressly names the Holy Spirit God, for Peter says: “Ananias, why did Satan tempt your heart, that you should lie to the Holy Spirit?” Later on, he adds: “You hast not lied to men, but to God” (Acts 5:3-4). The Holy Spirit, therefore, is God.

[17.18] We read again, in I Corinthians (14:2, 21): “He that speaks in a tongue speaks not unto men, but unto God; for no one hears. Yet by the Spirit He speaks mysteries,” from which he gives one to understand that the Holy Spirit was speaking in those who spoke with different tongues. Later on, of course, he says: “In the Law it is written: In other tongues and other lips I will speak to this people; and neither so will they hear me, says the Lord.” Therefore, the Holy Spirit who speaks mysteries with diverse lips and tongues is God.

Item. Parum post dicit: spiritus prophetarum prophetis subiecti sunt; non enim est dissensionis Deus, sed pacis. Gratiae autem prophetarum, quas spiritus prophetarum nominavit, a spiritu sancto sunt. Spiritus ergo sanctus, qui huiusmodi gratias sic distribuit ut ex eis non dissensio, sed pax sequatur, Deus esse ostenditur in hoc quod dicit, non est dissensionis Deus, sed pacis.

Amplius. Adoptare in filios Dei non potest esse opus alterius nisi Dei. Nulla enim creatura spiritualis dicitur filius Dei per naturam, sed per adoptionis gratiam: unde et hoc opus filio Dei, qui verus Deus est, apostolus attribuit, ad Gal. 4, dicens: misit Deus filium suum, ut adoptionem filiorum recipierimus. Spiritus autem sanctus est adoptionis causa: dicit enim apostolus, ad Rom. 8-15: accepistis spiritum adoptionis filiorum, in quo clamamus, abba (pater). Ergo spiritus sanctus non est creatura, sed Deus.

[17.19] Furthermore, after a bit, this is added: “If all prophesy, and there come in one that believes not, or an unlearned person, he is convinced of all, he is judged of all. The secrets of his heart are made manifest; and so, falling down on his face, he will adore God, affirming that God is among you indeed” (1 Cor. 14:24-25). Clearly, of course, from what he had previously set down, “the Spirit speaks mysteries,” the manifestation of the secrets of the heart is from the Holy Spirit. And this is a proper mark of divinity, for we read in Jeremiah (17:9-10): “The heart of man is perverse... and inscrutable, who can know it? I am the Lord who search the heart and prove the reins: And so from this indication even an unbeliever (cf. 1 Cor. 14:24) is said to consider carefully that He who speaks these secrets of hearts is God. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is God.

[17.20] Again, a bit later, the Apostle says: “The spirits of the prophets are subject to the prophets. For God is not the God of dissension, but of peace” (1 Cor. 14:32-33). Of course, the graces of the Prophets which he named “the spirits of the prophets” are from the Holy Spirit. Therefore, he shows that the Holy Spirit who distributes graces of this kind in such wise that from them follows not dissension but peace is God by these words: “God is not the God of dissension, but of peace.”

[17.21] Furthermore, to adopt as sons can be the work of no other than God. For no spiritual creature is called son of God by nature, but by the grace of adoption. Hence, the Apostle attributes this work to the Son of God who is true God: “God sent His Son that we might receive the adoption of sons” (Gal. 4:4-5). But the Holy Spirit is the cause of the adoption, as the Apostle says: “You have received the spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father)” (Rom. 8:15). Therefore, the Holy Spirit is not a creature, but God.
Chapter 20

On The Effects Attributed To The Holy Spirit In Scripture
Regarding The Whole Creation

Oportet autem, secundum convenientiam praedictorum, considerare effectus quos spiritui sancto sacra Scriptura attribuit.

Ostensum est enim in superioribus quod bonitas Dei est eius ratio volendi quod alia sint, et per suam voluntatem res in esse producit. Amor igitur quo suam bonitatem amat, est causa creationis rerum; unde et quidam antiqui philosophi amorem deorum causam omnium esse posuerunt, ut patet in I Metaph.; et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod divinus amor non permisit ipsum sine germine esse. Habitum est autem ex praemissis quod spiritus sanctus procedit per modum amoris quo Deus amat se ipsum. Igitur spiritus sanctus est principium creationis rerum. Et hoc significatur in Psalmo: emitte spiritum tuum et creabuntur.

Ex hoc etiam quod spiritus sanctus per modum amoris procedit; amor autem vim quandam impulsivam et motivam habet: motus qui est a Deo in rebus, spiritui sancto proprie attribui videtur. Prima autem mutatio in rebus a Deo existens intelligitur secundum quod ex materia creat a informi species diversas produxit. Unde hoc opus spiritui sancto sacra Scriptura attribuit: dicitur enim Gen. 1-2: spiritus domini ferebatur super aquas. Vult enim Augustinus per aquas intelligi materiam

[20.1] One must, of course, in harmony with what has been said, give thought to the effects which sacred Scripture attributes to the Holy Spirit.

[20.2] For it was shown in the foregoing that the goodness of God is His reason for willing that other things be, and that by His will He produces things in being. The love, then, by which He loves His own goodness is the cause of the creation of things: whence, even certain ancient philosophers held that “the love of the gods” is the cause of all things as is plain in Metaphysics I [4]; and Dionysius says that “the divine love did not allow itself to be without seed” [De div. nom. 4]. But it was held in the preceding that the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of the love by which God loves Himself. Therefore, the Holy Spirit is the principle of the creation of things. And this is signified in the word of the Psalmist: “Send forth your Spirit, and they shall be created” (Ps. 103:30).

[20.3] It is also from the fact that the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of love—and love has a kind of driving and moving force—that the movement which is from God in things seems properly to be attributed to the Holy Spirit. Of course, the first existing mutation in things from God is understood to be this: He produced the different species out of formless created matter. Hence, this work is what sacred Scripture attributes to the Holy Spirit. For we read in Genesis (1:2): “The Spirit of God moved
primam super quam spiritus domini ferri dicitur, non quasi ipse moveatur, sed quia est motionis principium.

Rursus. Rerum gubernatio a Deo secundum quandam motionem esse intelligitur, secundum quod Deus omnia dirigat et movet in propios fines. Si igitur impulsus et motio ad spiritum sanctum ratione amoris pertinet, convenienter rerum gubernatio et propagatio spiritui sancto attribuitur. Unde Iob 33-4 dicitur: spiritus domini fecit me et in Psalmo: spiritus tuus bonus deducet me in terram rectam.

Et quia gubernare subditos proprius actus domini est, convenienter spiritui sancto dominium attribuitur. Dicit enim apostolus, II ad Cor. 3-17: spiritus autem dominus est. Et in symbolo fidei dicitur: credo in spiritum sanctum dominum.

Item. Vita maxime in motu manifestatur: moventia enim seipsa vivere dicimus, et universaliter quaecumque a seipsis aguntur ad operandum. Si igitur ratione amoris spiritui sancto impulsio et motio competit, convenienter etiam sibi attribuitur vita. Dicitur enim Ioan. 6-64: spiritus est qui vivificat; et Ezech. 37-6: dabo vobis spiritum et vivetis, et in symbolo fidei nos in spiritum sanctum vivificantem credere profitemur. Quod etiam et nomini spiritus consonat: nam etiam corporalis vita animalium est per spiritum vitalem a principio vitae in cetera membra diffusum.

over the waters.” For by “waters” Augustine wants one to understand prime matter over which the Spirit of the Lord is said to be borne, not as though He Himself is moved, but because He is the principle of the movement.

[20.4] Again, the government of things by God is understood to be according to a kind of motion, in that God directs and moves all things to their proper ends. If, then, drive and motion belong to the Holy Spirit by reason of love, the government and propagation of things is fittingly attributed to the Holy Spirit. Hence Job (33:4) says: “The Spirit of God made me”; and the Psalmist: “Thy good spirit shall lead me into the right land” (Ps. 142:10).

[20.5] And because a master’s proper act is to govern subjects, dominion is fittingly attributed to the Holy Spirit, for the Apostle says: “Now the Lord is a Spirit” (2 Cor. 3:17); and the Creed of our faith says: “I believe in the Holy Spirit, the Lord.”

[20.6] Life also is especially manifested in motion, for we say that self-moving things live and in general we say this of everything which puts itself into operation. If, then, by reason of love, drive and motion are suited to the Holy Spirit, life is also suitably attributed to Him. For John (6:64) says: “It is the Spirit who gives life”; and Ezekiel (37:5): “I will send Spirit into you, and you shall live”; and in the Creed of our faith we profess to believe in the Holy Spirit, “the giver of life.” This also harmonizes with the name “Spirit,” for even the bodily life of animals is due to a vital spirit diffused from the principle of life into the rest of the members.
Caput 21
De effectibus attributis spiritui sancto in sacra Scriptura respectu rationalis creaturae, quantum ad ea quae Deus nobis largitur

Considerandum est etiam, quantum ad effectus quos proprie in natura rationali facit, quod ex hoc quod divinae perfectionis utcumque assimilamur, huiusmodi perfectio a Deo nobis dari dicitur: sicut sapientia a Deo nobis donatur secundum quod divinae sapientiae utcumque assimilamur. Cum igitur spiritus sanctus procedat per modum amoris quo Deus seipsum amat, ut ostensum est; ex hoc quod huic amoris assimilamur Deum amantes, spiritus sanctus a Deo nobis dari dicitur. Unde apostolus dicit, Rom. 5-5: caritas Dei diffusa est in cordibus nostris per spiritum sanctum, qui datus est nobis.

Sciendum tamen est quod ea quae a Deo in nobis sunt, reducuntur in Deum sicut in causam efficientem et exemplarem. In causam quidem efficientem, inquantum virtute operativa divina aliquid in nobis efficitur. In causam quidem exemplarem, secundum quod id quod in nobis a Deo est, aliquo modo Deum imitatur. Cum ergo eadem virtus sit patris et filii et spiritus sancti, sicut et eadem essentia; oportet quod omne id quod Deus in nobis efficit, sit, sicut a causa efficiente, simul a patre et filio et spiritu sancto. Verbum tamen sapientiae, quo Deum cognoscimus, nobis a Deo immissum, est proprium repraesentativum filii. Et similiter amor quo Deum diligimus, est proprium repraesentativum spiritus sancti. Et sic caritas quae in nobis est, licet sit effectus patris et filii et spiritus sancti, tamen
quadam speciali ratione dicitur esse in nobis per spiritum sanctum.

Quia vero effectus divini non solum divina operatione esse incipiunt, sed etiam per eam tenetur in esse, ut ex superioribus patet, nihil autem operari potest ubi non est, oportet enim operans et operatum in actu esse simile, sicut movens et motum: necesse est ut, ubicumque est aliquid effectus Dei, ibi sit ipse Deus effector. Unde, cum caritas, qua Deum diligimus, sit in nobis per spiritum sanctum, oportet quod ipse etiam spiritus sanctus in nobis sit, quandiu caritas in nobis est. Unde apostolus dicit, I Cor. 3-16: nescitis quoniam templum Dei estis, et spiritus sanctus habitat in vobis? Cum igitur per spiritum sanctum Dei amatores efficiamur; omne autem amatum in amante est, inquantum huiusmodi: necesse est quod per spiritum sanctum pater et filius in nobis habitent. Unde dominus dicit, Ioan. 14-23: ad eum veniemus, scilicet diligentem Deum, et mansionem apud eum faciemus. Et I Ioan. 3-24, dicitur: in hoc scimus quoniam manet in nobis de spiritu quem dedit nobis.

[21.3] However the divine effects not only begin to be by the divine operation, by it they are also maintained in being (as is clear from the foregoing). And nothing operates where it is not, for the agent and that acted upon must be simultaneously in act, just as the mover and the moved. Necessarily, then, wherever there is an effect of God, there God Himself is efficient. Hence, since the charity by which we love God is in us by the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit Himself must also be in us, so long as the charity is in us. And so the Apostle says: “Know you not that you are the temple of God, and that the Spirit of God dwells in you?” (1 Cor. 3:16). Therefore, since we are made lovers of God by the Holy Spirit, and every beloved is in the lover as such, by the Holy Spirit necessarily the Father and the Son dwell in us also. And so our Lord says: “We will come to him”—He means to one who loves God—“and will make our abode with him” (John 14:23). And in 1 John. (3:7.4) we read: “In this we know that He abides in us, by the Spirit which He has given us.”

Rursus. Manifestum est quod Deus maxime amat illos quos sui amatores per spiritum sanctum constituit, non enim tantum bonum nisi amando conferret, unde Proverb. 8-17 dicitur ex persona domini: ego diligentes me diligo; non quasi nos prius dilexerimus Deum, sed quoniam ipse prior dilexit nos, ut dicitur I Ioan. 4-10. Omne autem amatum in amante est. Necesse est igitur quod per spiritum sanctum non solum Deus sit in nobis, sed etiam nos in Deo. Unde dicitur I Ioan. 4-16: qui manet in caritate in Deo manet, et Deus in eo; et iterum: in hoc

[21.4] Moreover, God manifestly loves in the greatest degree those whom He has made lovers of Himself through the Holy Spirit, for He would not confer so great a good save by loving us. Hence, we read in Proverbs (8:17) from the Person of God: “I love those who love Me”; “not as though we had loved God, but because He has first loved us,” as we read in 1 John (4:10). Of course, every beloved is in a lover. Therefore, by the Holy Spirit not only is God in us, but we also are in God. Hence, we read in 1 John (4:16, 13): “He who abides in charity abides in
intelligimus quoniam in eo manemus, et ipse in nobis, quoniam de spiritu suo dedit nobis.

God, and God in him;” and: “In this we know that we abide in Him and He in us: because He has given us of His Spirit.”

Est autem hoc amicitiae proprium, quod amico aliquis sua secreta revelet. Cum enim amicitia coniungat affectus, et duorum faciat quasi cor unum, non videtur extra cor suum aliquis illud protulisse quod amico revelat: unde et dominus dicit discipulis, Ioan. 15-15: iam non dicam vos servos, sed amicos meos: quia omnia quae audivi a patre meo, nota feci vobis. Quia igitur per spiritum sanctum amici Dei constituimur, convenienter per spiritum sanctum hominibus dicuntur revelari divina mysteria. Unde apostolus dicit, I ad Cor. 2-9 scriptum est quod oculus non vidit, nec auris audivit, nec in cor hominis ascendit, quae praeparavit Deus diligentibus se; nobis autem revelavit Deus per spiritum sanctum.

Of course, this is the proper mark of friendship: that one reveal his secrets to his friend. For, since charity unites affections and makes, as it were, one heart of two, one seems not to have dismissed from his heart that which he reveals to a friend; and so our Lord says to His disciples: “I will not now call you servants but friends: because all things whatsoever I have heard of My Father I have made known to you” (John 15:15). Therefore, since by the Holy Spirit we are established as friends of God, fittingly enough it is by the Holy Spirit that men are said to receive the revelation of the divine mysteries. Hence, the Apostle says: “It is written that eye has not seen, nor ear heard, neither has it entered into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for them that love Him. But to us God has revealed them, by His Spirit” (1 Cor. 2:9-10).

It is from the things a man knows that his speech is formed; fittingly, therefore, a man speaks the mysteries through the Holy Spirit. Hence, the words of 1 Corinthians (14:2): “By the Spirit He speaks mysteries”; and Matthew (10:20): “It is not you that speak, but the Spirit of your Father that speaks in you.” And of prophets, 2 Peter (1:21) says that “the holy men of God spoke, inspired by the Holy Spirit.” Hence, also, in the Creed of our faith we say of the Holy Spirit: “Who spoke through the prophets.”

Now, it is not only proper to love that one reveal his secrets to a friend by reason of their unity in affection, but the same unity requires that what he has he have in common with the friend. For, “since a man has a friend as another self,” he must help the friend as he does himself, making his own
amicitiae esse ponitur velle et facere bonum amico; secundum illud I Ioan. 3-17: qui habuerit substantiam huius mundi, et viderit fratrem suum necessitatem habentem, et clauserit viscera sua ab eo: quomodo caritas Dei manet in eo? Hoc autem maxime in Deo habet locum, cuius velle est efficax ad effectum. Et ideo convenienter omnia dona Dei per spiritum sanctum nobis donari dicuntur: secundum illud I Cor. 12-8: alii datur per spiritum sermo sapientiae; alii autem sermo scientiae secundum eundem spiritum; et postea, multis enumeratis: haec omnia operatur unus atque idem spiritus, dividens singulis prout vult.

Manifestum est autem quod, sicut ad hoc quod corpus aliquod ad locum ignis perveniat, oportet quod igni assimiletur levitatem acquirens, ex qua motu ignis proprio moveatur; ita ad hoc quod homo ad beatitudinem divinae fruitionis, quae Deo propria est secundum suam naturam, perveniat, necesse est, primo quidem quod per spirituales perfectiones Deo assimiletur; et deinde secundum eas operetur; et sic tandem praedictam beatitudinem consequetur. Dona autem spiritualia nobis per spiritum sanctum dantur, ut ostensum est. Et sic per spiritum sanctum Deo configuramur; et per ipsum ad bene operandum habiles reddimur; et per eundem ad beatitudinem nobis via paratur. Quae tria apostolus insinuat nobis, II Cor. 1, dicens: unxit nos Deus; et signavit nos; et dedit pignus spiritus in cordibus nostris. Et Ephes. 1-13 signati estis spiritu promissionis sancto, qui est pignus hereditatis nostrae. Signatio enim ad similitudinem configurationis pertinere videtur; unctio autem ad habilitatem hominis ad perfectas operationes; pignus autem ad spem qua ordinamur in caelestem hereditatem, quae est beatitudo perfecta.

[21.8] This, too, is manifest: just as, to get a body to the place of fire, it must be likened to fire by acquiring that lightness according to which fire is moved by its own motion; so also, to get a man to the beatitude of divine enjoyment which is proper to God in His own nature, these are necessary: first, that by spiritual perfections he be likened to God; then, that he operate with these perfections; and thus, lastly, achieve that beatitude we mentioned. Of course, the spiritual gifts are given to us by the Holy Spirit, as was shown. And thus by the Holy Spirit we are configured to God and through Him we are made ready for good operation. And by the same Spirit the road to beatitude is opened to us. The Apostle implies all three of these when he says: “He who confirms us... is God who also has sealed us, and given the pledge of the Spirit in our hearts” (2 Cor. 1:21, 22). And in Ephesians (1:13, 14): “You were signed with the Holy Spirit of promise, who is the pledge of our inheritance: For the “signing” seems to belong to the likeness of configuration; the “confirming” to man’s readiness for perfect operation; the “pledge,” of course, to the hope by which we are
Et quia ex benevolentia quam quis habet ad aliquem, contingit quod eum sibi adoptat in filium, ut sic ad eum hereditas adoptantis pertineat; convenienter spiritui sancto adoptio filiorum Dei attribuitur; secundum illud Rom. 8-15: accepi spiritum adoptionis filiorum, in quo clamamus, abba (pater).

Further, since out of the good will which one has to another it comes about that he adopt that other as his son—and so the inheritance belongs to that other as adopted—it is fitting that the adoption of the sons of God is attributed to the Holy Spirit, in the words of Romans (8:15): “You have received the Spirit of adoption of sons, whereby we cry: Abba (Father).”

Per hoc autem quod aliquis alterius amicus constituitur, omnis offensa removetur, amicitiae enim offensa contrariatur: unde dicitur Proverb. 10-12: universa delicta operit caritas. Cum igitur per spiritum sanctum Dei amici constituamur, consequens est quod per ipsum nobis a Deo remittantur peccata: et ideo dominus dicit discipulis, Ioan. 20-22: accipite spiritum sanctum: quorum remiseritis peccata, remittentur. Et ideo Matth. 12-31, blasphemantibus in spiritum sanctum peccatorum remissio denegatur, quasi non habentibus illud per quod homo remissionem consequitur peccatorum.

Of course, by the fact that one is established as the friend of another, every offense is removed, because friendship and offense are contraries. Thus, we read in Proverbs (10:12): “Charity covers all sins.” Therefore, since we are established as friends of God by the Holy Spirit, it is by Him that God remits our sins, and so our Lord says to His disciples (John 20:22-23): “Receive the Holy Spirit. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven.” Therefore, also, in Matthew (12:31) blasphemers against the Holy Spirit are denied the remission of sins, as though they do not have that by which a man achieves the remission of his sins.

Hence, also, it is by the Holy Spirit that we are said to be renewed, and cleansed or washed; as the Psalmist has it: “Send forth your Spirit, and they shall be created, and You shall renew the face of the earth” (Ps. 103:30); and Ephesians (4:23): “Be renewed in the Spirit of your mind”; and Isaiah (4:4): “If the Lord shall wash away the filth of the sons of Zion and cleanse away the blood of her daughters in the midst by the Spirit of judgment and the Spirit of burning.”
His igitur consideratis quae per spiritum sanctum in sacris Scripturis nobis a Deo fieri dicuntur, oportet considerare quomodo per spiritum sanctum moveamur in Deum.

Et primo quidem, hoc videtur esse amicitiae maxime proprium, simul conversari ad amicum. Conversatio autem hominis ad Deum est per contemplationem ipsius: sicut et apostolus dicebat, Philipp. 3-20: nostra conversatio in caelis est. Quia igitur spiritus sanctus nos amatores Dei facit, consequens est quod per spiritum sanctum Dei contemplatores constituantur. Unde apostolus dicit, II Cor. 3-18: nos autem omnes, revelata facie gloriae Dei speculantes, in eandem imaginem transformamur a claritate in claritatem, tanquam a domini spiritu.


[22.1] Now that we have considered the things which are said to be done in us by God through the Holy Spirit, we ought to consider how through the Holy Spirit we are moved to God.

[22.2] First, indeed, this appears to be especially proper to friendship: really to converse with the friend. Now, the conversation of man with God is by contemplation of Him, just as the Apostle used to say: “Our conversation is in heaven” (Phil. 3:20). Since, therefore, the Holy Spirit makes us lovers of God, we are in consequence established by the Holy Spirit as contemplators of God. Hence, the Apostle says: “But we all beholding the glory of the Lord with open face, are transformed into the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord” (2 Cor. 3:18).

[22.3] It is also a property of friendship that one take delight in a friend’s presence, rejoice in his words and deeds, and find in him security against all anxieties; and so it is especially in our sorrows that we hasten to our friends for consolation. Since, then, the Holy Spirit constitutes us God’s friends, and makes Him dwell in us, and us dwell in Him (as was shown), it follows that through the Holy Spirit we have joy in God and security against all the world’s adversities and assaults. And so we read in the Psalmist: “Restore unto me the joy of your salvation and strengthen me with your lordly Spirit” (Ps. 50:14); and in Romans (14:17): “The kingdom of God is not meat and drink; but justice, and peace, and joy in the Holy Spirit”; and in Acts (9:31): “The church had peace and was edified, walking in the fear of the Lord, and was filled with the consolation of the Holy...
spiritum sanctum Paraclitum, idest consolatorem, nominat, Ioan. 14-26: Paraclitus autem spiritus sanctus, et cetera.

Similiter autem et amicitiae proprium est consentire amico in his quae vult. Voluntas autem Dei nobis per praecepta ipsius explicatur. Pertinet igitur ad amorem quo Deum diligimus, ut eius mandata impleamus: secundum illud Ioan. 14-15: si diligitis me, mandata mea servate. Unde, cum per spiritum sanctum Dei amatores constituamus, per ipsum etiam quodammodo agimur ut praecepta Dei impleamus: secundum illud apostoli, Rom. 8-14: qui spiritu Dei aguntur, hi filii Dei sunt.

Considerandum tamen est quod a spiritu sancto filii Dei aguntur non sicut servi, sed sicut liberi. Cum enim liber sit qui sui causa est, illud libere agimus quod ex nobis ipsis agimus. Hoc vero est quod ex voluntate agimus: quod autem agimus contra voluntatem, non libere, sed serviler agimus; sive sit violentia absoluta, ut quando totum principium est extra, nihil conferente vim passo, puta cum aliquis vi impellitur ad motum; sive sit violentia voluntario mixta, ut cum aliquis vult facere vel pati quod minus est contrarium voluntati, ut evadat quod magis voluntati contrariatur. Spiritus autem sanctus sic nos ad agendum inclinat ut nos voluntarie agere faciat, inquantum nos amatores Dei constituit. Filii igitur Dei libere a spiritu sancto aguntur ex amore, non serviler ex timore. Unde apostolus, Rom. 8-15, dicit: non accepistis spiritum servitutis iterum in timore, sed spiritum adoptionis filiorum.

Spirit.” For this reason, too, our Lord calls the Holy Spirit the Paraclete, that is, Comforter, in John (14:26): “But the Paraclete, the Holy Spirit,” and so forth.

[22.4] Similarly, too, it is proper to friendship to consent to a friend in what he wills. Of course, the will of God is set forth for us by His precepts. Therefore, it belongs to the love by which we love God that we fulfill His commandments, as the Word in John (14:15) says: “If you love Me, keep My commandments.” Hence, since we are established as God’s lovers by the Holy Spirit, by Him, too, we are in a way driven to fulfill the precepts of God, as the Apostle’s word goes: “Whosoever are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God” (Rom. 8:14).

[22.5] For all that, one must bear in mind that the sons of God are driven not as slaves, but as free men. For, since he is free who is for his own sake, we do that freely which we do of our very selves. But this is what we do of our will, but what we do against our will we do not freely but as slaves: be the violence absolute, as when “the whole principle is extrinsic, with the sufferer contributing nothing—for instance, a man is pushed into motion, or be the violence mixed with the voluntary—for instance, when one wishes to do or to suffer what is less contrary to his will to avoid what is more contrary to it. But the Holy Spirit so inclines us to act that He makes us act voluntarily, in that He makes us lovers of God. Therefore, the sons of God are impelled by the Holy Spirit freely out of love, not slavishly out of fear. Hence, the Apostle says: “You have not received the spirit of bondage again in fear, but the Spirit of adoption of sons” (Rom. 8:15).
Cum autem voluntas ordinetur in id quod est vere bonum, sive propter passionem sive propter malum habitum aut dispositionem homo ab eo quod est vere bonum avertatur, serviliter agit, inquantum a quodam extraneo inclinatur, si consideretur ipse ordo naturalis voluntatis. Sed si consideretur actus voluntatis ut inclinatae in apparens bonum, libere agit cum sequitur passionem aut habitum corruptum; serviliter autem agit si, tali voluntate manente, propter timorem legis in contrarium posita, abstinet ab eo quod vult. Cum igitur spiritus sanctus per amorem voluntatem inclinet in verum bonum, in quod naturaliter ordinatur, tollit et servitutem qua, servus passionis et peccati effectus, contra ordinem voluntatis agit; et servitutem qua, contra motum suae voluntatis, secundum legem agit, quasi legis servus, non amicus. Propter quod apostolus dicit, II Cor. 3-17: ubi spiritus domini, ibi libertas; et Galat. 5-18: si spiritu ducimini, non estis sub lege.

Hinc est quod spiritus sanctus facta carnis mortificare dicitur, secundum quod per passionem carnis a vero bono non avertimur, in quod spiritus sanctus per amorem nos ordinat: secundum illud Rom. 8-13: si spiritu facta carnis mortificaveritis, vivetis.

SCG IV, Ch. 23.5-11- An answer to the arguments given above against the divinity of the Holy Spirit

Est tamen et alius modus quo tam filius quam spiritus sanctus invisibiliter mitti dicuntur. Patet enim ex dictis quod filius procedit a patre per modum notitiae, qua Deus cognoscit seipsum; et spiritus sanctus procedit a patre et filio per modum amoris, quo Deus amat seipsum. Unde, sicut dictum est, cum aliquis per spiritum sanctum amator Dei efficitur, spiritus sanctus [22.6] The will, of course, is ordered to that which is truly good. But if, by reason of passion or of bad habit or disposition, a man be turned away from that which is truly good, he acts slavishly, in that he is diverted by some extraneous thing, if consideration be given the will’s natural order itself. But if one considers the act of the will as inclined to an apparent good, one acts freely when he follows passion or a corrupt habit he acts slavishly, of course, if while his will remains such he—for fear of a law to the contrary—refrains from that which he wills. Therefore, since the Holy Spirit inclines the will by love toward the true good, to which the will is naturally ordered, He removes both that servitude in which the slave of passion infected by sin acts against the order of the will, and that servitude in which, against the movement of his will, a man acts according to the law; its slave, so to say, not its friend. This is why the Apostle says: “Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty” (2 Cor. 3:17); and: “If you are led by the Spirit, you are not under the law” (Gal. 5: 18).

Hinc est quod spiritus sanctus facta carnis mortificare dicitur, secundum quod per passionem carnis a vero bono non avertimur, in quod spiritus sanctus per amorem nos ordinat: secundum illud Rom. 8-13: si spiritu facta carnis mortificaveritis, vivetis.

[22.7] Hence it is that the Holy Spirit is said to mortify the deeds of the flesh, inasmuch as a passion of the flesh does not turn us away from the true good, and to this the Holy Spirit orders us by love; hence, we read in Romans (8:13): “If by the Spirit you mortify the deeds of the flesh, you shall live.”

SCG IV, Ch. 23.5-11- An answer to the arguments given above against the divinity of the Holy Spirit

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est inhabitator ipsius: et sic quodam novo modo in homine est, scilicet secundum novum proprium effectum ipsum inhabitans. Et quod hunc effectum in homine faciat spiritus sanctus, est ei a patre et filio: et propter hoc a patre et filio invisibiliter dicitur mitti. Et pari ratione, in mente hominis filius dicitur mitti invisibiliter, cum aliquis sic in divina cognitione constitutur quod ex tali cognitione Dei amor procedat in homine. Unde patet quod nec iste etiam modus missionis in filio aut spiritu sancto minorationem inducit, sed solum processionem ab alio.

Hence, as was said,” when by the Holy Spirit one is made a lover of God, the Holy Spirit is dwelling within that one, and thus in a new kind of way He is in a man: to wit, dwelling in the man according to a new proper effect. And that the Holy Spirit produce this effect in man is His from the Father and the Son; and on this account He is said to be sent invisibly by the Father and the Son. And reasoning equally, in a human mind the Son is said to be invisibly sent when a man is in such wise established in the divine knowledge that the love of God comes forth in the man. Hence, clearly, neither does that fashion of being sent indicate in the Son or in the Holy Spirit His being the lesser, but His proceeding from another.

Similiter etiam nec spiritum sanctum a divinitate excludit quod pater et filius interdum connumerantur, non facta mentione de spiritu sancto: sicut nec filium a divinitate excludit quod interdum fit mentio de patre, non facta mentione de filio. Per hoc enim tacite Scriptura insinuat quod quicquid, ad divinitatem pertinens, de uno trium dicitur, de omnibus est intelligendum, eo quod sunt unus Deus. Nec etiam potest Deus pater sine verbo et amore intelligi, nec e converso: et propter hoc in uno trium omnes tres intelliguntur. Unde et interdum fit mentio de solo filio, in eo quod commune est tribus: sicut est illud Matth. 11-27, neque patrem quis novit nisi filius: cum tamen et pater et spiritus sanctus patrem cognoscant. Similiter etiam de spiritu sancto dicitur I Cor. 2-11: quae sunt Dei, nemo novit nisi spiritus Dei, cum tamen certum sit quod ab hac cognitione divinorum neque pater neque filius excludantur.

[23.6] Similarly, also, the Holy Spirit is not excluded from the Divinity by the occasional connumeration of the Father and the Son without mention of the Holy Spirit, just as the Son is not excluded from the Divinity by occasional mention of the Father without the Son. In this way Scripture tacitly suggests that whatever relating to Divinity is said of one of the Three must be understood of all, because they are one God. Nor is it possible to understand God the Father without a Word and a Love, nor is the converse possible. For this reason, in one of the Three all Three are understood. Hence, mention occasionally is made of the Son on a point common to the Three; such is the case in Matthew (11:27): “Neither does any one know the Father, but the Son,” although both the Father and the Holy Spirit know the Father. In the same way, we read about the Holy Spirit in 1 Corinthians (2:11): “The things... of God no one knows, but the Spirit of God,” whereas it is certain that from this cognition of Divinity neither the Father nor the Son is excluded.
Patet etiam quod non potest ostendi spiritus sanctus esse creatura per hoc quod de ipso in Scriptura sacra aliqua ad motum pertinentia dicta inveniuntur. Sunt enim accipienda metaphorice. Sic enim et Deo aliquando Scriptura sacra motum attribuit: ut est illud Gen. 3-8, cum audissent vocem domini deambulantis in Paradiso; et 18-21, descendam, et videbo utrum clamorem operae compleverint. Quod ergo dicitur, spiritus domini ferebatur super aquas, intelligendum est eo modo dictum esse sicut dicitur quod voluntas fertur in volitum, et amor in amatum. Quamvis et hoc quidam non de spiritu sancto, sed de aere intelligere velint, qui habet naturallem locum super aquam, unde ad eius multimodas transmutationes significandas, dictum est quod ferebatur super aquas. Quod etiam dicitur, effundam de spiritu meo super omnem carnem, ea ratione dictum esse oportet intelligi qua spiritus sanctus dicitur mitti hominibus a patre vel filio, ut dictum est. In verbo autem effusionis abundantia effectus spiritus sancti intelligitur; et quod non stabit in uno, sed ad plures deveniet, a quibus etiam quodammodo in alios derivetur, sicut patet in his quae corporaliter effunduntur.

Similiter autem quod dicitur, auferam de spiritu tuo tradamque eis, non ad ipsam essentiam seu personam spiritus sancti referendum est, cum indivisibilis sit: sed ad ipsius effectus, secundum quos in nobis habitat, qui in homine possunt augeri et minui; non tamen ita quod id quod subtrahitur uni, idem numero alteri conferatur sicut in rebus corporalibus accidit; sed quia aliquid simile potest accrescere uni in quo alii decrescit. Nec tamen requiritur quod ad hoc quod accrescat uni, alteri subtrahatur: quia res spiritualis potest simul absque detrimento cuiuslibet a pluribus possideri. Unde nec intelligendum est quod [23.7] Clearly, also, one cannot show that the Holy Spirit is a creature because one finds sacred Scripture saying things about Him which pertain to motion. They must be taken metaphorically. For sometimes, also, sacred Scripture attributes motion to God; for example, Genesis (3:8; 18:21): “When they heard the voice of the Lord God walking in paradise; and later: “I will go down and see whether they have done according to the cry that is come to Me.” Therefore, the saying, “the Spirit of God was borne over the waters,” must be understood to be said as the will is said to be borne on the willed, or the love on the beloved. This, also, by the way, some choose not to understand of the Holy Spirit, but of the air which has its natural place above the water, and so it was to indicate its manifold mutation that Scripture said it “was moved over the waters.” This further saying, “I will pour out My Spirit upon all flesh,” must be understood as said of the way in which the Holy Spirit is sent to men by the Father and the Son. This was mentioned. Of course, in the word, “poured out,” the abundance of the effect of the Holy Spirit is grasped: He will not be stopped at one but will move on to many, and from these also somehow to others; this is clear when things are poured out corporeally.

[23.8] In like manner, the saying, “I will take of your Spirit, and will give to them,” must not be referred to the essence or person of the Holy Spirit, since He is indivisible. The reference is to His effects, by which He dwells in us, and these can be increased or diminished in a man: not with the result, for all that, that what is subtracted from one is bestowed on another remaining numerically identical (this happens in bodily things), but so that a like thing may increase in one which decreases in another. Nor does this demand that to increase the effect in one it must be subtracted from another, for a spiritual
de donis spiritualibus oportuerit aliquid subtrahi Moysi ad hoc quod alis conferretur, sed ad actum sive ad officium referendum est: quia quod spiritus sanctus prius per solum Moysen effecerat, postea per plures implevit.

Sic etiam nec Elisaeus petiit ut spiritus sancti essentia seu persona duplicata augeretur: sed ut duos effectus spiritus sancti qui fuerant in Elia, scilicet prophetia et operatio miraculorum, essent etiam in ipso. Quamvis etiam non sit inconveniens quod effectum spiritus sancti unus alio abundanter participet, secundum duplum vel quantumcumque aliam proportionem: cum mensura utriusque sit finita. Non tamen hoc praesumpsisset Elisaeus petere, ut in effectu spirituali superaret magistrum.

Patet etiam ex consuetudine sacrae Scripturae quod per quandam similitudinem humani animi passiones transferuntur in Deum: sicut dicitur in Psalmo: iratus est furore dominus in populum suum. Dicitur enim Deus iratus per similitudinem effectus: punit enim, quod et irati faciunt; unde et ibidem subditur: et tradidit eos in manus gentium. Sic et spiritus sanctus contristari dicitur per similitudinem effectus: deserit enim peccatores, sicut contristati deserunt contristantes.

Est etiam consuetus modus loquendi in sacra Scriptura ut illud Deo attribuatur quod in homine facit: secundum illud Gen. 22-12: nunc cognovi quod timeas dominum, idest, nunc cognoscere feci. Et hoc modo dicitur quod spiritus sanctus postulat, quia thing can be possessed by many simultaneously without any loss. Hence, concerned with spiritual gifts, one must not understand that something was withdrawn from Moses to be conferred on others; the reference is rather to his act or office, for what the Holy Spirit had previously done through Moses alone He later effected through many.

Thus, also, Elishah did not beg that the essence or person of the Holy Spirit be increased by duplication, but that the twofold effect of the Holy Spirit which had been in Elijah—namely, prophecy and the working of miracles—be also in himself. To be sure, there is no awkwardness in one’s participating in the Holy Spirit more abundantly than another, be it by the double or by any other ratio whatever, for the measure in each participant is finite. For all that, Elishah would not have had the presumption to ask that in a spiritual effect he should be greater than his master.

[23.9] Again, it is plainly the custom of sacred Scripture to pass over into God a likeness to the passions of the human spirit; we read in the Psalms (105:40-41): “And the Lord was exceedingly angry with His people.” God is said to be angered by similarity in the effect, for He punishes, which is what the angered do; so this is added below: “And He delivered them into the hands of the nations.” Thus, the Holy Spirit is said to be ‘made sorrowful,” for He leaves sinners as those who are made sorrowful leave those who make them sorrowful.

[23.10] It is also the usual manner of speech in sacred Scripture to attribute to God what He does in man; hence, Genesis (22:12): “Now I know that you fear God”—that is, “now I have made you know.” And in this way the Holy Spirit is said to petition, for He makes others petition; He makes the
postulantes facit: facit enim amorem Dei in cordibus nostris, ex quo desideramus ipso frui, et desiderantes postulamus.

Cum autem spiritus sanctus procedat per modum amoris quo seipsum Deus amat; eodem autem amore Deus se et alia propter suam bonitatem amat: manifestum est quod ad spiritum sanctum pertinet amor quo Deus nos amat. Similiter etiam et amor quo nos Deum amamus: cum nos Dei faciat amatores, ut ex dictis patet. Et quantum ad utrumque, spiritui sancto competit donari. Ratione quidem amoris quo Deus nos amat, eo modo loquendi quo unusquisque dicitur dare amorem suum alicui cum eum amare incipit:- quamvis Deus neminem ex tempore amare incipiat, si respiciat ad voluntatem divinam qua nos amat; effectus tamen sui amoris ex tempore causatur in aliquo, cum eum ad se trahit. Ratione autem amoris quo nos Deum amamus, quia hunc amorem spiritus sanctus facit in nobis: unde secundum hunc amorem in nobis habitat, ut ex dictis patet, et sic eum habemus ut eius ope fruimur. Et quia hoc est spiritui sancto a patre et filio, quod per amorem quem in nobis causat, in nobis sit et habeatur a nobis, convenienter dicitur a patre et filio nobis dari. Nec per hoc patre et filio minor ostenditur: sed ab ipsis habet originem. Dicit etiam et a seipso dari nobis, inquantum amorem secundum quem nos inabitat, simul cum patre et filio in nobis causat.

[23.11] Of course, since the Holy Spirit proceeds by way of the love by which God loves Himself, and by that same love and for His own goodness God loves Himself and other things, manifestly that love pertains to the Holy Spirit, the love by which God loves us. So, also, does the love by which we love God, for He makes us lovers of God. This has been explained. It is in regard to each of these loves that “to be bestowed” is fitting to the Holy Spirit. It is fitting by reason of the love by which God loves us in that manner of speech wherein each is said “to give his love” to someone when he begins to love him. Although there is no one whom God begins to love in time, if one considers the divine will by which He loves us, there is, nevertheless, an effect of His love caused in time in the one whom He draws to Himself. It is fitting to the Holy Spirit by reason of the love by which we love God, for the Holy Spirit makes this love in us. Hence, in accord with this love, He dwells in us—clearly from what has been said—and so we possess Him as one whose resources we enjoy. Now, this is in the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son: that by the love which He causes in us He be in us and be possessed by us. Fittingly, therefore, He is said “to be bestowed” upon us by the Father and the Son. Nor does this show Him to be one lesser than the Father and the Son, but to be one who has His origin from them. He is said also to be given us even by Himself in that He causes in us the love by which He dwells in us together with the Father and the Son.
SCG IV, Ch. 26.8- That there are but three Persons in divinity: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit


Disputed Questions De veritate Q. 25, A. 2- Is sensuality a cognitive or only an appetitive power?

Difficulties

Et videtur quod sit una simplex potentia, non divisa in plures potencias, scilicet irascibilem et concupiscibilem.

It seems that it is one simple power not divided into several, for

Quia in definitione sensualitatis dicitur, art. praeced., quod est quaedam vis animae inferior; quod non diceretur, si in se plures vires contineret. Ergo videtur quod non dividatur in plures potencias.

Obj. 1. In its definition sensuality is said to be a lower power of the soul. This would not be said if it contained several powers. It therefore does not seem to be divided into several powers.

Praeterea, eadem potentia animae est unius contrarietatis, ut visus albi et nigri, sicut dicitur in II de anima. Sed conveniens et nocivum sunt contraria. Ergo eadem vis animae se habet ad utrumque. Sed concupiscibilis se habet ad conveniens, irascibilis.

Obj. 2. One and the same power of the soul "is concerned will one contrariety, as sight is concerned will white and black," as is said in The Soul. But agreeable and harmful are contraries. One and the same power of the soul is therefore referred to both. But the concupiscible power is referred to the agreeable,
vero ad nocivum. Ergo eadem vis est irascibilis et concupiscibilis; et sic sensualitas non dividitur in plures vires.

Praeterea, per eamdem virtutem aliquis recedit ab uno extremo et accedit ad alterum; sicut ratione gravitatis lapsis recedit a loco supremo, et accedit ad locum infimum. Sed per vim irascibilem anima recedit a nocivo, fugiendo ipsum; per vim autem concupiscibilum accedit ad conveniens, concupiscendo ipsum. Ergo eadem vis animae est irascibilis et concupiscibilis; et sic idem quod prius.

Praeterea, proprium obiectum gaudii est conveniens. Gaudium autem non est nisi in concupiscibili. Ergo proprium obiectum concupiscibilis est conveniens. Sed conveniens est obiectum totius sensualitatis, ut patet ex definitione sensualitatis praeexposita: nam res ad corpus pertinentes sunt res corpori convenientes. Ergo tota sensualitas nihil aliud est quam concupiscibilis. Aut ergo irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt idem, aut irascibilis ad sensualitatem non pertinent: et quodcumque horum detur, habetur propositum; scilicet quod sensualitas est una simplex vis.

Sed dicendum, quod sensualitatis obiectum est etiam nocivum, sive disconveniens, ad quod irascibilis se extendit.

- Sed contra: sicut conveniens est obiectum gaudii, ita nocivum vel disconveniens est obiectum tristitiae. Sed tam gaudium quam tristitia sunt in concupiscibili. Ergo tam conveniens quam nocivum sunt obiectum concupiscibilis; et sic quidquid est and the irascible to the harmful. The irascible and the concupiscible are therefore one and the same power, and sensuality is accordingly not divided into several powers.

Obj. 3. It is by the same force that a person withdraws from one extreme and approaches the other, as by reason of gravity a stone leaves the top and goes to the bottom. But by the irascible power the soul will draws from the harmful by shunning it; and by the concupiscible power it approaches the agreeable by craving it. The irascible and the concupiscible are therefore the same power of the soul. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.

Obj. 4. The proper object of joy is the agreeable. Now joy is found only in the concupiscible power. The proper object of the concupiscible power is therefore the agreeable. But the agreeable is the object of the whole of sensuality, as is evident from the definition of sensuality explained above; for the body’s concerns are things agreeing will the body. Consequently the whole of sensuality is nothing but the concupiscible power. Then either the irascible and the concupiscible powers are the same, or the irascible does not belong to sensuality. Whichever of these two is granted, the thesis (that sensuality is one simple power) stands.

Obj. 5. The answer was given that the object of sensuality is also the harmful or disagreeable, which the irascible power attains.

—On the contrary, the harmful or disagreeable is the object of sadness, just as the agreeable is the object of joy. But both joy and sadness are found in the concupiscible power. Consequently both the agreeable and the harmful are the object.
objectum sensualitatis, est objectum concupiscibilis; et ita idem quod prius.

Praeterea, appetitus sensibilis praesupponit apprehensionem. Sed eadem vi apprehensiva apprehenditur conveniens et nocivum. Ergo et eadem vis appetitiva se habet ad utrumque; et sic idem quod prius.

Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, odium est ira inveterata. Sed odium est in concupiscibili, ut probatur in II topicorum, quod amor est in eadem; ira autem in irascibili. Ergo eadem vis et irascibilis et concupiscibilis: aliter enim non posset esse in utraque.

Praeterea, illud animae quod cuilibet potentiae competit, non requirit potentiam determinatam ab aliis distinctam. Sed concupiscere, ad quamlibet potentiam animae pertinet: quod patet ex hoc quod quaelibet potentia animae in suo objecto delectatur, et illud concupiscit. Ergo ad concupiscendum non debet aliqua potentia ordinari ab aliis distincta; et sic concupiscibilis non est alia potentia ab irascibili.

Praeterea, potentiae secundum actus distinguuntur. Sed in quolibet actu irascibilis includitur actus concupiscibilis; nam ira habet concupiscentiam vindictae, et sic de aliis. Ergo concupiscibilis non est alia potentia ab irascibili.

Sed contra. Est quod Damascenus distinguat appetitum sensitivum in irascibilem et concupiscibilem, et similiter of the concupiscible. Thus, whatever is the object of sensuality is the object of the concupiscible. And so the same must be concluded as above.

Obj. 6. Sense appetite presupposes apprehension. But the agreeable and the harmful are apprehended by the same apprehensive power. Then the same appetitive power is concerned will both. Thus the conclusion is the same as above.

Obj. 7. According to Augustine "hatred is inveterate anger." But hatred is in the concupiscible power, as is proved in the Topics, because love is in the same power. But anger is in the irascible. Therefore the irascible and the concupiscible are one and the same power, for other will anger could not be in both.

Obj. 8. That function of the soul which belongs to every power does not require a definite power distinct from the rest. But to crave (concupiscere) belongs to every power of the soul, as is evident from the fact that every power of the soul delights in its object and craves it. Consequently a power distinct from the rest need not be referred to craving. Thus the concupiscible power is not distinct from the irascible.

Obj. 9. Powers are distinguished according to their acts. But in any act of the irascible power the act of the concupiscible is included, for anger has a craving for revenge, and so of the others. The concupiscible is therefore not a power distinct from the irascible.

To the Contrary

s.c. 1. Damascene distinguishes the sensitive appetite into the irascible and the concupiscible powers, and so does Gregory of
Gregorius Nyssenus in Lib. quem de anima et eius viribus scribit. Appetitus autem inferior est sensualitas. Ergo sensualitas in se plures vires continet.

Nyssa. But the lower appetite is sensuality. Sensuality therefore includes several powers.

Praeterea, in libro de spiritu et anima, distinguuntur hae tres vires motivae, rationalis, concupiscibilis et irascibilis. Sed rationalis est alia vis ab irascibili. Ergo et irascibilis a concupiscibili.

s.c. 2. In Spirit and Soul these three motive powers are distinguished: "the rational, the concupiscible, and the irascible." But the rational power is distinct from the irascible. Then so also is the irascible from the concupiscible.

Praeterea, philosophus in III de anima ponit in appetitu sensitivo desiderium et animum, id est irascibilem et concupiscibilem, quae sunt ad invicem diversae.

s.c. 3. The Philosopher places in the sensitive appetite "desire and high spirit," that is, the concupiscible and the irascible.

Respondeo. Dicendum, quod appetitus sensualitatis has duas vires continet, scilicet irascibilem et concupiscibilem quae sunt ad invicem diversae potentiae; quod quidem hoc modo videri potest.

REPLY: The appetite of sensuality contains these two powers: the irascible and the concupiscible, which are faculties distinct from one another. This can be seen from the following consideration.

Appetitus enim sensitivus quamdam convenientiam habet cum appetitu naturali, in quantum uterque tendit in rem conveniuntem appetenti. Invenitur autem appetitus naturalis ad duo tendere, secundum duplicem operationem rei naturalis. Una quarum est per quam res naturalis nittitur acquirere id quod est conservativum suae naturae; sicut grave movetur deorsum, ut ibi conservetur. Alia est per quam res naturalis sua contraria destruitt per qualitatem activam: et hoc quidem necessarium est corruptibili; quia, nisi haberet virtutem, qua suum contrarium vinceret, ab eo corrumpetetur.

Sic ergo appetitus naturalis ad duo tendit: scilicet ad consequendum id quod est congruum et amicum naturae, et ad

Sense appetite has something in common will natural appetite inasmuch as both tend to a thing agreeing will the subject of the tendency. Natural appetite is found to tend to two things in accordance will the two types of operation of a natural being. One of these is that by which the natural being strives to acquire what is capable of preserving its nature, as a heavy body moves downward in order to be preserved there. The other type is that by which the natural being destroys its contraries by an active quality. This is necessary for a corruptible being because, if it did not have the strength to conquer its contrary, it would be destroyed by it.

Natural appetite accordingly has a twofold tendency: to obtain what is suited and favorable to this nature, and to gain, as it
habendum quamdam victoriam super illud quod est ei adversum; et primum est quasi per modum receptionis, secundum vero est per modum actionis; unde ad diversa principia reducuntur. Recipere enim et agere non sunt ab eodem principio; ut ignis, qui per levitatem fert sursum, per calorem contraria corrumpit.

Ita in appetitu sensibili ista duo inveniuntur: nam animal per appetitivam potentiam appetit id quod est congruum et amicum sibi, et hoc per vim concupiscibilum, cuius proprium objectum est delectabile secundum sensum; appetit etiam habere dominium et victoriam super ea quae sunt sibi contraria, et hoc per vim irascibilum; unde dicitur quod eius objectum est alicquid arduum.

Et sic patet quod irascibilis est alia potentia a concupiscibili. Nam aliam rationem appetibilitatis habet aliquid ex hoc quod est arduum, cum quandoque illud quod est arduum, a delectatione separat, et rebus circumstantibus immisceat; sicut cum animal relicta voluptate cui vacabat, aggreditur pugnam, nec retrahitur propter dolores quos sustinet. Et iterum una earum, scilicet concupiscibilis, videtur ordinata ad recipiendum: haec enim appetit ut ei suum delectabile coniungatur; altera vero, scilicet irascibilis, est ordinata ad agendum, quia per actionem aliquam superat id quod est contrarium vel nocivum, ponens se in quadam altitudine victoriae super ipsum. Hoc autem communiter in potentis animae invenitur quod recipere et agere ad diversas potentias pertinent, sicut patet de intellectu agente et possibili. Et inde est quod secundum Avicennam, ad irascibilem pertinet fortitudo et debilitas cordis, quasi virtuti ordinatae ad agendum; ad concupiscibilem autem dilatatio et constrictio ipsius, quasi virtuti ordinatae ad recipiendum.

were, a victory over whatever is opposed to it. The first is done by way of reception, the second by way of action. They are consequently reduced to different principles, for receiving and acting are not from the same principle, as fire is borne upward by its lightness and by heat destroys things contrary to it.

In sense appetite those same two tendencies are likewise found. For by its appetitive faculty an animal desires what is suited and favorable to it. This is done by the concupiscible power, whose proper object is what is delightful to sense. It also seeks to gain the mastery and victory over things that are contrary to it. This it does by the irascible power. Its object is accordingly said to be something arduous.

From this it is clear that the irascible is a different power from the concupiscible. If something is pleasurable it has a different reason for its appetibility than if it is arduous, since the arduous sometimes keeps us away from pleasure and involves us in affairs that bring sadness, as when an animal leaves the pleasure which he was enjoying and enters a light and is not made to withdraw from it by the pains which he incurs. One of the two, moreover, the concupiscible power, seems to be directed to reception; for it tends in order that the object of its delight may be joined to it. The other, however, the irascible power, is directed to action, because by its action it overcomes something which is contrary or harmful to it, getting the upper hand by victory over it. It is found to be the case among the powers of the soul in general that receiving and acting belong to different powers, as is clear of the agent and possible intellect. It is for this reason too that according to Avicenna courage and faintness of heart pertain to the irascible power as the faculty directed to action, whereas the expansion and contraction of the heart...
It is clear, then, from what has been said that the irascible power is in some sense subordinated to the concupiscible as its defender. For it is necessary for an animal to gain victory over the things contrary to it by means of the irascible power, as has been said, in order that the concupiscible may possess the object of its delight without hindrance. An indication of this is the fact that animals fight among themselves on account of things that give them pleasure, such as copulation and food, as is said in Animals. For this reason all the passions of the irascible power have their beginning and end in the concupiscible. Anger, for instance, begins will some sadness that has been caused (in the concupiscible power) and, after revenge has been got, ends will joy (which is likewise in the concupiscible power). In the same way hope begins will desire or love and ends in enjoyment.

It should be noted, however, that not only in the apprehensive powers but also in the appetitive there is something which belongs to the sensitive soul in accordance with its own nature and something else according as it has some slight participation in reason, coming into contact at its highest level of activity will reason at its lowest. There is verified here the statement of Dionysius that the divine wisdom "joins the ends of the first things to the beginnings of the second."

Thus the imaginative power belongs to the sensitive soul in accordance with its own nature, because forms received from sense are stored up in it; but the estimative power, by which an animal apprehends intentions not received by the senses, such as friendship or hostility, is in the sensitive soul according as it shares somewhat in reason. It is accordingly in virtue of this...
animalia quamdam prudentiam habere, ut patet in principio Metaphys., sicut quod ovis fugit lupum, cuius inimicitiam nunquam sensit.

Et similiter ex parte sensitivae. Nam quod animal appetat id quod est delectabile secundum sensum, quod ad concupiscibilem pertinet, hoc est secundum propriam rationem sensibilis animae; sed quod relictum delectabilis appetit victioriam, quam consequitur cum dolore, quod ad irascibilem pertinet, competit ei secundum quod attingit aliquam appetitum superiorem; unde irascibilis est propinquior rationi et voluntati quam concupiscibilis. Et propter hoc incontinentes irae est minus turpis quam incontinentes concupiscientiae, utpote minus privatus ratione, ut dicit philosophus in II Ethic.

Patet igitur ex dictis, quod irascibilis et concupiscibilis sunt diversae potentiae, et quid est objectum utriusque, et quomodo irascibilis iuvat concupiscibilem, et est superior et dignior ea, sicut aestimativa inter ceteras apprehensivas virtutes sensitivae partis.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod sensualitas dicitur esse vis singulariter, quia est una in genere, quamvis per aliquas partes dividatur.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod tam conveniens delectabile quam nocivum tristabile ad concupiscibilem pertinet, secundum quod unum est fugiendum et alterum consequendum; sed habere quamdam altitudinem super utrumque, ut scilicet nocivum possit estimative power that animals are said to have a sort of prudence, as is seen in the beginning of the Metaphysics. A sheep, for example, flees from a wolf whose hostility it has never sensed.

The same principle is verified also in regard to the appetitive power. The fact that an animal seeks what is pleasurable to its senses (the business of the concupiscible power) is in accordance will the sensitive soul’s own nature; but that it should leave what is pleasurable and seek something for the sake of a victory which it will pain (the business of the irascible), this belongs to it according as it in some measure reaches up to the higher appetite. The irascible power, there fore, is closer to reason and the will than the concupiscible. On this account a man unable to control his anger is less base than one unable to control his concupiscence, being less deprived of reason, as the Philosopher says.

It is therefore clear from what has been said that the irascible and the concupiscible are distinct powers, and also what is the object of each and how the irascible power helps the concupiscible and is higher and nobler than it, like the estimative among the apprehensive powers of the sensitive part.

Ad 1. Sensuality is called a power in the singular because it is one in genus although it is divided into different species or parts.

Ad. 2. Both the agreeable object of delight and the harmful object of sadness belong to the concupiscible inasmuch as one is to be fled, the other to be pursued. But to get the upper hand over both of them, so as to be able to overcome the harmful and
superari, et delectabile cum securitate quadem possideri, ad irascibilem pertinet.

Ad tertium dicendum, quod recedere a nocivo et accedere ad delectabile, utrumque concupiscibili competitor; sed impugnare et superare id quod potest esse nocivum, hoc pertinet ad irascibilem.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad quartum et quintum: quia conveniens est objectum concupiscibilis, secundum quod est delectabile; sed totius sensualitatis, secundum quod est quomodocumque expediens animali, vel per viam ardui, vel per viam delectabilis

Ad sextum dicendum, quod eadem appetitiva concupiscibilis est convenientis prosecutiva, et inconveniens fugitiva; unde irascibilis et concupiscibilis non distinguuntur per conveniens et nocivum, ut ex dictis, in solutione ad 2 argumentum, patet.

Ad septimum dicendum, quod cum dicitur: odium est ira inveterata, est praedicatio per causam, et non per essentiam: nam passiones irascibilis terminantur ad passiones concupiscibilis, ut dictum est, in corp. art.

Ad octavum dicendum, quod concupiscere appetitu animali, ad solam concupiscibilem pertinet; sed concupiscere appetitu naturali, pertinet ad quamlibet potentiam: nam quaelibet potentia animae natura quaedam est, et naturaliter in aliquid inclinatur. Et similiter est distinguendum de amore et delectatione, et aliis huiusmodi.
Ad nonum dicendum, quod in definitione passionum irascibilis ponitur actus appetitivae communis, ut appetere; non autem aliquid ad concupiscibilem pertinens, nisi sit principium vel terminus; ut si dicatur, quod ira est appetitus vindictae propter praeecedentem contristationem.

Ad. 9. In the definition of the passions of the irascible power there is placed the common act of the appetitive power, to tend, but not any thing that belongs to the concupiscible except as the beginning or the end, as would be the case if one were to say that anger is the desire for revenge because of n previous saddening.

ST I, Q. 20, A. 2- Whether God loves all things?

Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod Deus non omnia amet. Quia, secundum Dionysium, IV cap. de Div. Nom., amor amantem extra se ponit, et eum quodammodo in amatum transfert. Inconveniens autem est dicere quod Deus, extra se positus, in alia transferatur. Ergo inconveniens est dicere quod Deus alia a se amet.

Objection 1. It seems that God does not love all things. For according to Dionysius (Div. Nom. iv, 1), love places the lover outside himself, and causes him to pass, as it were, into the object of his love. But it is not admissible to say that God is placed outside of Himself, and passes into other things. Therefore it is inadmissible to say that God loves things other than Himself.

Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, amor Dei aeternus est. Sed ea quae sunt alia a Deo, non sunt ab aeterno nisi in Deo. Ergo Deus non amat ea nisi in seipso. Sed secundum quod sunt in eo, non sunt aliud ab eo. Ergo Deus non amat alia a seipso.

Objection 2. Further, the love of God is eternal. But things apart from God are not from eternity; except in God. Therefore God does not love anything, except as it exists in Himself. But as existing in Him, it is no other than Himself. Therefore God does not love things other than Himself.

Iª q. 20 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, duplex est amor, scilicet concupiscientiae, et amicitiae. Sed Deus creaturas irrationales non amat amore concupiscientiae, quia nullius extra se eget, nec etiam amore amicitiae, quia non potest ad res irrationales haberi, ut patet per philosophum, in VIII Ethic. Ergo Deus non omnia amat.

Objection 3. Further, love is twofold—the love, namely, of desire, and the love of friendship. Now God does not love irrational creatures with the love of desire, since He needs no creature outside Himself. Nor with the love of friendship; since there can be no friendship with irrational creatures, as the Philosopher shows (Ethic. viii, 2). Therefore God does not love all things.
I\textsuperscript{a} q. 20 a. 2 arg. 4 Praeterea, in Psalmo dicitur, odisti omnes qui operantur iniquitatem. Nihil autem simul odio habetur et amat. Ergo Deus non omnia amat.

I\textsuperscript{a} q. 20 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Sap. XI, diligis omnia quae sunt, et nihil odisti eorum quae fecisti.

I\textsuperscript{a} q. 20 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod Deus omnia existentia amat. Nam omnia existentia, inquantum sunt, bona sunt, ipsum enim esse cuiuslibet rei quoddam bonum est, et similiter quaelibet perfectio ipsius. Ostensum est autem supra quod voluntas Dei est causa omnium rerum et sic oportet quod intantum habeat aliquid esse, aut quodcumque bonum, inquantum est volitum a Deo. Cum igitur existenti Deus vult aliquod bonum. Unde, cum amare nil alii d sit quam velle bonum alicui, manifestum est quod Deus omnia quae sunt, amat. Non tamen eo modo sicut nos. Quia enim voluntas nostra non est causa bonitatis rerum, sed ab ea movetur sicut ab objecto, amor noster, quo bonum alicui volumus, non est causa bonitatis ipsius, sed e converso bonitas eius, vel vera vel aestimata, provocat amorem, quo ei volumus et bonum conservari quod habet, et addi quod non habet, et ad hoc operamur. Sed amor Dei est infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus.

I\textsuperscript{a} q. 20 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod amans sic fit extra se in amatum translatus, inquantum vult amato bonum, et operatur per suam providentiam, sicut et sibi. Unde et Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., audendum est autem et hoc pro veritate dicere, quod et ipse omnium causa, per abundantiam amativae bonitatis, extra seipsum fit ad omnia existentia providentiis.

Objection 4. Further, it is written (Psalm 5:7): "Thou hatest all the workers of iniquity." Now nothing is at the same time hated and loved. Therefore God does not love all things.

On the contrary, It is said (Wisdom 11:25): "Thou lovest all things that are, and hatest none of the things which Thou hast made."

I answer that, God loves all existing things. For all existing things, in so far as they exist, are good, since the existence of a thing is itself a good; and likewise, whatever perfection it possesses. Now it has been shown above (19, 4) that God's will is the cause of all things. It must needs be, therefore, that a thing has existence, or any kind of good, only inasmuch as it is willed by God. To every existing thing, then, God wills some good. Hence, since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists. Yet not as we love. Because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides the good it has not, and to this end we direct our actions: whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness.

Reply to Objection 1. A lover is placed outside himself, and made to pass into the object of his love, inasmuch as he wills good to the beloved; and works for that good by his providence even as he works for his own. Hence Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv, 1): "On behalf of the truth we must make bold to say even this, that He Himself, the cause of all things,
Reply to Objection 2. Although creatures have not existed from eternity, except in God, yet because they have been in Him from eternity, God has known them eternally in their proper natures; and for that reason has loved them, even as we, by the images of things within us, know things existing in themselves.

Reply to Objection 3. Friendship cannot exist except towards rational creatures, who are capable of returning love, and communicating one with another in the various works of life, and who may fare well or ill, according to the changes of fortune and happiness; even as to them is benevolence properly speaking exercised. But irrational creatures cannot attain to loving God, nor to any share in the intellectual and beatific life that He lives. Strictly speaking, therefore, God does not love irrational creatures with the love of friendship; but as it were with the love of desire, in so far as He orders them to rational creatures, and even to Himself. Yet this is not because He stands in need of them; but only on account of His goodness, and of the services they render to us. For we can desire a thing for others as well as for ourselves.

Reply to Objection 4. Nothing prevents one and the same thing being loved under one aspect, while it is hated under another. God loves sinners in so far as they are existing natures; for they have existence and have it from Him. In so far as they are sinners, they have not existence at all, but fall short of it; and this in them is not from God. Hence under this aspect, they are hated by Him.
Iª -IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 1 Ad octavum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amici sint necessarii ad beatitudinem. Futura enim beatitudo in Scripturis frequenter nomine gloriae designatur. Sed gloria consistit in hoc quod bonum hominis ad notitiam multorum deducitur. Ergo ad beatitudinem requiritur societas amicorum.

Objection 1. It would seem that friends are necessary for Happiness. For future Happiness is frequently designated by Scripture under the name of "glory." But glory consists in man's good being brought to the notice of many. Therefore the fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.

Iª -IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 2 Praeterea, Boetius dicit quod nullius boni sine consortio iucunda est possessio. Sed ad beatitudinem requiritur delectatio. Ergo etiam requiritur societas amicorum.

Objection 2. Further, Boethius [Seneca, Ep. 6 says that "there is no delight in possessing any good whatever, without someone to share it with us." But delight is necessary for Happiness. Therefore fellowship of friends is also necessary.

Iª -IIae q. 4 a. 8 arg. 3 Praeterea, caritas in beatitudine perficitur. Sed caritas se extendit ad dilectionem Dei et proximi. Ergo videtur quod ad beatitudinem requiritur societas amicorum.

Objection 3. Further, charity is perfected in Happiness. But charity includes the love of God and of our neighbor. Therefore it seems that fellowship of friends is necessary for Happiness.

Iª -IIae q. 4 a. 8 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, si loquamur de felicitate praesentis vitae, sicut philosophus dicit in IX Ethic., felix indiget amicis, non quidem propter utilitatem, cum sit sibi sufficiens; nec propter delectationem, quia habet in seipso delectationem perfectam in operatione virtutis; sed propter bonam operationem, ut scilicet eis benefaciat, et ut eos inspiciens benefacere delectetur, et ut etiam ab eis in

On the contrary, It is written (Wisdom 7:11): "All good things came to me together with her," i.e. with divine wisdom, which consists in contemplating God. Consequently nothing else is necessary for Happiness.

I answer that, If we speak of the happiness of this life, the happy man needs friends, as the Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 9), not, indeed, to make use of them, since he suffices himself; nor to delight in them, since he possesses perfect delight in the operation of virtue; but for the purpose of a good operation, viz. that he may do good to them; that he may delight in seeing them do good; and again that he may be helped by them in his
benefaciendo adiuvertur. Indiget enim homo ad bene operandum
auxilio amicorum, tam in operibus vitae activae, quam in
operibus vitae contemplatiae.

Sed si loquamur de perfecta beatitudine quae erit in patria, non
requiritur societas amicorum de necessitate ad beatitudinem,
quia homo habet totam plenitudinem suae perfectionis in Deo.
Sed ad bene esse beatitudinis facit societas amicorum. Unde
Augustinus dicit, VIII super Gen. ad Litt., quod creatura
spiritualis, ad hoc quod beata sit, non nisi intrinsecus adiuvar
aeteritate, veritate, caritate creatoris. Extrinsicus vero, si
adiuvari dicenda est, fortasse hoc solo adiuvar, quod invicem
vident, et de sua societate gaudent in Deo.

\textbf{P-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 1} Ad primum ergo dicendum quod gloria quae
est essentialis beatitudini, est quam habet homo non apud
hominem, sed apud Deum.

\textbf{P-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 2} Ad secundum dicendum quod verbum illud
intelligitur, quando in eo bono quod habetur, non est plena
sufficientia. Quod in proposito dici non potest, quia omnis boni
sufficientiam habet homo in Deo.

\textbf{P-IIae q. 4 a. 8 ad 3} Ad tertium dicendum quod perfectio
caritatis est essentialis beatitudini quantum ad dilectionem Dei,
on autem quantum ad dilectionem proximi. Unde si esset una
sola anima fruens Deo, beata esset, non habens proximum quem
diligeret. Sed supposito proximo, sequitur dilectio eius ex
perfecta dilectione Dei. Unde quasi concomitanter se habet
amicitia ad beatitudinem perfectam.

But if we speak of perfect Happiness which will be in our
heavenly Fatherland, the fellowship of friends is not essential
to Happiness; since man has the entire fulness of his perfection
in God. But the fellowship of friends conduces to the well-
being of Happiness. Hence Augustine says (Gen. ad lit. viii, 25)
that "the spiritual creatures receive no other interior aid to
happiness than the eternity, truth, and charity of the Creator.
But if they can be said to be helped from without, perhaps it is
only by this that they see one another and rejoice in God, at
their fellowship."

Reply to Objection 1. That glory which is essential to
Happiness, is that which man has, not with man but with God.

Reply to Objection 2. This saying is to be understood of the
possession of good that does not fully satisfy. This does not
apply to the question under consideration; because man
possesses in God a sufficiency of every good.

Reply to Objection 3. Perfection of charity is essential to
Happiness, as to the love of God, but not as to the love of our
neighbor. Wherefore if there were but one soul enjoying God, it
would be happy, though having no neighbor to love. But
supposing one neighbor to be there, love of him results from
perfect love of God. Consequently, friendship is, as it were,
concomitant with perfect Happiness.
Articulus 5- Quinto quaeritur utrum voluntas sit subjectum virtutis.

Et videtur quod sic.

Maior enim perfectio requiritur in imperante ad hoc quod recte imperet, quam in exequente ad hoc quod recte exequatur; quia ex imperante procedit ordinatio exequentis. Sed ad actum virtutis se habet voluntas sicut imperans, irascibilis autem et concupiscibilis sicut obedientes et exequentes. Cum igitur in irascibili et concupiscibili sit virtus sicut in subjecto, videtur quod multo fortius debeat esse in voluntate.

Sed dicetur, quod naturalis inclinatio voluntatis ad bonum sufficit ad eius rectitudinem. Nam finem naturaliter desideramus, unde non requiritur quod rectificetur per habitum virtutis superadditum.

Sed contra, voluntas non solum est finis ultimi, sed etiam finium aliorum. Sed circa appetitum aliorum finium contingit voluntatem et recte et non recte se habere. Nam boni praestuunt sibi bonos fines, mali vero malos, ut dicitur in III ethic.: qualis unusquisque est, talis finis videtur ei. Ergo requiritur ad rectitudinem voluntatis, quod sit in ea aliquis habitus virtutis ipsam perficiens.

Praeterea, etiam inest animae cognoscitivae aliqua cognitionis naturalis, quae est primorum principiorum; et tamen respectu huius cognitionis est aliqua virtus intellectualis in nobis, scilicet intellectus, qui est habitus principiorum. Ergo et in voluntate

Article 5- Whether will is the subject of virtue

And it seems that it is.

Obj. 1. A greater perfection is needed in the commander if he is to command perfectly than in the executor if he is to execute well, because the order to execute comes from the commander. But the will commands the act of virtue, and the irascible and concupiscible obey and execute. Therefore, since virtue exists in the irascible and concupiscible as in a subject, it seems that it should even more so be in the will.

Obj. 2. It will be said that the will’s natural inclination to the good suffices for its rectitude, since we naturally desire the end, so it does not need to be rectified by a superadded habit of virtue.

On the contrary: Will does not bear on the ultimate end alone, but also on other ends. But with respect to the desire for other ends the will can act rightly or not rightly. For the good propose for themselves good ends, and the evil evil, as is said in Ethics 3: As a person is, so does the end appear to him. Therefore, for rectitude of will there is required that there be in it some habit of virtue that perfects it.

Obj. 3. Moreover, the soul’s knowing power has some natural knowledge, namely, of first principles, yet we have an intellectual virtue with respect to such knowledge, namely, insight (intellectus), which is the habit of first principles. So
debet esse aliqua virtus respectu eius ad quod naturaliter inclinatur.

Praeterea, sicut circa passiones est aliqua virtus moralis, ut temperantia et fortitudo; ita etiam est aliqua virtus circa operationes, ut iustitia. Operari autem sine passione est voluntatis, sicut operari ex passione est irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Ergo sicut aliqua virtus moralis est in irascibili et concupiscibili, ita aliqua est in voluntate.

Praeterea, Philosophus in IV ethic. Dicit, quod amor sive amicitia est ex passione. Amicitia autem est ex electione. Dilectio autem quae est sine passione, est actus voluntatis. Cum igitur amicitia sit vel virtus, vel non sine virtute, ut dicitur in VIII ethic.; videtur quod virtus sit in voluntate sicut in subiecto.

Praeterea, caritas est potissima inter virtutes, ut probat apostolus, I ad Cor. XIII. Sed caritatis subiectum esse non potest nisi voluntas; non enim est eius subiectum concupiscibilis inferior, quae solum ad bona sensibilia se extendit. Ergo voluntas est subiectum virtutis.

Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, per voluntatem immediatius Deo coniungimur. Sed id quod coniungit nos Deo, est virtus. Ergo videtur quod virtus sit in voluntate sicut in subiecto.

Praeterea, felicitas, secundum Hugonem de s. Victore, in voluntate est. Virtutes autem sunt dispositiones quaedam ad felicitatem. Cum igitur dispositio et perfectio sint in eodem, videtur quod virtus sit in voluntate sicut in subiecto.

there should be in will a virtue with respect to that to which it is naturally inclined.

Obj. 4. Moreover, just as there is moral virtue governing the emotions, namely temperance and courage, so there is a virtue governing actions, namely justice. But will acts without emotion while the irascible and concupiscible are with emotion. Therefore, just as there is moral virtue in the irascible and concupiscible, so too is there in the will.

Obj. 5. Moreover, the Philosopher says in Ethics 4 that love or friendship involves emotion. But friendship is a matter of choice, and the love that is without passion is an act of will. Therefore, since friendship is a virtue, or not without virtue, as is said in Ethics 8, it seems that there is also virtue in will as in a subject.

Obj. 6. Moreover, charity is the most powerful of the virtues, as the Apostle proves in 1 Corinthians 13. But only will can be the subject of charity; the concupiscible, which is lower, cannot be its subject since it bears only on sensible goods. Therefore, will is the subject of virtue.

Obj. 7. Moreover, according to Augustine we are conjoined to God most immediately through will. But that which conjoins us to God is virtue. Therefore, it seems that virtue is in will as in a subject.

Obj. 8. Moreover, happiness according to Hugh of St. Victor is in the will. But virtues are dispositions to happiness. Therefore, since disposition and perfection are in the same thing, it seems that virtue is in will as in a subject.
Praeterea, secundum Augustinum, voluntas est qua peccatur et recte vivitur. Rectitudo autem vitae pertinet ad virtutem; unde Augustinus dicit, quod virtus est bona qualitas mentis, qua recte vivitur. Ergo virtus est in voluntate.


Praeterea, virtus humana in illa parte animae debet esse quae est propria hominis. Sed voluntas est propria hominis, sicut et ratio; utpote magis propinqua rationi quam irascibilis et concupiscibilis. Cum igitur irascibilis et concupiscibilis sint subjicte virtutum, videtur quod multo fortius voluntas.

Sed contra.

Omnis virtus aut est intellectualis, aut moralis, ut patet per Philosophum in fine I ethic.. Virtus autem moralis est sic in subjicte in eo quod est rationale non per essentiam, sed per participationem; virtus vero intellectualis habet pro subjicte id quod est rationale per essentiam. Cum igitur voluntas in neutra parte possit computari; quia nec est cognoscitiva potencia, quod pertinet ad rationalem per essentiam; neque pertinet ad irrationalem animae partem quae pertinet ad rationalem per participationem; videtur quod voluntas nullo modo subjicte virtutis esse possit.

Praeterea, ad eumdem actum non debent ordinari plures virtutes. Hoc autem sequeretur, si voluntas virtutis esset subjicte; quia ostensum est, quod in irascibili et concupiscibili sunt aliquae

Obj. 9. Moreover, according to Augustine, will is that whereby we either live rightly or sin. But rectitude of life pertains to virtue. Hence, Augustine says that virtue is a good quality of mind, whereby we live rightly. Therefore, virtue is in the will.

Obj. 10. Moreover, contraries are such as to be in the same subject; but sin is contrary to virtue. Therefore, just as every sin is in the will, as Augustine says, so it seems that every virtue too must be in the will.

Obj. 11. Moreover, human virtue ought to be in the part of the soul that it proper to man. But will is proper to man, just as reason is, as being closer to reason than are the irascible and concupiscible. Therefore, since the irascible and concupiscible are subject of virtue, it seems that the will should be a fortiori.

On The Contrary

s.c. 1. Every virtue is either intellectual or moral, as is clear from what the Philosopher says at the end of Ethics 1. But moral virtue has as its subject that which is rational by participation, not essentially. But intellectual virtue has for subject that which is rational essentially. Therefore, since the will can be counted in neither part, since it is not a knowing power, which pertains to the essentially rational, nor does it pertain to the rational by way of participation, it seems that the will can in no way be the subject of virtue.

s.c. 2. Moreover, several virtues ought not pertain to the same act, but that is what would happen if the will were the subject of virtue because, as has been shown, there are virtues in the
virtutes; et cum ad actus illarum virtutum se habeat quodammodo voluntas, oporteret quod ad eosdem actus essent aliquae virtutes in voluntate. Ergo non est dicendum, quod voluntas sit subiectum virtutis.

Respondeo. Dicendum, quod per habitum virtutis potentia quae ei subicitur, respectu sui actus complementum acquirit. Unde ad id ad quod potentia aliqua se extendit ex ipsa ratione potentiae, non est necessarius habitus virtutis. Virtus autem ordinat potentias ad bonum; ipsa enim est quae bonum facit habentem, et opus eius bonum reddit.

Voluntas autem hoc quod virtus facit circa alias potentias, habet ex ipsa ratione suae potentiae: nam eis obiectum est bonum. Unde tendere in bonum hoc modo se habet ad voluntatem sicut tendere in delectabile ad concupiscibilem, et sicut ordinari ad sonum se habet ad auditum. Unde voluntas non indiget aliquo habitu virtutis inclinante ipsam ad bonum quod est sibi proportionatum, quia in hoc ex ipsa ratione potentiae tindit; sed ad bonum quod transcendit proportionem potentiae, indiget habitu virtutis. Cum autem uniuscuiusque appetitus tendat in proprium bonum appetentis; dupliciter aliquod bonum potest excedere voluntatis proportionem.

Uno modo ratione speciei; alio modo ratione individui. Ratione quidem speciei, ut voluntas elevetur ad aliquod bonum quod excedit limites humani boni: et dico humanum id quod ex viribus naturae homo potest. Sed supra humanum bonum est bonum divinum, id quod voluntatem hominis caritas elevat, et simili spes.

Ratione autem individui, hoc modo quod aliquis quaerat id quod est alterius bonum, licet voluntas extra limites boni humani non irascible and concupiscible, and since will is related in some way to the acts of those virtues, there would have to be virtues in the will related to those acts. Therefore, it should not be said that the will is the subject of virtue.

Response. It should be said that a power acquires a complement to its act from the habit of virtue to which it is subject. Hence, a habit of virtue is not needed in order for a power to extend to its proper objects. Virtue orders the power to the good, since virtue is what makes the one having it good and renders his act good.

But will has by reason of itself that which other powers have as a result of virtue, since its object is the good. Hence, for the will to tend to the good is like the concupiscible tending to the pleasurable and hearing to sound. Hence, the will is in no need of a habit of virtue in order to be inclined to the good proportioned to it, to which it tends because of what it is, but with respect to the good which transcends what is proportioned to the power, it needs a habit of virtue. Since it is the nature of any appetite to tend to the proper good of the desirer, a good can exceed the proportion of will in two ways.

In one way by reason of the species, in another by reason of the individual. By reason of the species, as when the will is elevated to a good that exceeds the limits of the human good, and by human I mean what a man can do with his own powers. But the divine good is above the human good, and charity raises man’s will to that, and so does hope.

By reason of the individual, as when someone seeks the good of another, although the will is not borne beyond the limits of the
feratur; et sic voluntatem perficit iustitia, et omnes virtutes in
aliud tendentes, ut liberalitas, et alia huiusmodi. Nam iustitia est
alterius bonum, ut Philosophus dicit in V ethic..

Sic ergo duae virtutes sunt in voluntate sicut in subiecto; scilicet
caritas et iustitia. Cuius signum est, quod istae virtutes quamvis
ad appetitivam pertineant, tamen non circa passiones consistunt,
sicut temperantia et fortitudo: unde patet quod non sunt in
sensibili appetitu, in quo sunt passiones, sed in appetitu rationali,
qui est voluntas, in quo passiones non sunt. Nam omnis passio
est in parte animae sensitiva, ut probatur in VII physic.. Illae
autem virtutes quae circa passiones consistunt, sicut fortitudo
circa timores et audacias, et temperantia circa concupiscentias,
ceptet eadem ratione esse in appetitu sensitivo. Nec oportet
quod ratione istarum passionum sit aliqua virtus in voluntate
quia bonum in istis passionibus est quod est secundum rationem.
Et ad hoc naturaliter se habet voluntas ex ratione ipsius
potentiae, cum sit proprium obiectum voluntatis.

Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod ad imperandum sufficit
voluntati iudicium rationis; nam voluntas appetit naturaliter
quod est bonum secundum rationem, sicut concupiscibilis quod
est delectabile secundum sensum.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod inclinatio naturalis voluntatis non
solum est in ultimum finem, sed in id bonum quod sibi a ratione
demonstratur. Nam bonum intellectum est obiectum voluntatis,
ad quod naturaliter ordinatur voluntas, sicut et quaelibet potentia
in suum obiectum, dummodo hoc sit proprium bonum, ut supra
dictum est. Tamen circa hoc aliquis peccat, in quantum iudicium
rationis intercipitur passione.

Thus, there are two virtues in will as in a subject, namely,
charity and justice. A sign of this is that these virtues, although
they pertain to appetite, are not about emotions, as temperance
and courage are, and thus, it is clear that they are not in sense
appetite in which the emotions are found, but in rational
appetite, that is, will, in which there are no emotions. For every
emotion is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in
Physics 8. But those virtues which concern the emotions, as
courage concerns fear and boldness, and temperance desire,
must for this reason be in sense appetite. Nor need there be any
virtue in the will because of such emotions, because the good of
such emotions is according to reason. To which, since it is its
proper object, the will is naturally disposed by reason of what it
is.

Ad 1. It should be said that the judgment of reason suffices for
the will to command, since will naturally seeks the good
according to reason, as the concupiscible seeks what is
pleasurable to the sense.

Ad 2. It should be said that the natural inclination of will is not
only to the ultimate end, but to the good shown to it by reason.
For the good as understood is the object of will and to it the will
is naturally ordered, as any power is ordered to its own object,
so long as it is its proper good, as was said earlier. But one can
sin in this regard insofar as the judgment of reason is intercepted
by emotion.
Ad tertium dicendum, quod cognitio fit per aliquam speciem; nec ad cognoscendum potestas intellectus sufficit per seipsam, nisi species a sensibilibus accipiat. Et ideo oportet in his etiam quae naturaliter cognoscimus, esse quendam habitum, qui etiam quodammodo principium a sensibus sumit, ut dicitur in fine poster.. Sed voluntas ad volendum non indiget aliqua specie; unde non est simile.

Ad quartum dicendum, quod circa passiones virtutes sunt in appetitu inferiori; nec ad huiusmodi requiritur alia virtus in appetitu superiori, ratione iam dicta.

Ad quintum dicendum, quod amicitia proprie non est virtus, sed consequens virtutem. Nam ex hoc ipso quod aliquis est virtuosus, sequitur quod diligat sibi similis. Secus autem est de caritate, quae est quaedam amicitia ad Deum, elevans hominem in id quod metam naturae excedit; unde caritas in voluntate est, ut diximus.

Et per hoc patet responsio ad sextum et septimum; nam virtus coniungens voluntatem Deo est caritas.

Ad octavum dicendum, quod ad felicitatem quaedam praexiguntur sicut dispositiones, sicuti actus virtutum Moraliun, per quos removuntur impedimenta felicitatis; scilicet inquietudo mentis a passionibus, et ab exterioribus perturbationibus. Aliquis autem actus est virtutis qui est essentialiter ipsa felicitas quando est completus; scilicet actus rationis vel intellectus. Nam felicitas contemplativa nihil aliud est quam perfecta contemplatio summae veritatis; felicitas autem activa est actus prudentiae, quo homo et se et alios gubernat. Aliquid autem est in felicitate sicut perfectivum felicitatis; scilicet delectatio, quae perficit felicitatem, sicut decor

Ad 3. It should be said that knowledge comes about through some likeness (species), nor does the power of intellect suffice of itself for knowing unless it receives an intelligible species. That is why in things that we know naturally there must be some habit which also takes its rise from the senses, as is said at the end of the Posterior Analytics. But will does not need any species in order to will, so the case is not similar.

Ad 4. It should be said that the virtues which concern emotions are in the lower appetite, nor is any virtue of the higher appetite required for them, for the reason already given.

Ad 5. It should be said that friendship is not a virtue properly speaking, but something following on virtue. For because one is virtuous it follows that he will love those like himself. It is otherwise with charity, which is a friendship with God that lifts man up to that which exceeds the limits of his nature. Hence, charity is in the will, as we said.

Ad 6 & 7. From this the reply to six and seven are obvious, for the virtue joining the will to God is charity.

Ad 8. It should be said that certain dispositions are prerequisites to happiness, such as the acts of the moral virtues by which impediments to happiness are removed, such as disturbance of the mind by passions and external distractions. But there is an act of virtue which when it is complete is essentially happiness, namely, the act of reason or intellect. For contemplative happiness is nothing else than the perfect contemplation of the highest truth; but active happiness is the act of prudence by which a man governs himself and others. But there is something perfective of happiness, namely, pleasure which completes happiness as comeliness does youth, as is said in Ethics 10. This
iuventutem, ut dicitur in X ethic.: et hoc pertinet ad voluntatem; et in ordine ad hoc perficit voluntatem caritas, si loquamur de felicitate caelesti, quae sanctis repromittitur. Si autem loquamur de felicitate contemplativa, de qua Philosophi tractaverunt, ad huiusmodi delectionem voluntas naturali desiderio ordinatur. Et sic patet quod non oportet omnes virtutes esse in voluntate.

Ad nonum dicendum, quod voluntate recte vivitur et peccatur sicut imperante omnes actus virtutum et vitiorum; non autem sicut eliciente; unde non oportet quod voluntas sit proximum subiectum cuiuslibet virtutis.

Ad decimum dicendum, quod peccatum omne est in voluntate sicut in causa, in quantum omne peccatum fit ex consensu voluntatis; non tamen oportet quod omne peccatum sit in voluntate sicut in subiecto; sed sicut gula et luxuria sunt in concupiscibili, ita et superbia in irascibili.

Ad undecimum dicendum, quod ex propinquitate voluntatis ad rationem contingit quod voluntas secundum ipsam rationem potentiae consonet rationi; et ideo non indiget ad hoc habitu virtutis super inducto, sicut inferiores potentiae, scilicet irascibilis et concupiscibilis.

Ad primum vero eorum quae in contrarium obiiciuntur, dicendum, quod caritas et spes, quae sunt in voluntate, non continentur sub ista Philosophi divisione; sunt enim aliud genus virtutum, et dicuntur virtutes theologicae. Iustitia vero inter morales continetur; voluntas enim sicut et alii appetitus, ratione participat, in quantum dirigitur a ratione. Licet enim voluntas ad pertains to will, and if we are speaking of celestial happiness which is promised to the saints, the will is ordered to it by charity, but if we are speaking of contemplative happiness, the will is ordered to it by a natural desire. Thus, it is clear that not all virtues need be in the will.

Ad 9. It should be said that one lives rightly or sinfully by will which commands all the acts of virtues and vices, although not as eliciting, so it is not necessary that the will be the proximate subject of every virtue.

Ad 10. It should be said that every sin is in the will as in its cause insofar as every sin comes about by consent of the will, but it is not necessary that every sin be in the will as in its subject: Gluttony and dissipation are in the concupiscible, and pride is in the irascible.

Ad 11. It should be said that from will’s closeness to reason it happens that will is in harmony with reason just because of what it is, and therefore, there is no need of any habit of virtue besides, as there is with the lower powers, namely, the irascible and concupiscible.

Replies To Arguments On The Contrary

Ad s.c. 1. It should be said that charity and hope which are in the will are not included in this division of philosophy, for they are another kind of virtue called theological. justice is included among the moral virtues, for the will like other appetites participates in reason in the sense that it is directed by reason. For although will belongs by nature to the same intellectual part as reason, it is not the same power as reason.
eamdem naturam intellectivae partis pertineat, non tamen ad
ipsam potentiam rationis.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod respectu illorum ad quae habetur
virtus in irascibili et concupiscibili, non oportet esse virtutem in
voluntate, ratione prius dicta.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod respectu illorum ad quae habetur
virtus in irascibili et concupiscibili, non oportet esse virtutem in
voluntate, ratione prius dicta.

Ad s.c. 2. It should be said that with respect to the things to
which a virtue of the irascible or concupiscible relates, there
need be no virtue in will, for the reason already given.

**ST I-II, Q. 26, A. 2- Whether love is a passion?**

Iª -IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur
quod amor non sit passio. Nulla enim virtus passio est. Sed
omnis amor est virtus quaedam, ut dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de
Div. Nom. Ergo amor non est passio.

Objection 1. It would seem that love is not a passion. For no
power is a passion. But every love is a power, as Dionysius
says (Div. Nom. iv). Therefore love is not a passion.

Iª -IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, amor est unio quaedam vel
nexus, secundum Augustinum, in libro de Trin. Sed unio vel
nexus non est passio, sed magis relatio. Ergo amor non est
passio.

Objection 2. Further, love is a kind of union or bond, as
Augustine says (De Trin. viii, 10). But a union or bond is not a
passion, but rather a relation. Therefore love is not a passion.

Iª -IIae q. 26 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, Damascenus dicit, in II libro,
quod passio est motus quidam. Amor autem non importat motum
appetitus, qui est desiderium; sed principium huiusmodi motus.
Ergo amor non est passio.

Objection 3. Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22)
that passion is a movement. But love does not imply the
movement of the appetite; for this is desire, of which
movement love is the principle. Therefore love is not a passion.

Iª -IIae q. 26 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod philosophus dicit, in
VIII Ethic., quod amor est passio.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 5) that "love
is a passion."

Iª -IIae q. 26 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod passio est
effectus agentis in patiente. Agens autem naturale duplicem
effectum induet in patiens, nam primo quidem dat formam,
secundo autem dat motum consequentem formam; sicut generans
dat corpori gravitatem, et motum consequentem ipsam. Et ipsa
gravitas, quae est principium motus ad locum connaturalem

I answer that, Passion is the effect of the agent on the patient.
Now a natural agent produces a twofold effect on the patient:
for in the first place it gives it the form; and secondly it gives it
the movement that results from the form. Thus the generator
gives the generated body both weight and the movement
resulting from weight: so that weight, from being the principle
præter gravitatem, potest quodammodo dici amor naturalis. Sic etiam ipsum appetibile dat appetitu, primo quidem, quandam coaptationem ad ipsum, quae est complacentia appetibilis; ex qua sequitur motus ad appetibile. Nam appetitivus motus circulo agitur, ut dicitur in III de anima, appetibile enim movet appetitum, faciens se quodammodo in eius intentione; et appetitus tendit in appetibile realiter consequendum, ut sit ibi finis motus, ubi fuit principium.

Prima ergo immutatio appetitus ab appetibili vocatur amor, qui nihil est aliud quam complacentia appetibilis; et ex hac complacentia sequitur motus in appetibile, qui est desiderium; et ultimo quies, quae est gaudium. Sic ergo, cum amor consistat in quadam immutatione appetitus ab appetibili, manifestum est quod amor et passio, proprie quidem, secundum quod est in concupiscibili; communiter autem, et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in voluntate.

Iª -IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, quia virtus significat principium motus vel actionis, ideo amor, inquantum est principium appetitivi motus, a Dionysio vocatur virtus.

Iª -IIae q. 26 a. 2 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod unio pertinet ad amorem, inquantum per complacentiam appetitus amans se habet ad id quod amat, sicut ad seipsum, vel ad aliquid sui. Et sic patet quod amor non est ipsa relatio unionis, sed unio est consequens amorem. Unde et Dionysius dicit quod amor est of movement to the place, which is connatural to that body by reason of its weight, can, in a way, be called "natural love." In the same way the appetible object gives the appetite, first, a certain adaptation to itself, which consists in complacency in that object; and from this follows movement towards the appetible object. For "the appetitive movement is circular," as stated in De Anima iii, 10; because the appetible object moves the appetite, introducing itself, as it were, into its intention; while the appetite moves towards the realization of the appetible object, so that the movement ends where it began.

Accordingly, the first change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object is called "love," and is nothing else than complacency in that object; and from this complacency results a movement towards that same object, and this movement is "desire"; and lastly, there is rest which is "joy." Since, therefore, love consists in a change wrought in the appetite by the appetible object, it is evident that love is a passion: properly so called, according as it is in the concupiscible faculty; in a wider and extended sense, according as it is in the will.

Reply to Objection 1. Since power denotes a principle of movement or action, Dionysius calls love a power, in so far as it is a principle of movement in the appetite.

Reply to Objection 2. Union belongs to love in so far as by reason of the complacency of the appetite, the lover stands in relation to that which he loves, as though it were himself or part of himself. Hence it is clear that love is not the very relation of union, but that union is a result of love. Hence, too, Dionysius says that "love is a unitive force" (Div. Nom. iv),
and the Philosopher says (Polit. ii, 1) that union is the work of love.

Reply to Objection 3. Although love does not denote the movement of the appetite in tending towards the appetible object, yet it denotes that movement whereby the appetite is changed by the appetible object, so as to have complacency therein.

**ST I-II, Q. 26, A. 3- Whether love is the same as dilection?**

**Objection 1.** It would seem that love is the same as dilection. For Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that love is to dilection, "as four is to twice two, and as a rectilinear figure is to one composed of straight lines." But these have the same meaning. Therefore love and dilection denote the same thing.

**Objection 2.** Further, the movements of the appetite differ by reason of their objects. But the objects of dilection and love are the same. Therefore these are the same.

**Objection 3.** Further, if dilection and love differ, it seems that it is chiefly in the fact that "dilection refers to good things, love to evil things, as some have maintained," according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7). But they do not differ thus; because as Augustine says (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) the holy Scripture uses both words in reference to either good or bad things. Therefore love and dilection do not differ: thus indeed Augustine concludes (De Civ. Dei xiv, 7) that "it is not one thing to speak of love, and another to speak of dilection."
I -IIae q. 26 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod quibusdam sanctorum visum est divinius esse nomen amoris quam nomen dilectionis.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "some holy men have held that love means something more Godlike than dilection does."

I -IIae q. 26 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod quatuor nomina inveniuntur ad idem quodammodo pertinentia, scilicet amor, dilectio, caritas et amicitia. Differunt tamen in hoc, quod amicitia, secundum philosophum in VIII Ethic., est quasi habitus; amor autem et dilectio significantur per modum actus vel passionis; caritas autem utroque modo accipi potest.

I answer that, We find four words referring in a way, to the same thing: viz. love, dilection, charity and friendship. They differ, however, in this, that "friendship," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5), "is like a habit," whereas "love" and "dilection" are expressed by way of act or passion; and "charity" can be taken either way.

Differenter tamen significatur actus per ista tria. Nam amor communius est inter ea, omnis enim dilectio vel caritas est amor, sed non e converso. Addit enim dilectio supra amorem, electionem praecedentem, ut ipsum nomen sonat. Unde dilectio non est in concupiscibili, sed in voluntate tantum, et est in sola rationali natura. Caritas autem addit supra amorem, perfectionem quandam amoris, inquantum id quod amatur magni pretii aestimatur, ut ipsum nomen designat.

Moreover these three express act in different ways. For love has a wider signification than the others, since every dilection or charity is love, but not vice versa. Because dilection implies, in addition to love, a choice [electionem] made beforehand, as the very word denotes: and therefore dilection is not in the concupiscible power, but only in the will, and only in the rational nature. Charity denotes, in addition to love, a certain perfection of love, in so far as that which is loved is held to be of great price, as the word itself implies [Referring to the Latin "carus" (dear)].

I -IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod Dionysius loquitur de amore et dilectione, secundum quod sunt in appetitu intellectivo, sic enim amor idem est quod dilectio.

Reply to Objection 1. Dionysius is speaking of love and dilection, in so far as they are in the intellectual appetite; for thus love is the same as dilection.

I -IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod objectum amoris est communius quam objectum dilectionis, quia ad plura se extendit amor quam dilectio, sicut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 2. The object of love is more general than the object of dilection: because love extends to more than dilection does, as stated above.

I -IIae q. 26 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod non differunt amor et dilectio secundum differentiam boni et mali, sed sicut dictum est. In parte tamen intellectiva idem est amor et dilectio.

Reply to Objection 3. Love and dilection differ, not in respect of good and evil, but as stated. Yet in the intellectual faculty love is the same as dilection. And it is in this sense that
Augustine speaks of love in the passage quoted: hence a little further on he adds that "a right will is well-directed love, and a wrong will is ill-directed love." However, the fact that love, which is concupiscible passion, inclines many to evil, is the reason why some assigned the difference spoken of.

Reply to Objection 4. The reason why some held that, even when applied to the will itself, the word "love" signifies something more Godlike than "dilection," was because love denotes a passion, especially in so far as it is in the sensitive appetite; whereas dilection presupposes the judgment of reason. But it is possible for man to tend to God by love, being as it were passively drawn by Him, more than he can possibly be drawn thereto by his reason, which pertains to the nature of dilection, as stated above. And consequently love is more Godlike than dilection.

Objection 1. It would seem that love is not properly divided into love of friendship and love of concupiscence. For "love is a passion, while friendship is a habit," according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). But habit cannot be the member of a division of passions. Therefore love is not properly divided into love of concupiscence and love of friendship.

Objection 2. Further, a thing cannot be divided by another member of the same division; for man is not a member of the same division as "animal." But concupiscence is a member of the same division as love, as a passion distinct from love. Therefore concupiscence is not a division of love.
Iª -IIae q. 26 a. 4 arg. 3 Praeterea, secundum philosophum, in VIII Ethic., triplex est amicitia, utilis, delectabilis et honesta. Sed amicitia utilis et delectabilis habet concupiscientiam. Ergo concupiscientia non debet dividi contra amicitiam.

Objection 3. Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) friendship is threefold, that which is founded on "usefulness," that which is founded on "pleasure," and that which is founded on "goodness." But useful and pleasant friendship are not without concupiscence. Therefore concupiscence should not be contrasted with friendship.

Iª -IIae q. 26 a. 4 s. c. Sed contra, quaedam dicimur amare quia ea concupiscimus, sicut dicitur aliquis amare vinum propter dulce quod in eo concupiscit, ut dicitur in II Topic. Sed ad vinum, et ad huiusmodi, non habemus amicitiam, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Ergo alius est amor concupiscientiae, et alius est amor amicitiae.

On the contrary, We are said to love certain things, because we desire them: thus "a man is said to love wine, on account of its sweetness which he desires"; as stated in Topic. ii, 3. But we have no friendship for wine and suchlike things, as stated in Ethic. viii, 2. Therefore love of concupiscence is distinct from love of friendship.

Iª -IIae q. 26 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut philosophus dicit in II Rhetoric., amare est velle alicui bonum. Sic ergo motus amoris in duo tendit, scilicet in bonum quod quis vult aliqui, vel sibi vel aliis; et in illud cui vult bonum. Ad illud ergo bonum quod quis vult alteri, habetur amor concupiscientiae, ad illud autem cui aliquis vult bonum, habetur amor amicitiae.

I answer that, As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4), "to love is to wish good to someone." Hence the movement of love has a twofold tendency: towards the good which a man wishes to someone (to himself or to another) and towards that to which he wishes some good. Accordingly, man has love of concupiscence towards the good that he wishes to another, and love of friendship towards him to whom he wishes good.

Haec autem divisio est secundum prius et posterius. Nam id quod amatour amore amicitiae, simpliciter et per se amatour, quod autem amatour amore concupiscientiae, non simpliciter et secundum se amatour, sed amatour alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter est quod habet esse, ens autem secundum quid quod est in alio; ita bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, simpliciter quidem est quod ipsum habet bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonum secundum quid. Et per consequens amor quo amatour aliquid ut ei sit bonum, est amor simpliciter, amor autem quo amatour aliquid ut sit bonum alterius, est amor secundum quid.

Now the members of this division are related as primary and secondary: since that which is loved with the love of friendship is loved simply and for itself; whereas that which is loved with the love of concupiscence, is loved, not simply and for itself, but for something else. For just as that which has existence, is a being simply, while that which exists in another is a relative being; so, because good is convertible with being, the good, which itself has goodness, is good simply; but that which is another's good, is a relative good. Consequently the love with which a thing is loved, that it may have some good, is love
simply; while the love, with which a thing is loved, that it may be another's good, is relative love.

Reply to Objection 1. Love is not divided into friendship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence. For a friend is, properly speaking, one to whom we wish good: while we are said to desire, what we wish for ourselves.

Hence the Reply to the Second Objection.

Reply to Objection 3. When friendship is based on usefulness or pleasure, a man does indeed wish his friend some good: and in this respect the character of friendship is preserved. But since he refers this good further to his own pleasure or use, the result is that friendship of the useful or pleasant, in so far as it is connected with love of concupiscence, loses the character to true friendship.

Objection 1. It would seem that likeness is not a cause of love. For the same thing is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the cause of hatred; for it is written (Proverbs 13:10) that "among the proud there are always contentions"; and the Philosopher says (Ethic. viii, 1) that "potters quarrel with one another." Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.

Objection 2. Further, Augustine says (Confess. iv, 14) that "a man loves in another that which he would not be himself: thus he loves an actor, but would not himself be an actor." But it would not be so, if likeness were the proper cause of love; for in that case a man would love in another, that which he
Iª -IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, quilibet homo amat id quo indiget, etiam si illud non habeat, sicut infirmus amat sanitatem, et pauper amat divitiias. Sed inquantum indiget et caret eis, habet dissimilitudinem ad ipsa. Ergo non solum similitudo, sed etiam dissimilitudo est causa amoris.

Objection 3. Further, everyone loves that which he needs, even if he have it not: thus a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves riches. But in so far as he needs them and lacks them, he is unlike them. Therefore not only likeness but also unlikeness is a cause of love.

Iª -IIae q. 27 a. 3 arg. 4 Praeterea, philosophus dicit, in II Rhetoric., quod beneficos in pecunias et salutem amamus, et similiter eos qui circa mortuos servant amicitiam, omnes diligunt. Non autem omnes sunt tales. Ergo similitudo non est causa amoris.

Objection 4. Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 4) that "we love those who bestow money and health on us; and also those who retain their friendship for the dead." But all are not such. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.

Iª -IIae q. 27 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur Eccli. XIII, omne animal diligit simul sibi.

On the contrary, It is written (Sirach 13:19): "Every beast loveth its like."

I answer that, Likeness, properly speaking, is a cause of love. But it must be observed that likeness between things is twofold. One kind of likeness arises from each thing having the same quality actually: for example, two things possessing the quality of whiteness are said to be alike. Another kind of likeness arises from one thing having potentially and by way of inclination, a quality which the other has actually: thus we may say that a heavy body existing outside its proper place is like another heavy body that exists in its proper place: or again, according as potentiality bears a resemblance to its act; since act is contained, in a manner, in the potentiality itself.

Primus ergo similitudinis modus causat amorem amicitiae, seu benevolentiae. Ex hoc enim quod aliqui duo sunt similes, quasi habentes unam formam, sunt quodammodo unum in forma illa, possesses himself, or would like to possess. Therefore likeness is not a cause of love.

Accordingly the first kind of likeness causes love of friendship or well-being. For the very fact that two men are alike, having, as it were, one form, makes them to be, in a manner, one in

Dictum est autem supra quod in amore concupiscientiae amans proprie amat seipsum, cum vult illud bonum quod concupiscit. Magis autem unusquisque seipsum amat quam alium, quia sibi unus est in substantia, alteri vero in similitudine alicuius formae. Et ideo si ex eo quod est sibi similis in participacione formae, impediatur ipsemet a consecutione boni quod amat; efficitur ei odiosus, non inquantum est similis, sed inquantum est proprii boni impeditivus. Et propter hoc figuli corrixauntur ad invicem, quia se invicem impediunt in proprio lucro, et inter superbos sunt iurgia, quia se invicem impediunt in propria excellentia, quam concupiscunt.

Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 1 Et per hoc patet responsio ad primum.

Iª-IIae q. 27 a. 3 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod in hoc etiam quod aliquis in altero amat quod in se non amat, inventur ratio similitudinis secundum proportionalitatem, nam sicit se habet alius ad hoc quod in eo amatur, ita ipse se habet ad hoc quod in se amat. Puta si bonus cantor bonum amet scriptorem, attenditur ibi similitudo proportionis, secundum quod uterque habet quod convenit ei secundum suam artem.

that form: thus two men are one thing in the species of humanity, and two white men are one thing in whiteness. Hence the affections of one tend to the other, as being one with him; and he wishes good to him as to himself. But the second kind of likeness causes love of concupiscence, or friendship founded on usefulness or pleasure: because whatever is in potentiality, as such, has the desire for its act; and it takes pleasure in its realization, if it be a sentient and cognitive being.

Now it has been stated above (Question 26, Article 4), that in the love of concupiscence, the lover, properly speaking, loves himself, in willing the good that he desires. But a man loves himself more than another: because he is one with himself substantially, whereas with another he is one only in the likeness of some form. Consequently, if this other's likeness to him arising from the participation of a form, hinders him from gaining the good that he loves, he becomes hateful to him, not for being like him, but for hindering him from gaining his own good. This is why "potters quarrel among themselves," because they hinder one another's gain: and why "there are contentions among the proud," because they hinder one another in attaining the position they covet.

Hence the Reply to the First Objection is evident.

Reply to Objection 2. Even when a man loves in another what he loves not in himself, there is a certain likeness of proportion: because as the latter is to that which is loved in him, so is the former to that which he loves in himself: for instance, if a good singer love a good writer, we can see a likeness of proportion, inasmuch as each one has that which is becoming to him in respect of his art.
Iª - IIæ q. 27 a. 3 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod ille qui amat hoc quo indiget, habet similitudinem ad id quod amat sicut quod est potentia ad actum, ut dictum est.

Reply to Objection 3. He that loves what he needs, bears a likeness to what he loves, as potentiality bears a likeness to its act, as stated above.

Iª - IIæ q. 27 a. 3 ad 4 Ad quartum dicendum quod secundum eandem similitudinem potentiae ad actum, ille qui non est liberalis, amat eum qui est liberalis, inquantum expectat ab eo aliquid quod desiderat. Et eadem ratio est de perseverante in amicitia ad eum qui non perseverat. Utroque enim videtur esse amicitia propter utilitatem. Vel dicendum quod, licet non omnes homines habeant huiusmodi virtutes secundum habitum completum, habent tamen ea secundum quaedam seminalia rationis, secundum quae, qui non habet virtutem, diligit virtuosum, tanquam suae naturali rationi conformem.

Reply to Objection 4. According to the same likeness of potentiality to its act, the illiberal man loves the man who is liberal, in so far as he expects from him something which he desires. The same applies to the man who is constant in his friendship as compared to one who is inconstant. For in either case friendship seems to be based on usefulness. We might also say that although not all men have these virtues in the complete habit, yet they have them according to certain seminal principles in the reason, in force of which principles the man who is not virtuous loves the virtuous man, as being in conformity with his own natural reason.

**ST I-II, Q. 28, A. 1- Whether union is an effect of love?**


Question 28. The effects of love Is union an effect of love? Is mutual indwelling an effect of love? Is ecstasy an effect of love? Is zeal an effect of love? Is love a passion that is hurtful to the lover? Is love cause of all that the lover does?

Objection 1. It would seem that union is not an effect of love. For absence is incompatible with union. But love is compatible with absence; for the Apostle says (Galatians 4:18): "Be zealous for that which is good in a good thing always" (speaking of himself, according to a gloss), "and not only when I am present with you." Therefore union is not an effect of love.

Objection 2. Further, every union is either according to essence, thus form is united to matter, accident to subject, and a part to
Pars toti vel alteri parti ad constitutionem totius, aut est per similitudinem vel generis, vel speciei, vel accidentis. Sed amor non causat unionem essentiae, alioquin nunquam haberetur amor ad ea quae sunt per essentiam divisa. Unionem autem quae est per similitudinem, amor non causat, sed magis ab ea causatur. Ut dictum est. Ergo unio non est effectus amoris.

Iª -IIae q. 28 a. 1 arg. 3 Praeterea, sensus in actu fit sensibile in actu, et intellectus in actu fit intellectum in actu. Non autem amans in actu fit amatum in actu. Ergo unio magis est effectus cognitionis quam amoris.

Iª -IIae q. 28 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicit Dionysius, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod amor quilibet est virtus unitiva.

Iª -IIae q. 28 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod duplex est unio amantis ad amatum. Una quidem secundum rem, puta cum amatum praesentialiter adest amanti. Alia vero secundum affectum. Quae quidem unio consideranda est ex apprehensione praecedente, nam motus appetitivus sequitur apprehensionem. Cum autem sit duplex amor, scilicet concupiscentiae et amicitiae, uterque procedit ex quadam apprehensione unitatis amati ad amantem. Cum enim aliquis amat aliquid quasi concupiscens illud, apprehendit illum quasi pertinens ad suum bene esse.

Similiter cum aliquis amat aliquem amore amicitiae, vult ei bonum sicut et sibi vult bonum, unde apprehendit eum ut alterum se, inquantum scilicet vult ei bonum sicut et sibi ipsi. Et inde est quod amicus dicitur esse alter ipse, et Augustinus dicit, in IV Confess., bene quidam dixit de amico suo, dimidium animae suae. Primam ergo unionem amor facit effective, quia the whole, or to another part in order to make up the whole: or according to likeness, in genus, species, or accident. But love does not cause union of essence; else love could not be between things essentially distinct. On the other hand, love does not cause union of likeness, but rather is caused by it, as stated above (Question 27, Article 3). Therefore union is not an effect of love.

Objection 3. Further, the sense in act is the sensible in act, and the intellect in act is the thing actually understood. But the lover in act is not the beloved in act. Therefore union is the effect of knowledge rather than of love.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that every love is a "unitive love."

I answer that. The union of lover and beloved is twofold. The first is real union; for instance, when the beloved is present with the lover. The second is union of affection: and this union must be considered in relation to the preceding apprehension; since movement of the appetite follows apprehension. Now love being twofold, viz. love of concupiscence and love of friendship; each of these arises from a kind of apprehension of the oneness of the thing loved with the lover. For when we love a thing, by desiring it, we apprehend it as belonging to our well-being.

In like manner when a man loves another with the love of friendship, he wills good to him, just as he wills good to himself: wherefore he apprehends him as his other self, in so far, to wit, as he wills good to him as to himself. Hence a friend is called a man's "other self" (Ethic. ix, 4), and Augustine says (Confess. iv, 6), "Well did one say to his friend: Thou half of
movet ad desiderandum et quaerendum praesentiam amati, quasi sibi convenientis et ad se pertinentis. Secundam autem unionem facit formaliter, quia ipse amor est talis unio vel nexus. Unde Augustinus dicit, in VII de Trin., quod amor est quasi vita quaedam duo aliqua copulans, vel copulare appetens, amantem scilicet et quod amatur. Quod enim dicit copulans, refertur ad unionem affectus, sine qua non est amor, quod vero dicit copulare intendens, pertinet ad unionem realem.

Reply to Objection 1. This argument is true of real union. That is necessary to pleasure as being its cause; desire implies the real absence of the beloved: but love remains whether the beloved be absent or present.

Reply to Objection 2. Union has a threefold relation to love. There is union which causes love; and this is substantial union, as regards the love with which one loves oneself; while as regards the love wherewith one loves other things, it is the union of likeness, as stated above (Question 27, Article 3). There is also a union which is essentially love itself. This union is according to a bond of affection, and is likened to substantial union, inasmuch as the lover stands to the object of his love, as to himself, if it be love of friendship; as to something belonging to himself, if it be love of concupiscence. Again there is a union, which is the effect of love. This is real union, which the lover seeks with the object of his love. Moreover this union is in keeping with the demands of love: for as the Philosopher relates (Polit. ii, 1), "Aristophanes stated that lovers would wish to be united both into one," but since "this would result in either one or both being destroyed," they seek a suitable and
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod cognitio perficitur per hoc quod cognitum unitur cognoscenti secundum suam similitudinem. Sed amor facit quod ipsa res quae amatur, amanti aliquo modo uniatur, ut dictum est. Unde amor est magis unitivus quam cognitio.

Reply to Objection 3. Knowledge is perfected by the thing known being united, through its likeness, to the knower. But the effect of love is that the thing itself which is loved, is, in a way, united to the lover, as stated above. Consequently the union caused by love is closer than that which is caused by knowledge.

ST I-II, Q. 28, A. 2- Whether mutual indwelling is an effect of love?

Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 1 Ad secundum sic proceditur. Videtur quod amor non causet mutuam inhaesionem, ut scilicet amans sit in amato, et e converso. Quod enim est in altero, continetur in eo. Sed non potest idem esse continens et contentum. Ergo per amorem non potest causari mutua inhaesio, ut amatum sit in amante et e converso.

Objection 1. It would seem that love does not cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa. For that which is in another is contained in it. But the same cannot be container and contents. Therefore love cannot cause mutual indwelling, so that the lover be in the beloved and vice versa.

Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 2 Praeterea, nihil potest penetrare in interiora alicuius integri, nisi per aliquam divisionem. Sed dividere quae sunt secundum rem coniuncta, non pertinet ad appetitum, in quo est amor, sed ad rationem. Ergo mutua inhaesio non est effectus amoris.

Objection 2. Further, nothing can penetrate within a whole, except by means of a division of the whole. But it is the function of the reason, not of the appetite where love resides, to divide things that are really united. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.

Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 2 arg. 3 Praeterea, si per amorem amans est in amato et e converso, sequetur quod hoc modo amatum uniatur amanti, sicut amans amato. Sed ipsa unio est amor, ut dictum est. Ergo sequitur quod semper amans ametur ab amato, quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo mutua inhaesio est effectus amoris.

Objection 3. Further, if love involves the lover being in the beloved and vice versa, it follows that the beloved is united to the lover, in the same way as the lover is united to the beloved. But the union itself is love, as stated above (Article 1). Therefore it follows that the lover is always loved by the object of his love; which is evidently false. Therefore mutual indwelling is not an effect of love.
I*-IIae q. 28 a. 2 s. c. Sed contra est quod dicitur I Joan. IV, qui manet in caritate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo. Caritas autem est amor Dei. Ergo, eadem ratione, quilibet amor facit amatum esse in amante, et e converso.

I*-IIae q. 28 a. 2 co. Respondeo dicendum quod iste effectus mutuae inhaesionis potest intelligi et quantum ad vim apprehensivam, et quantum ad vim appetitivam. Nam quantum ad vim apprehensivam amatum dicitur esse in amante, inquantum amatum immoratur in apprehensione amantis; secundum illud Philipp. I, eo quod habeam vos in corde. Amans vero dicitur esse in amato secundum apprehensionem inquantum amans non est contentus superficiali apprehensione amati, sed nittiur singula quae ad amatum pertinent intrinsecus disquirere, et sic ad interiora eius ingreditur. Sicut de spiritu sancto, qui est amor Dei, dicitur, I ad Cor. II, quod scrutatur etiam profunda Dei.

Sed quantum ad vim appetitivam, amatum dicitur esse in amante, prout est per quandam complacentiam in eis affectu, ut vel delectetur in eo, aut in bonis eius, apud praeentiam; vel in absentia, per desiderium tendat in ipsum amatum per amorem concupiscientiae; vel in bona quae vult amato, per amorem amicitiae; non quidem ex aliqua extrinseca causa, sicut cum aliquis desiderat aliquid propter alterum, vel cum aliquis vult bonum alteri propter aliquid aliud; sed propter complacentiam amati interius radicatam. Unde et amor dicitur intimus; et dicuntur viscera caritatis. E converso autem amans est in amato aliter quidem per amorem concupiscientiae, aliter per amorem amicitiae. Amor namque concupiscientiae non requiescit in quacumque extrinseca aut superficiali adepctione vel fruizione amati, sed quœ sit amatum perfecte habere, quasi ad intima illius

On the contrary, It is written (1 John 4:16): "He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him." Now charity is the love of God. Therefore, for the same reason, every love makes the beloved to be in the lover, and vice versa.

I answer that, This effect of mutual indwelling may be understood as referring both to the apprehensive and to the appetitive power. Because, as to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover, according to Philippians 1:7, "For that I have you in my heart": while the lover is said to be in the beloved, according to apprehension, inasmuch as the lover is not satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul. Thus it is written concerning the Holy Ghost, Who is God's Love, that He "searcheth all things, yea the deep things of God" (1 Corinthians 2:10).

As the appetitive power, the object loved is said to be in the lover, inasmuch as it is in his affections, by a kind of complacency: causing him either to take pleasure in it, or in its good, when present; or, in the absence of the object loved, by his longing, to tend towards it with the love of concupiscence, or towards the good that he wills to the beloved, with the love of friendship: not indeed from any extrinsic cause (as when we desire one thing on account of another, or wish good to another on account of something else), but because the complacency in the beloved is rooted in the lover's heart. For this reason we speak of love as being "intimate"; and "of the bowels of charity." On the other hand, the lover is in the beloved, by the love of concupiscence and by the love of friendship, but not in the same way. For the love of concupiscence is not satisfied...
Perveniens. In amore vero amicitiae, amans est in amato, inquantum reputat bona vel mala amici sicut sua, et voluntatem amici sicut suam, ut quasi ipse in suo amico videatur bona vel mala pati, et affici. Et propter hoc, proprium est amicorum eadem velle, et in eodem tristari et gaudere secundum philosophum, in IX Ethic. et in II Rhetoric. Ut sic, inquantum quae sunt amici aestimat sua, amans videatur esse in amato, quasi idem factus amato. Inquantum autem e converso vult et agit propter amicum sicut propter seipsum, quasi reputans amicum idem sibi, sic amatum est in amante.

Potest autem et tertia modo mutua inhaesio intelligi in amore amicitiae, secundum viam redamationis, inquantum mutuo se amant amici, et sibi invicem bona volunt et operantur.

Reply to Objection 1. The beloved is contained in the lover, by being impressed on his heart and thus becoming the object of his complacency. On the other hand, the lover is contained in the beloved, inasmuch as the lover penetrates, so to speak, into the beloved. For nothing hinders a thing from being both container and contents in different ways: just as a genus is contained in its species, and vice versa.

Reply to Objection 2. The apprehension of the reason precedes the movement of love. Consequently, just as the reason divides, so does the movement of love penetrate into the beloved, as was explained above.
Iª -IIae q. 28 a. 2 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de tertio modo mutuae inhaesionis, qui non invenitur in quolibet amore.

Reply to Objection 3. This argument is true of the third kind of mutual indwelling, which is not to be found in every kind of love.

**ST I-II, Q. 28, A. 3- Whether ecstasy is an effect of love?**

Iª -IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod extasis non sit effectus amoris. Extasis enim quandam alienationem importare videtur. Sed amor non semper facit alienationem, sunt enim amantes interdum sui compotes. Ergo amor non facit extasim.

Objection 1. It would seem that ecstasy is not an effect of love. For ecstasy seems to imply loss of reason. But love does not always result in loss of reason: for lovers are masters of themselves at times. Therefore love does not cause ecstasy.

Iª -IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 2 Praeterea, amans desiderat amatum sibi uniri. Magis ergo amatum trahit ad se, quam etiam pergat in amatum, extra se exiens.

Objection 2. Further, the lover desires the beloved to be united to him. Therefore he draws the beloved to himself, rather than betakes himself into the beloved, going forth out from himself as it were.

Iª -IIae q. 28 a. 3 arg. 3 Praeterea, amor unit amatum amanti, sicut dictum est. Si ergo amans extra se tendit, ut in amatum pergat, sequitur quod semper plus diligat amatum quam seipsum. Quod patet esse falsum. Non ergo extasis est effectus amoris.

Objection 3. Further, love unites the beloved to the lover, as stated above (Article 1). If, therefore, the lover goes out from himself, in order to betake himself into the beloved, it follows that the lover always loves the beloved more than himself: which is evidently false. Therefore ecstasy is not an effect of love.

Iª -IIae q. 28 a. 3 s. c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod divinus amor extasim facit, et quod ipse Deus propter amorem est extasim passus. Cum ergo quilibet amor sit quaedam similitudo participata divini amoris, ut ibidem dicitur, videtur quod quilibet amor causet extasim.

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv) that "the Divine love produces ecstasy," and that "God Himself suffered ecstasy through love." Since therefore according to the same author (Div. Nom. iv), every love is a participated likeness of the Divine Love, it seems that every love causes ecstasy.

Iª -IIae q. 28 a. 3 co. Respondeo dicendum quod extasim pati aliquid dicitur, cum extra se ponitur. Quod quidem contingit et secundum vim apprehensivam, et secundum vim appetitivam.

I answer that, To suffer ecstasy means to be placed outside oneself. This happens as to the apprehensive power and as to the appetitive power. As to the apprehensive power, a man is
Secundum quidem vim apprehensivam aliquis dicitur extra se poni, quando ponitur extra cognitionem sibi propriam, vel quia ad superiorem sublimatur, sicut homo, dum elevatur ad comprehendenda aliqua quae sunt supra sensum et rationem, dicitur extasim pati, inquantum ponitur extra connaturalem apprehensionem rationis et sensus; vel quia ad inferiorem deprimitur; puta, cum aliquis in furiam vel amentiam cadit, dicitur extasim passus. Secundum appetitivam vero partem dicitur aliquis extasim pati, quando appetitus alicuius in alterum fertur, exiens quodammodo extra se ipsum.

Primam quidem extasim facit amor disposite, inquantum scilicet facit meditari de amato, ut dictum est, intensa autem meditatio unius abstrahit ab aliis. Sed secundam extasim factit amor directe, simpliciter quidem amor amicitiae; amor autem concupiscientiae non simpliciter, sed secundum quid. Nam in amore concupiscientiae, quodammodo fertur amans extra se ipsum, inquantum scilicet, non contentus gaudere de bono quod habet, quaerit frui aliquo extra se. Sed quia illud extrinsecum bonum quaerit sibi habere, non exit simpliciter extra se, sed talis affectio in fine infra ipsum concluditur. Sed in amore amicitiae, affectus alicuius simpliciter exit extra se, quia vult amico bonum, et operatur, quasi gerens curam et providentiam ipsius, propter ipsum amicum.

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The first of these ecstasies is caused by love dispositively in so far, namely, as love makes the lover dwell on the beloved, as stated above (Article 2), and to dwell intently on one thing draws the mind from other things. The second ecstasy is caused by love directly; by love of friendship, simply; by love of concupiscence not simply but in a restricted sense. Because in love of concupiscence, the lover is carried out of himself, in a certain sense; in so far, namely, as not being satisfied with enjoying the good that he has, he seeks to enjoy something outside himself. But since he seeks to have this extrinsic good for himself, he does not go out from himself simply, and this movement remains finally within him. On the other hand, in the love of friendship, a man's affection goes out from itself simply; because he wishes and does good to his friend, by caring and providing for him, for his sake.

Pª-Ilæq. 28 a. 3 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod illa ratio procedit de prima extasi.
Reply to Objection 2. This argument applies to love of concupiscence, which, as stated above, does not cause ecstasy simply.

ST I-II, Q. 28, A. 4- Whether zeal is an effect of love?

Objection 1. It would seem that zeal is not an effect of love. For zeal is a beginning of contention; wherefore it is written (1 Corinthians 3:3): "Whereas there is among you zeal ['envying'] and contention," etc. But contention is incompatible with love. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.

Objection 2. Further, the object of love is the good, which communicates itself to others. But zeal is opposed to communication; since it seems an effect of zeal, that a man refuses to share the object of his love with another: thus husbands are said to be jealous of [zelare] their wives, because they will not share them with others. Therefore zeal is not an effect of love.

Objection 3. Further, there is no zeal without hatred, as neither is there without love: for it is written (Psalm 72:3): "I had a zeal on occasion of the wicked." Therefore it should not be set down as an effect of love any more than of hatred.
Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 c. Sed contra est quod Dionysius dicit, IV cap. de Div. Nom., quod Deus appellatur Zelotes propter multum amorem quem habet ad existentia.

Iª-IIae q. 28 a. 4 co. Respondeo dicendum quod zelus, quocumque modo sumatur, ex intensione amoris provenit. Manifestum est enim quod quanto aliqua virtus intensius tendit in aliquid, fortius etiam repellit omne contrarium vel repugnans. Cum igitur amor sit quidam motus in amatum, ut Augustinus dicit in libro octoginta trium quaest., intensus amor quaerit exclusere omne quod sibi repugnat.

Aliter tamen hoc contingit in amore concupiscentiae, et aliter in amore amicitiae. Nam in amore concupiscentiae, qui intense aliquid concupiscit, movetur contra omne illud quod repugnat consecutioni vel fruitioni quietae eius quod amat. Et hoc modo viri dicuntur zelare uxoribus, ne per consortium aliorem impediatus singularitas quam in uxor in quaerunt. Similiter etiam qui quaerunt excellendam, movetur contra eos qui excellerent videntur, quasi impedientes excellendam eorum. Et iste est zelus invidiae, de quo dicitur in Psalm 36:1, noli aemulari in malignantibus, neque zelaveris facientes iniquitatem.

Amor autem amicitiae quaerit bonum amici, unde quando est intensus, facit hominem moveri contra omne illud quod repugnat bono amici. Et secundum hoc, aliquis dicitur zelare pro amico, quando, si qua dicuntur vel fiunt contra bonum amici, homo repellere studet. Et per hunc etiam modum aliquis dicitur zelare pro Deo, quando ea quae sunt contra honorem vel voluntatem Dei, repellere secundum posse conatur; secundum illud III Reg. XIX, zelo zelatus sum pro domino exercitum. Et Ioan. II, super illud, zelus domus tuae comedit me, dicit Glossa quod bono zelo

On the contrary, Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv): "God is said to be a zealot, on account of his great love for all things."

I answer that, Zeal, whatever way we take it, arises from the intensity of love. For it is evident that the more intensely a power tends to anything, the more vigorously it withstands opposition or resistance. Since therefore love is "a movement towards the object loved," as Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 35), an intense love seeks to remove everything that opposes it.

But this happens in different ways according to love of concupiscence, and love of friendship. For in love of concupiscence he who desires something intensely, is moved against all that hinders his gaining or quietly enjoying the object of his love. It is thus that husbands are said to be jealous of their wives, lest association with others prove a hindrance to their exclusive individual rights. In like manner those who seek to excel, are moved against those who seem to excel, as though these were a hindrance to their excelling. And this is the zeal of envy, of which it is written (Psalm 36:1): "Be not emulous of evil doers, nor envy [zelaveris] them that work iniquity."

On the other hand, love of friendship seeks the friend's good: wherefore, when it is intense, it causes a man to be moved against everything that opposes the friend's good. In this respect, a man is said to be zealous on behalf of his friend, when he makes a point of repelling whatever may be said or done against the friend's good. In this way, too, a man is said to be zealous on God's behalf, when he endeavors, to the best of his means, to repel whatever is contrary to the honor or will of God; according to 1 Kings 19:14: "With zeal I have been
comeditur, qui quaelibet prava quae viderit, corrigere satagit; si nequit, tolerat et gemit.

Iª -IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod apostolus ibi loquitur de zelo invidiae; qui quidem est causa contentionis, non contra rem amamatam, sed pro re amata contra impedimenta ipsius.

Reply to Objection 1. The Apostle is speaking in this passage of the zeal of envy; which is indeed the cause of contention, not against the object of love, but for it, and against that which is opposed to it.

Iª -IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod bonum amatur inquantum est communicabile amanti. Unde omne illud quod perfectionem huius communicacionis impedit, efficitur odiosum. Et sic ex amore boni zelus causatur. Ex defectu autem bonitatis contingit quod quaedam parva bona non possunt integre simul possideri a multis. Et ex amore talium causatur zelus invidiae. Non autem proprie ex his quae integre possunt a multis possideri, nullus enim invidet alteri de cognitione veritatis, quae a multis integre cognosci potest; sed forte de excellentia circa cognitionem huius.

Reply to Objection 2. Good is loved inasmuch as it can be communicated to the lover. Consequently whatever hinders the perfection of this communication, becomes hateful. Thus zeal arises from love of good. But through defect of goodness, it happens that certain small goods cannot, in their entirety, be possessed by many at the same time: and from the love of such things arises the zeal of envy. But it does not arise, properly speaking, in the case of those things which, in their entirety, can be possessed by many: for no one envies another the knowledge of truth, which can be known entirely by many; except perhaps one may envy another his superiority in the knowledge of it.

Iª -IIae q. 28 a. 4 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod hoc ipsum quod aliquis odio habet ea quae repugnant amato, ex amore procedit. Unde zelus proprie ponitur effectus amoris magis quam odii.

Reply to Objection 3. The very fact that a man hates whatever is opposed to the object of his love, is the effect of love. Hence zeal is set down as an effect of love rather than of hatred.

ST I-II, Q. 38, A. 3- Whether pain or sorrow are assuaged by the sympathy of friends?

Iª -IIae q. 38 a. 3 arg. 1 Ad tertium sic proceditur. Videtur quod dolor amici compatientis non mitiget tristitiam. Contrariorem enim contrarii sunt effectus. Sed sicut Augustinus dicit, VIII

Objection 1. It would seem that the sorrow of sympathizing friends does not assuage our own sorrow. For contraries have contrary effects. Now as Augustine says (Confess. viii, 4),
Confess., quando cum multis gaudetur, in singulis uberius est gaudium, quia fervere faciunt se, et inflammantur ex alterutro. Ergo, pari ratione, quando multi simul tristantur, videtur quod sit maius tristitia.

"when many rejoice together, each one has more exuberant joy, for they are kindled and inflamed one by the other." Therefore, in like manner, when many are sorrowful, it seems that their sorrow is greater.

Objection 2. Further, friendship demands mutual love, as Augustine declares (Confess. iv, 9). But a sympathizing friend is pained at the sorrow of his friend with whom he sympathizes. Consequently the pain of a sympathizing friend becomes, to the friend in sorrow, a further cause of sorrow: so that, his pain being doubled his sorrow seems to increase.

Objection 3. Further, sorrow arises from every evil affecting a friend, as though it affected oneself: since "a friend is one's other self" (Ethic. ix, 4,9). But sorrow is an evil. Therefore the sorrow of the sympathizing friend increases the sorrow of the friend with whom he sympathizes.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic. ix, 11) that those who are in pain are consoled when their friends sympathize with them.

I answer that, When one is in pain, it is natural that the sympathy of a friend should afford consolation: whereof the Philosopher indicates a twofold reason (Ethic. ix, 11). The first is because, since sorrow has a depressing effect, it is like a weight whereof we strive to unburden ourselves: so that when a man sees others saddened by his own sorrow, it seems as though others were bearing the burden with him, striving, as it were, to lessen its weight; wherefore the load of sorrow becomes lighter for him: something like what occurs in the carrying of bodily burdens. The second and better reason is because when a man's friends console with him, he sees that he
supra dictum est. Unde, cum omnis delectatio mitiget tristitiam, sicut supra dictum est, sequitur quod amicus condolens tristitiam mitiget.

**P-1IIae q. 38 a. 3 ad 1** Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in utroque amicitia manifestatur, scilicet et quod congaudet gaudenti, et quod condeo dolenti. Et ideo utrumque ratione causae redditur delectabile.

**P-1IIae q. 38 a. 3 ad 2** Ad secundum dicendum quod ipse dolor amici secundum se contristaret. Sed consideratio causae eius, quae est amor, magis delectat.

**P-1IIae q. 38 a. 3 ad 3** Et per hoc patet responsio ad tertium.

**ST I-II, Q. 38, A. 4- Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by the contemplation of truth?**

**P-1IIae q. 38 a. 4 arg. 1** Ad quartum sic proceditur. Videtur quod contemplatio veritatis non mitiget dolorem. Dicitur enim Eccle. I, qui addit scientiam, addit et dolor. Sed scientia ad contemplationem veritatis pertinent. Non ergo contemplatio veritatis mitigat dolorem.

Objection 1. It would seem that the contemplation of truth does not assuage sorrow. For it is written (Ecclesiastes 1:18): "He that addeth knowledge addeth also sorrow" [Vulgate: 'labor']. But knowledge pertains to the contemplation of truth. Therefore the contemplation of truth does not assuage sorrow.

**P-1IIae q. 38 a. 4 arg. 2** Praeterea, contemplatio veritatis ad intellectum speculativum pertinent. Sed intellectus speculativus non movet, ut dicitur in III de anima. Cum igitur gaudium et dolor sint quidam motus animi, videtur quod contemplatio veritatis nihil faciat ad mitigationem doloris.

Objection 2. Further, the contemplation of truth belongs to the speculative intellect. But "the speculative intellect is not a principle of movement"; as stated in De Anima iii, 11. Therefore, since joy and sorrow are movements of the soul, it seems that the contemplation of truth does not help to assuage sorrow.

**P-1IIae q. 38 a. 4 arg. 3** Praeterea, remedium aegritudinis apponendum est ubi est aegritudo. Sed contemplatio veritatis est

Objection 3. Further, the remedy for an ailment should be applied to the part which ails. But contemplation of truth is in
in intellectu. Non ergo mitigat dolorem corporalem, qui est in sensu.

P-IIae q. 38 a. 4 s. c Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I Soliloq., videbatur mihi, si se ille mentibus nostris veritatis fulgor aperiret, aut non me sensurum fuisse illum dolorem, aut certe pro nihilol toleraturum.

P-IIae q. 38 a. 4 co Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, in contemplatione veritatis maxima delectatio consistit. Omnis autem delectatio dolorem mitigat, ut supra dictum est. Et ideo contemplatio veritatis mitigat tristitiam vel dolorem, et tanto magis, quanto perfectius aliquis est amator sapientiae. Et ideo homines ex contemplatione divina et futurae beatitudinis, in tribulationibus gaudent; secundum illud Iacobi I, omne gaudium existimate, fratres mei, cum in tentationes varias incideritis. Et quod est amplius, etiam inter corporis cruciatus huiusmodi gaudium invenitur, sicut Tiburtius martyr, cum nudatis plantis super ardentes prunas incederet, dixit, videtur mihi quod super roseos flores incedam, in nomine Iesu Christi.

P-IIae q. 38 a. 4 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod qui addit scientiam, addit dolorem, vel propter difficultatem et defectum inveniendae veritatis, vel propter hoc, quod per scientiam homo cognoscit multa quae voluntati contrariantur. Et sic ex parte rerum cognitarum, scientia dolorem causat, ex parte autem contemplationis veritatis, delectationem.

P-IIae q. 38 a. 4 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod intellectus speculativus non movet animum ex parte rei speculatae, movet the intellect. Therefore it does not assuage bodily pain, which is in the senses.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Soliloq. i, 12): "It seemed to me that if the light of that truth were to dawn on our minds, either I should not feel that pain, or at least that pain would seem nothing to me."

I answer that, As stated above (Question 3, Article 5), the greatest of all pleasures consists in the contemplation of truth. Now every pleasure assuages pain as stated above (Article 1): hence the contemplation of truth assuages pain or sorrow, and the more so, the more perfectly one is a lover of wisdom. And therefore in the midst of tribulations men rejoice in the contemplation of Divine things and of future Happiness, according to James 1:2: "My brethren, count it all joy, when you shall fall into divers temptations": and, what is more, even in the midst of bodily tortures this joy is found; as the "martyr Tiburtius, when he was walking barefoot on the burning coals, said: Methinks, I walk on roses, in the name of Jesus Christ."

[Cf. Dominican Breviary, August 11th, commemoration of St. Tiburtius.]

Reply to Objection 1. "He that addeth knowledge, addeth sorrow," either on account of the difficulty and disappointment in the search for truth; or because knowledge makes man acquainted with many things that are contrary to his will. Accordingly, on the part of the things known, knowledge causes sorrow: but on the part of the contemplation of truth, it causes pleasure.

Reply to Objection 2. The speculative intellect does not move the mind on the part of the thing contemplated: but on the part
tamen animum ex parte ipsius speculationis, quae est quoddam bonum hominis, et naturaliter delectabilis.

Reply to Objection 3. In the powers of the soul there is an overflow from the higher to the lower powers: and accordingly, the pleasure of contemplation, which is in the higher part, overflows so as to mitigate even that pain which is in the senses.

_ ST I-II, Q. 38, A. 5- Whether pain and sorrow are assuaged by sleep and baths?_

Objection 1. It would seem that sleep and baths do not assuage sorrow. For sorrow is in the soul: whereas sleep and baths regard the body. Therefore they do not conduce to the assuaging of sorrow.

Objection 2. Further, the same effect does not seem to ensue from contrary causes. But these, being bodily things, are incompatible with the contemplation of truth which is a cause of the assuaging of sorrow, as stated above (Article 4). Therefore sorrow is not mitigated by the like.

Objection 3. Further, sorrow and pain, in so far as they affect the body, denote a certain transmutation of the heart. But such remedies as these seem to pertain to the outward senses and limbs, rather than to the interior disposition of the heart. Therefore they do not assuage sorrow.

On the contrary, Augustine says (Confess. ix, 12): "I had heard that the bath had its name [Balneum, from the Greek balaneion] . . . from the fact of its driving sadness from the mind." And further on, he says: "I slept, and woke up again, and found my grief not a little assuaged": and quotes the words from the hymn
hymno Ambrosii dicitur, quod quies artus solutos reddit laboris usui, mentesque fessas allevat, luctusque solvit anxios.

Iª -IIae q. 38 a. 5 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, tristitia secundum sua speciem repugnat vitali motioni corporis. Et ideo illa quae reformant naturam corporalem in debitum statum vitalis motionis, repugnant tristitiae, et ipsam mitigant. Per hoc etiam quod huiusmodi remediis reducitur natura ad debitum statum, causatur ex his delectatio, hoc enim est quod delectationem facit, ut supra dictum est. Unde, cum omnis delectatio tristitiam mitiget, per huiusmodi remedia corporalia tristitia mitigatur.

Iª -IIae q. 38 a. 5 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod ipsa debita corporis dispositio, inquantum sentitur, delectationem causat, et per consequens tristitiam mitigat.

Iª -IIae q. 38 a. 5 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod delectationum una aliam impedit, ut supra dictum est, et tamen omnis delectatio tristitiam mitigat. Unde non est inconveniens quod ex causis se invicem impedientibus tristitia mitigetur.

Iª -IIae q. 38 a. 5 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod omnis bona dispositio corporis redundat quodammodo ad cor, sicut ad principium et finem corporalium motionum, ut dicitur in libro de causa motus animalium.

Iª -IIae q. 23 pr. Consequenter considerandum est de caritate. Et primo, de ipsa caritate; secundo, de dono sapientiae ei of Ambrose [Cf. Sarum Breviary: First Sunday after the octave of the Epiphany, Hymn for first Vespers], in which it is said that "Sleep restores the tired limbs to labor, refreshes the weary mind, and banishes sorrow."

I answer that, As stated above (Question 37, Article 4), sorrow, by reason of its specific nature, is repugnant to the vital movement of the body; and consequently whatever restores the bodily nature to its due state of vital movement, is opposed to sorrow and assuages it. Moreover such remedies, from the very fact that they bring nature back to its normal state, are causes of pleasure; for this is precisely in what pleasure consists, as stated above (Question 31, Article 1). Therefore, since every pleasure assuages sorrow, sorrow is assuaged by such like bodily remedies.

Reply to Objection 1. The normal disposition of the body, so far as it is felt, is itself a cause of pleasure, and consequently assuages sorrow.

Reply to Objection 2. As stated above (Question 31, Article 8), one pleasure hinders another; and yet every pleasure assuages sorrow. Consequently it is not unreasonable that sorrow should be assuaged by causes which hinder one another.

Reply to Objection 3. Every good disposition of the body reacts somewhat on the heart, which is the beginning and end of bodily movements, as stated in De Causa Mot. Animal. xi.

ST II-II, Q. 23, A. 1- Whether charity is friendship?

Iª -IIae q. 23 pr. Consequenter considerandum est de caritate. Et primo, de ipsa caritate; secundo, de dono sapientiae ei.

**IIª-IIIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 1** Ad primum sic proceditur. Videtur quod caritas non sit amicitia. Nihil enim est ita proprium amicitiae sicut convivere amico; ut philosophus dicit, in VIII Ethic. Sed caritas est hominis ad Deum et ad Angelos, quorum non est cum hominibus conversatio, ut dicitur Dan. II. Ergo caritas non est amicitia.

**Objection 1.** It would seem that charity is not friendship. For nothing is so appropriate to friendship as to dwell with one's friend, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 5). Now charity is of man towards God and the angels, "whose dwelling [Douay: 'conversation'] is not with men" (Daniel 2:11). Therefore charity is not friendship.

**IIª-IIIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 2** Praeterea, amicitiae tres sunt species, secundum philosophum, in VIII Ethic., scilicet amicitia delectabilis, utilis et honesti. Sed caritas non est amicitia utilis aut delectabilis, dicit enim Hieronymus, in Epist. ad Paulinum, quae ponitur in principio Bibliae, illa est vera necessitudo, et Christi glutino copulata, quam non utilitas rei familiaris, non praesentia tantum corporum, non subdola et palpans adulatio, sed Dei timor et divinarum Scripturarum studia conciliant. Similiter etiam non est amicitia honesti, quia caritate diligimus virtue? Is it one virtue? Is it the greatest of the virtues? Is any true virtue possible without it? Is it the form of the virtues?

**IIª-IIIae q. 23 a. 1 arg. 3** Praeterea, amicitiae tres sunt species, secundum philosophum, in VIII Ethic., scilicet amicitia delectabilis, utilis et honesti. Sed caritas non est amicitia utilis aut delectabilis, dicit enim Hieronymus, in Epist. ad Paulinum, quae ponitur in principio Bibliae, illa est vera necessitudo, et Christi glutino copulata, quam non utilitas rei familiaris, non praesentia tantum corporum, non subdola et palpans adulatio, sed Dei timor et divinarum Scripturarum studia conciliant. Similiter etiam non est amicitia honesti, quia caritate diligimus virtue? Is it one virtue? Is it the greatest of the virtues? Is any true virtue possible without it? Is it the form of the virtues?

**Objection 2.** Further, there is no friendship without return of love (Ethic. viii, 2). But charity extends even to one's enemies, according to Matthew 5:44: "Love your enemies." Therefore charity is not friendship.

**Objection 3.** Further, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 3) there are three kinds of friendship, directed respectively towards the delightful, the useful, or the virtuous. Now charity is not the friendship for the useful or delightful; for Jerome says in his letter to Paulinus which is to be found at the beginning of the Bible: "True friendship cemented by Christ, is where men are drawn together, not by household interests, not by mere bodily presence, not by crafty and cajoling flattery, but by the fear of God, and the study of the Divine Scriptures." No more is
etiam peccatores; amicitia vero honesti non est nisi ad virtuosos, ut dicitur in VIII Ethic. Ergo caritas non est amicitia.

IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 s. c. Sed contra est quod Ioan. XV dicitur, iam non dicam vos servos, sed amicos meos. Sed hoc non dicebatur eis nisi ratione caritatis. Ergo caritas est amicitia.

On the contrary, It is written (John 15:15): "I will not now call you servants . . . but My friends." Now this was said to them by reason of nothing else than charity. Therefore charity is friendship.

IIª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 co. Respondeo dicendum quod, secundum philosophum, in VIII Ethic., non quilibet amor habet rationem amicitiae, sed amor qui est cum benevolentia, quando scilicet sic amamus aliquem ut ei bonum velimus. Si autem rebus amatis non bonum velimus, sed ipsum eorum bonum velimus nobis, sicut dicimur amare vinum aut equum aut aliquid huiusmodi, non est amor amicitiae, sed cuiusdam concupiscientiae, ridiculum enim est dicere quod aliquis habeat amicitiam ad vinum vel ad equum.

I answer that, According to the Philosopher (Ethic. viii, 2,3) not every love has the character of friendship, but that love which is together with benevolence, when, to wit, we love someone so as to wish good to him. If, however, we do not wish good to what we love, but wish its good for ourselves, (thus we are said to love wine, or a horse, or the like), it is love not of friendship, but of a kind of concupiscence. For it would be absurd to speak of having friendship for wine or for a horse.

Sed nec benevolentia sufficit ad rationem amicitiae, sed requiritur quedam mutua amatio, quia amicus est amico amicus. Talis autem mutua benevolentia fundatur super aliqua communicatione.

Yet neither does well-wishing suffice for friendship, for a certain mutual love is requisite, since friendship is between friend and friend: and this well-wishing is founded on some kind of communication.

Cum igitur sit aliqua communicatio hominis ad Deum secundum quod nobis suam beatitudinem communicat, super hac communicacione oportet aliquam amicitiam fundari. De qua quidem communicacione dicitur I ad Cor. I, fidelis Deus, per quem vocati estis in societatem filii eius. Amor autem super hac communicacione fundatus est caritas. Unde manifestum est quod caritas amicitia quedam est hominis ad Deum.

Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which it is written (1 Corinthians 1:9): "God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son." The love which is based on this communication, is charity: wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God.
Iiª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 1 Ad primum ergo dicendum quod duplex est hominis vita. Una quidem exterior secundum naturam sensibilem et corporalem, et secundum hanc vitam non est nobis communicatio vel conversatio cum Deo et Angelis. Alia autem est vita hominis spiritualis secundum mentem. Et secundum hanc vitam est nobis conversatio et cum Deo et cum Angelis. In praesenti quidem statu imperfecte, unde dicitur Philipp. III, nostra conversatio in caelis est. Sed ista conversatio perficietur in patria, quando servi eius servient Deo et videbunt faciem eius, ut dicitur Apoc. ult. Et ideo hic est caritas imperfecta, sed perficietur in patria.

Reply to Objection 1. Man's life is twofold. There is his outward life in respect of his sensitive and corporeal nature: and with regard to this life there is no communication or fellowship between us and God or the angels. The other is man's spiritual life in respect of his mind, and with regard to this life there is fellowship between us and both God and the angels, imperfectly indeed in this present state of life, wherefore it is written (Philippians 3:20): "Our conversation is in heaven." But this "conversation" will be perfected in heaven, when "His servants shall serve Him, and they shall see His face" (Apocalypse 22:3-4). Therefore charity is imperfect here, but will be perfected in heaven.

Iiª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 2 Ad secundum dicendum quod amicitia se extendit ad aliquem dupliciter. Uno modo, respectu sui ipsius, et sic amicitia nunquam est nisi ad amicum. Alio modo se extendit ad aliquem respectu alterius personae, sicut, si aliquis habet amicitiam ad aliquem hominem, ratione eius diligat omnes ad illum hominem pertinentes, sive filios sive servos sive qualitercumque ei attinentes. Et tanta potest esse dilectio amici quod propter amicum amantur hi qui ad ipsum pertinent etiam si nos offendant vel odiant. Et hoc modo amicitia caritatis se extendit etiam ad inimicos, quos diligimus propter Deum, ad quem principaliter habetur amicitia caritatis.

Reply to Objection 2. Friendship extends to a person in two ways: first in respect of himself, and in this way friendship never extends but to one's friends: secondly, it extends to someone in respect of another, as, when a man has friendship for a certain person, for his sake he loves all belonging to him, be they children, servants, or connected with him in any way. Ondeed so much do we love our friends, that for their sake we love all who belong to them, even if they hurt or hate us; so that, in this way, the friendship of charity extends even to our enemies, whom we love out of charity in relation to God, to Whom the friendship of charity is chiefly directed.

Iiª-IIae q. 23 a. 1 ad 3 Ad tertium dicendum quod amicitia honesti non habetur nisi ad virtuosum sicut ad principalem personam, sed eius intuitu diliguntur ad eum attinentes etiam si non sint virtuosi. Et hoc modo caritas, quae maxime est amicitia honesti, se extendit ad peccatores, quos ex caritate diligimus propter Deum.

Reply to Objection 3. The friendship that is based on the virtuous is directed to none but a virtuous man as the principal person, but for his sake we love those who belong to him, even though they be not virtuous: in this way charity, which above all is friendship based on the virtuous, extends to sinners, whom, out of charity, we love for God's sake.